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NEDERLANSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
Sociale ondernemingen zijn ondernemingen die sociale en maatschappelijke problemen, zoals 
armoede, sociale uitsluiting en ecologische problemen willen aanpakken en dit doen door het 
verhandelen van goederen en/of diensten. Ze onderscheiden zich van non-profit organisaties 
doordat ze hun financiële middelen verwerven via het uitoefenen van een 
ondernemingsactiviteit en niet (alleen) uit  giften en subsidies. Ze onderscheiden zich van 
reguliere, commerciële organisaties omwille van het dominante sociale doel dat ze nastreven. 
Sociaal ondernemerschap krijgt in toenemende mate aandacht van beleidsmakers en academici 
als een middel om sociale en maatschappelijke problemen op te lossen. 
In de literatuur worden sociale ondernemingen beschreven als hybride organisaties omdat ze in 
hun kernactiviteiten zowel financiële als sociale doelstellingen nastreven, wat niet altijd 
makkelijk combineerbaar is in de bedrijfsvoering. Omwille van hun hybride karakter, worden 
sociale ondernemingen blootgesteld aan specifieke interne en externe uitdagingen. Intern staan 
sociale ondernemingen voor de uitdaging om hun sociale en financiële doelstellingen in 
evenwicht te houden. In deze context wordt vaak gewezen op het risico van ‘mission drift’, wat 
inhoudt dat de oorspronkelijke doelstellingen verwateren. Zo kunnen, bijvoorbeeld, de sociale 
doelstellingen minder belangrijk worden door de toenemende druk om te voldoen aan de 
wensen van klanten en om goede financiële resultaten te kunnen voorleggen. Extern zijn sociale 
ondernemingen blootgesteld aan de vaak uiteenlopende verwachtingen van verschillende 
dominante stakeholders, wiens steun ze nodig hebben om legitimiteit te verwerven. Wat op zijn 
beurt belangrijk is voor het aantrekken van (financiële) middelen. 
Gegeven deze interne en externe uitdagingen waarmee sociale ondernemingen geconfronteerd 
worden, wordt vaak gewezen op het belang van ‘governance’ in sociale ondernemingen. 
Governance verwijst naar structuren en besluitvormingsprocessen en heeft te maken met 
besturen, controle en verantwoording. In de context van sociale ondernemingen wordt specifiek 
verwezen naar de uitdaging van verantwoording voor de het realiseren van sociale én financiële 
doelstellingen en van verantwoording naar verschillende dominante stakeholdergroepen. We 
volgen deze benadering ook in dit proefschrift. We bestuderen specifiek de rol van de Raad van 
Bestuur, als een ‘interface’ tussen de sociale onderneming en haar externe omgeving en 
onderzoeken hoe betrokkenheid van stakeholders in de Raad van Bestuur van sociale 
ondernemingen kan helpen om in te spelen op de uiteenlopende verwachtingen van stakeholders 
voor wat betreft het realiseren van de sociale en financiële doelstellingen. 
viii 
Na de algemene inleiding, worden in de volgende hoofdstukken drie empirische studies 
voorgesteld. 
De eerste studie focust op stakeholder vertegenwoordiging in de Raad van Bestuur, waarbij 
bestuurders gelinkt aan specifieke stakeholdergroepen, worden aangesteld als bestuurder. In het 
bijzonder onderzoeken we de relatie tussen stakeholder vertegenwoordiging en de mate waarin 
de Raad van Bestuur zijn service functie opneemt. De service functie omvat de mate waarin de 
Raad van Bestuur advies geeft aan het management, betrokken is bij de strategische 
besluitvorming en zijn relaties en netwerk gebruikt om de doelstellingen van de organisatie te 
helpen realiseren. 
Het realiseren van de sociale doelstellingen en het rapporteren hierover naar de (belangrijkste) 
stakeholders is cruciaal voor sociale ondernemingen. Er bestaat echter geen eenduidige manier 
om de niet-financiële resultaten van sociale ondernemingen te meten. In de tweede studie 
ontwikkelen we, in samenwerking met de sector, een instrument om de niet-financiële 
performantie intern te beoordelen en een set van indicatoren om hierover extern te rapporteren 
naar de stakeholders. 
In de derde studie bestuderen we hoe stakeholder betrokkenheid in de Raad van Bestuur 
beïnvloedt in welke mate de Raad van Bestuur zijn service rol opneemt en hoe dit vervolgens 
de sociale en financiële resultaten van de sociale onderneming beïnvloedt.  
Het laatste hoofdstuk geeft een overzicht van de voornaamste bevindingen en gaat dieper in op 
de theoretische bijdrage van dit proefschrift. Daarnaast worden ook besproken wat de resultaten 
betekenen voor sociale ondernemingen. Tot slot formuleren we suggesties voor toekomstig 
onderzoek. 
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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1. ORIGIN AND DEFINITION OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Social entrepreneurship, broadly defined as entrepreneurial, market-based approaches to 
address social issues, is increasingly recognized as an effective way to tackle a variety of 
unsolved social problems, such as poverty, social exclusion or ecological damage (Dacin et al., 
2010; Mair and Marti, 2006). Over the past decades, the number of social enterprises has 
substantially increased in many regions of the world (Kerlin, 2013; Nicholls, 2009). 
Furthermore, social entrepreneurship has drawn the attention of governments and public sector 
organizations, taking initiatives to encourage social entrepreneurial initiatives such as 
establishing specific legal frameworks (Galera and Borzaga, 2009). Alongside the public 
interest, interest by the scientific community has significantly increased, as evidenced by the 
increased attention for social entrepreneurship in the curricula at universities (Miller et al., 
2012b; Mirabella and Young, 2012), the growing number of conferences, special issues in 
journals and even newly established journals, entirely devoted to the field of social 
entrepreneurship (Bacq and Janssen, 2011; Lumpkin et al., 2013). Finally, many organizations 
with the specific aim of supporting social entrepreneurship have emerged (Nicholls, 2010). 
Although social entrepreneurship as a practice is not new, the concepts ‘social 
entrepreneurship’ and ‘social enterprise’ only emerged in the 1990’s (Bacq and Janssen, 2011; 
Defourny and Nyssens, 2010). Since then, there has been extant debate among researchers and 
practitioners on how to define the concept. It is clear that there are different understandings of 
the phenomenon (Dees, 1998). These different approaches of social entrepreneurship can be 
partly explained from the fact that social enterprises emerged in different contexts: non-profit, 
for-profit as well as in the public sector (Short et al., 2009). Other scholars point to the 
importance of the institutional context for the emergence and development of social enterprises, 
resulting in regional differences in defining social entrepreneurship (Kerlin, 2013; Sud et al., 
2009). Specifically, several scholars have studied the differences and similarities between 
European and American conceptions of social enterprises (Bacq and Janssen, 2011; Defourny 
and Nyssens, 2010; Kerlin, 2006). Indeed, according to Defourny and Nyssens (2010), the 
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conceptualization of social entrepreneurship and its development took place in parallel in 
Europe and the US, with very few connections until the years 2004-2005. Furthermore, the 
typology proposed by Dees and Anderson (2006) distinguishes between two major approaches 
of social entrepreneurship in the US. The first one, the American Social Enterprise School, 
refers to the use of commercial activities by non-profit organizations, which originates from 
cutbacks in federal funding, urging these organizations to find other ways of income generation 
to realize their social mission (Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004). The second perspective, the 
American Social Innovation School, focuses on innovative ways to tackle social problems and 
emphasizes the importance of the social entrepreneur as an activist of social change (Austin et 
al., 2006). Then, Dees and Anderson (2006) point to the convergence of the two approaches 
and the blurring boundaries between the government, nonprofit and business sectors in 
addressing social needs (Dees and Anderson, 2003). In Europe, social enterprises mainly 
emerged because of the persistence of structural unemployment and the need for more active 
policies to tackle the increasing exclusion of specific groups from the labor market (Defourny 
and Nyssens, 2010). Social enterprises are considered to belong to the ‘third sector’ or the 
‘social economy’, generally of the non-profit or cooperative type, although it is acknowledged 
that social entrepreneurship may increasingly be found in the private for-profit sector and the 
public sector (Defourny and Nyssens, 2008). In Europe, the definition developed by researchers 
cooperating in the EMES Research Network is often used. This definition distinguishes 
between economic and social criteria, establishing a social enterprise ‘ideal type’. This implies 
that these criteria are not prescriptive and that social enterprises, not precisely adhering to these 
‘ideal type’ criteria, may still be considered social enterprises (Defourny, 2001; Defourny and 
Nyssens, 2006). Four criteria, encompassing the economic and entrepreneurial dimension of 
social enterprises, are proposed: (1) a continuous activity producing and selling goods and/or 
services, (2) a high degree of autonomy, (3) a significant level of economic risk and (4) a 
minimum amount of paid work. To capture the social dimension of social enterprises, five 
criteria have been put forward: (1) an explicit aim to benefit the community, (2) an initiative 
launched by a group of citizens, (3) decision-making power not based on capital ownership, (4) 
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a participatory nature, which involves the various parties affected by the activity and (5) limited 
profit distribution. 
 
1.2. SOCIAL ENTERPRENEURSHIP IN FLANDERS 
In what follows, we want to give insight in the field of social entrepreneurship in Flanders 
as well as in the sample of social enterprises we used in our research. We performed our 
research in one specific region because Belgium has a federal structure and social economy 
policies are organized at the regional level. 
In Flanders ‘Social economy’ (Sociale economie) is often used to refer to initiatives of social 
entrepreneurship (Department of Work and Social Economy, 2010). As it is the case in Europe 
in general, in Flanders social enterprises mainly emerged with the aim of reintegrating 
disadvantaged people in the labor market, because nor the public sector nor the mainstream for-
profit sectors succeeded in providing jobs for disadvantaged people such as disabled people, 
low-skilled and long-term unemployed people (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010; Van Opstal et al., 
2009). Various initiatives of so-called Work Integration Social Enterprises (WISE), also 
referred to as ‘social inclusion economy’, were set up to provide jobs for people who are very 
distant from the labor market. These initiatives often originated bottom-up and have as a 
consequence a different background, target group and organizational culture. In Flanders, we 
can identify specific policy programs for ‘Social Inclusion’, recognized and supported by the 
Flemish government. These programs differ in terms of recognition criteria, organization types, 
nature and level of financing and intended target group. The population of Work Integration 
Social Enterprises in Flanders is rather easy to define as they are subsidized and monitored by 
the Flemish administration (Department of Work and Social Economy, 2010; Van Opstal et al., 
2009; Van Waeyenberg and De Cuyper, 2016). 
It is however recognized that, next to Work Integration Social Enterprises, there are also 
other forms of entrepreneurial initiatives with a dominant social aim in Flanders (Van 
Waeyenberg and De Cuyper, 2016). However, this group of organizations is much more 
difficult to identify as they are not monitored by the Flemish government. Moreover there is no 
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particular organizational or legal form for social enterprises (Coates et al., 2008). Organizations 
working according to the co-operative principles are generally considered as social enterprises 
(Gijselinckx et al., 2011). However, the Belgian legal framework for co-operatives (e.g. CVBA; 
Coöperatieve Vennootschap met Beperkte Aansprakelijkheid) makes little reference to the co-
operative principles and can be adopted by regular for-profit enterprises as well. Co-operatives 
can opt for an accreditation by the National Council for Co-operatives if they clearly subscribe 
the principles of co-operative entrepreneurship and can, by consequence, be considered as 
social enterprises. However, only a small number of co-operatives have applied for this 
accreditation (about 500 out of  40 000 Belgian co-operatives) (Coates and Van Opstal, 2009).  
In 1995, a new legal framework, tailored to social enterprises, was established. ‘Social 
Purpose Company’ (SPC) (‘Vennootschap met Sociaal Oogmerk’ - VSO) is a legal label that 
all types of companies can adopt if their statutes comply with a series of conditions 
demonstrating the social aim of the company. However, also the SPC-framework has hardly 
been adopted (Coates and Van Opstal, 2009; Defourny and Nyssens, 2008).  
We can conclude that, next to the Work Integration Social Enterprises which are rather easily 
to identify, there are other organizations that may be considered as social enterprises because 
they are accredited co-operatives or because they adopted the legal label of ‘Social purpose 
company’. However, the number of these companies is limited and there is also overlap between 
these several groups of social enterprises (Van Waeyenberg and De Cuyper, 2016). As there is 
no specific legal form for social enterprises, we have to recognize that, next to the accreditated 
co-operatives and the social purpose companies, social entrepreneurs may exist that adopted 
another legal form. If these organizations do not receive subsidies for integrating disadvantaged 
workers, it is very difficult to identify them. For this reason, in combination with the difficulty 
that the concept of social enterprise is not clearly defined, sampling issues are considered 
challenging when studying social enterprises (Short et al., 2009). Social entrepreneurship 
researchers can make sampling decisions by using a respondent-driven sample of social 
enterprises or do purposive sampling, starting from a sample frame of social enterprises that are 
generally expected to have dominant social goals (Stevens et al., 2015). As we performed our 
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research in collaboration with the Policy Research Centre Work and Social Economy 
(Steunpunt Werk en Sociale Economie), we followed the latter approach. More specifically, in 
our sample, we used organizations that are identified and monitored by the Flemish 
Administration. This monitor encompasses Work Integration Social Enterprises and accredited 
co-operatives (De Cuyper et al., 2015; Van Waeyenberg and De Cuyper, 2016). We identify 6 
groups of Work Integration Social Enterprises. Some of these enterprises are specifically set up 
to employ disadvantaged workers (e.g. sheltered workshops and social workshops). Others 
employ target group employees next to a majority of regular employees (e.g. work integration 
enterprises and work experience enterprises) (Van Opstal et al., 2009). 
In what follows, we describe in detail the several forms of Work Integration Social 
Enterprises we studied in this dissertation1. In 2013, 29339 people were employed by these 
WISEs 2, including 25703 disadvantaged workers and 3636 people specifically hired to support 
and give training to the target group employees (‘omkaderend personeel’) (Van Waeyenberg 
and De Cuyper, 2016).  
Sheltered workshops (‘Beschutte Werkplaatsen’) offer a job to people with a work-limiting 
disability who are not (yet) able to work in the mainstream economic sector. They offer assisted 
work in a customized workplace. Sheltered workshops mainly operate in a business-to-business 
context and often combine different activity domains, such as packaging, printing, assembly, 
gardening and recycling. Because of the disabilities of the workers, activities have to be easy 
to explain and to carry out. It is a challenge for sheltered workshops to find work adapted to the 
capabilities of their workers, moreover because they often operate in highly competitive 
industries (Department of Work and Social Economy, 2010; Van Opstal et al., 2009). In 2013, 
there were 54 sheltered workshops, offering jobs to 16602 people (14439 disadvantaged 
workers). The average number of employees (in FTE) of the sheltered workshops is 286 
workers (Van Waeyenberg and De Cuyper, 2016). 
                                                          
1 In 2015 new Flemish legislation (Maatwerkdecreet) changed the several forms of Work Integration Social 
Enterprises. This legislation is suspended by the Council of State in January, 2016. As a consequence, the old 
legislation is again applicable. 
2 Not including the ‘regular’ employees working in the WISEs 
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Social workshops (‘Sociale Werkplaatsen’) develop a business activity with customized 
employment in a protected working environment for jobseekers who face difficulties to find a 
job in the regular labor market because of physical, social or psychological problems. Activity 
domains of social workshops are partly the same as that of sheltered workshops. A specific 
activity of social workshops is recycling shops (‘Kringwinkels’). Of the 94 social workshops 
approximately 30 run a recycling shop (Department of Work and Social Economy, 2010; Van 
Opstal et al., 2009). Social workshops offer employment to 5254 people (4386 disadvantaged 
workers). Social workshops are on average smaller than sheltered workshops, with a mean 
number of 50 employees (in FTE) (Van Waeyenberg and De Cuyper, 2016). 
Local service economy initiatives (‘Lokale Diensteneconomie’) provide employment for 
long-term unemployed people in combination with offering services to the local community 
and households. These organizations are often closely connected to local authorities. Their 
activities include cleaning services, shopping assistance for the elderly, maintenance of public 
parks (Department of Work and Social Economy, 2010; Van Opstal et al., 2009). In 2013, there 
were 231 local service economy initiatives, offering employment to 2418 people (1935 
disadvantaged workers).  
Work integration enterprises (‘Invoegbedrijven’) receive subsidies in return for 
employing long-term unemployed jobseekers and integrate them in their regular staff, while 
focusing on training and guidance (Department of Work and Social Economy, 2010). In 2013, 
there were 124 work integration enterprises, providing jobs for 807 disadvantaged workers. 
They have a mean number of employees of 115 (regular workers and disadvantaged workers) 
(Van Waeyenberg and De Cuyper, 2016). 
Work experience enterprises (‘Werkervaringsbedrijven’) offer a job to long-term 
unemployed people. They focus on offering a work experience as well as on providing the skills 
necessary to find a job in the regular labor market. These organizations are mainly active in 
health and social care or the cultural sector (Van Opstal et al., 2009). In 2013, 196 work 
experience enterprises, with a mean number of employees of 135, offered jobs to 2315 
disadvantaged people (Department of Work and Social Economy, 2010). 
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Work care initiatives (‘Arbeidszorginitiatieven’) provide unpaid employment tailored to 
people who can no longer or not yet function in the regular labor market or adapted employment 
systems. Work care initiatives are often part of social workshops, sheltered workshops or social 
profit organizations (Department of Work and Social Economy, 2010). In 2013, 1821 
disadvantaged workers and 122 supporting staff was employed by work care initiatives (Van 
Waeyenberg and De Cuyper, 2016). 
 
1.3. IN THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
The conceptual debate has dominated research in social entrepreneurship (Nicholls, 2010). 
The predominance of definitional debates resulted in a focus on conceptual work and a relative 
lack of empirical research. Moreover, empirical research has mainly relied on case studies 
(Short et al., 2009). Several authors consider the ongoing definitional debate as a concern. It 
makes it difficult to establish legitimacy for social entrepreneurship as a distinct construct or 
field of research. Moreover, it hinders theory building and theory testing in the field (Dacin et 
al., 2011; Dacin et al., 2010; Short et al., 2009). While case study research has provided rich 
qualitative data and researchers are encouraged to continue using qualitative methods, calls are 
made to use quantitative methods to advance theory, building on a variety of established 
management and entrepreneurship theories (Certo and Miller, 2008; Dacin et al., 2011; Short 
et al., 2009).  
As to what the definition of social entrepreneurship is concerned, recent research is moving 
away from the strive for a strict definition as it is unlikely that a set of characteristics applying 
to all kinds of social entrepreneurial initiatives, set up in different contexts, could be found 
(Dacin et al., 2010). Instead, a consensus has emerged in which, irrespective of the adopted 
organizational or legal form and the activities undertaken, social entrepreneurs are viewed as 
pursuing a dominant social mission while paying attention to social as well as economic value 
creation (Stevens et al., 2015; Zahra et al., 2009).  The predominant social mission distinguishes 
social enterprises from traditional for-profit organizations, that create social value at the 
periphery of their activities (Ramus and Vaccaro, 2014; Smith et al., 2012). Setting up an 
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economic activity differentiates social enterprises from social movements and charitable and 
philanthropic initiatives (Mair et al., 2012). By consequence, social enterprises are considered 
as a distinct category of organizations, positioned between profit and nonprofit organizations 
and are, in recent years, increasingly described and studied as ‘hybrid organizations’ (Santos, 
2012; Wilson and Post, 2013). Hybrid organizations are characterized by their commitment 
towards multiple, possibly conflicting, goals. Because of these multiple goals, hybrids face the 
challenge of combining activities that are not always compatible and of dealing with a variety 
of stakeholders with divergent expectations towards the organization (Doherty et al., 2014; 
Pache and Santos, 2010). Following their hybrid character, social enterprises are exposed to 
some specific internal and external tensions. Internal tensions are related to balancing the social 
and economic goals in decision-making and resource allocation (Ashforth and Reingen, 2014; 
Battilana and Lee, 2014). More specific, several authors refer to the risk of mission drift, 
implying that an organization deviates from its original mission or goals (Ebrahim et al., 2014; 
Jones, 2007; Miller et al., 2012a). In the context of social enterprises, mission drift is mainly 
considered as the erosion of the social goals in favor of commercial and financial performance 
(Doherty et al., 2014). However, also the opposite situation may occur in which the social goals 
prevail and the financial goals are neglected, possibly resulting in business failure (Cornforth, 
2014b; Hockerts, 2010; Tracey et al., 2011). Social enterprises are further also exposed to 
external tensions, related to the need to establish legitimacy and obtain support from different 
stakeholder groups. As multi-stakeholder organizations, social enterprises lack a dominant 
stakeholder and have to align the conflicting interests of diverge principal stakeholders. 
Dominant stakeholders of social enterprises are the beneficiaries of the social mission (e.g. the 
disadvantaged workers in work integration social enterprises who need training and social 
support) and the customers, paying for the products and services delivered by the social 
enterprise (Campi et al., 2006; Ebrahim et al., 2014). As social enterprises often rely on 
subsidies, also government representatives and policy makers are considered as important 
stakeholders (Spear et al., 2009). The same holds for funders, providing financial resources 
(Miller and Wesley, 2010). Obtaining legitimacy from different stakeholder groups is crucial 
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for acquiring the necessary financial and human resources (Doherty et al., 2014; Miller et al., 
2012a).  
Given the internal challenge of balancing potentially conflicting goals and the external 
challenge of addressing potentially conflicting stakeholder expectations, several authors point 
to the specific challenges social enterprises face regarding organizational governance (Battilana 
and Lee, 2014; Doherty et al., 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Huybrechts et al., 2014), which may 
be defined as ‘systems and processes concerned with ensuring the overall direction, control and 
accountability of an organization’ (Cornforth, 2014a). Ebrahim et al. (2014) specifically use an 
‘accountability lens’ to study the governance challenges social enterprises have to deal with. 
They argue that ‘it is a function of governance to articulate both for what an organization is 
accountable and to whom it is primarily accountable’ (Ebrahim et al., 2014:82). In the case of 
social enterprises, this means that social enterprises are accountable for both social and financial 
performance and are accountable to multiple dominant stakeholders, also referred to as 
multiple-goal and multiple-stakeholder organizations (Campi et al., 2006; Mason, 2010; 
Thompson, 2008).  
 
1.4. FOCUS OF THE DISSERTATION 
The aim of this dissertation is to study the governance challenges social enterprises face. By 
doing so,  we aim at responding to calls to study how social enterprises, as hybrid organizations, 
internally deal with the challenges they are exposed to (Battilana and Lee, 2014; Pache and 
Santos, 2013). While the existence of the aforementioned tensions is agreed upon and is 
confirmed in recent empirical research (Battilana et al., 2015; Pache and Santos, 2010), less 
attention has been paid to how these challenges may be addressed or even prevented (Battilana 
and Lee, 2014). More specifically, we answer the calls to study organizational governance in 
social enterprises, which has surprisingly only received little attention in social 
entrepreneurship research (Doherty et al., 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Spear et al., 2009). 
While studying the governance challenges of social enterprises, we focus, in line with 
Ebrahim et al. (2014), on ‘accountability to whom’ as well as on ‘accountability for what’. 
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Considering the former, we build on the basic assumption that the alignment of interests of 
diverse stakeholder groups is crucial for social enterprises (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Hockerts, 
2010). As mentioned before, social enterprises are considered multi-stakeholder organizations, 
as they lack a dominant stakeholder. Multi-stakeholder dialog and stakeholder involvement are 
often discussed as typical governance characteristics of social enterprises (Cornforth and Spear, 
2010; Huybrechts et al., 2014; Mason et al., 2007). Furthermore, such involvement is in line 
with the democratic and participatory values that characterize social enterprises (Pestoff and 
Hulgård, 2015; Spear, 2004). In particular, the board of directors, as an interface between the 
social enterprise and its external environment, is considered of major importance in dealing 
with diverging stakeholder expectations and securing stakeholder support (Diochon, 2010; 
Doherty et al., 2014; Huybrechts, 2010). Appointing board members, connected with or 
representing specific stakeholder groups, is considered a good practice as it enables the board, 
as the ultimate decision-making body, to align and balance the diverging stakeholder 
expectations (Campi et al., 2006; Spear et al., 2009). In this dissertation, we study how 
stakeholder involvement in the board may support social enterprises in addressing the tensions 
they face.  
1.4.1. Governance characteristics of Flemish social enterprises 
As mentioned before, we study Flemish social enterprises in this dissertation. In order to 
better understand the specific research questions and research settings, we will first elaborate 
on the governance characteristics of social enterprises in Flanders.  
The specific governance structure of enterprises is related to the adopted legal form and its 
legal implications. As mentioned before, in Belgium there is no specific legal form for social 
enterprises. In Flanders, social entrepreneurship is largely encompassed by associations 
(‘Vereniging zonder winstoogmerk’). The main reason is that, in order to be recognized as a 
Work Integration Social Enterprise, necessary to receive subsidies, Flemish legislation requires 
that organizations are associations (this requirement will be adapted in new legislation). Next 
to the majority of associations, social enterprises mainly adopt the co-operative legal form or 
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the social purpose company label (Coates et al., 2008; Coates and Van Opstal, 2009). Given the 
sample of social enterprises in this dissertation, we will discuss governance characteristics of 
social enterprises being associations or co-operatives. 
In associations as well as in co-operatives, three bodies relevant for organizational 
governance can be distinguished: (1) general assembly, (2) board of directors and (3) the day-
to-day management (CEO or management team). The general assembly and the board of 
directors are required by law. In associations, the board of directors has at least three members 
and the general assembly must have more members than the board of directors. In co-operatives, 
the board of directors has at least one member3, while the general assembly must consist of at 
least three members. The general assembly has a meeting at least once a year. From a strict 
judicial point of view, the general assembly is sometimes considered to be the most important 
governing body. In practice this is not the case because of two reasons. First, the general 
assembly predominantly has a control function regarding the functioning and financial status 
of the association, but it can mainly exercise this function post-hoc, when major decisions are 
already made. Second, specifically in the case of associations, it appears that very often the 
general assembly and the board of directors have more or less the same composition. By 
consequence, the general assembly not really has a distinguishing function from the board of 
directors, making the board of directors the most important governing body of the organization 
(Ceuleers et al., 2009). Having a CEO or a management team is not required by law. By 
consequence, there is no legislation regarding the distinct tasks of the board of directors and the 
management. In general, we can state that the board of directors is responsible for formulating 
(and safeguarding) the mission and for developing a long term strategy to carry out the mission, 
while the operationalization of the mission and the strategy is the task of the CEO or the 
management team. The board of directors monitors the activities and results of the management 
team as well as the financial and non-financial performance of the organization. Next to the 
control or monitoring function, the board of directors in social enterprises also has a service 
role. This service role encompasses, next to the earlier described strategic participation, advice 
                                                          
3 In our samples, board of directors have at least three members. 
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giving to the CEO and the managers. Board members further use their connections and 
networks to help the organization in achieving its goals and can help the organization to 
establish legitimacy in the external environment. Although there is a consensus that boards have 
to fulfill a control and a service role, there remain important questions about the ability and 
willingness of boards to fulfill their tasks properly. The ability of the board of (social) 
enterprises is related to the knowledge, experience and networks of board members. Recruiting 
board members with the right skills and experience is found to be challenging in social 
enterprises. It appears that only a small number of suitable people are willing to serve on boards. 
Possible explanations for this might be that board members are not paid, while this task can be 
quite time-consuming (Spear et al., 2009). Even if the necessary knowledge, experience and 
networks are available, this does not guarantee that boards function adequately. A common 
complaint of boards (not particularly in social enterprises) is that they become a ‘rubber stamp’ 
for management’s proposals, providing legitimacy for managerial decisions (Huybrechts, 2010; 
Spear et al., 2009). As such, boards become passive boards, executing operational tasks instead 
of taking a strategic role. Indicators of active versus passive boards include the frequency and 
the quality of meetings and time spent discussing and determining strategies (Coombes et al., 
2011). In our research we take into consideration the activism of the board by studying the (self-
reported) engagement of the board in fulfilling its service role. 
 
1.4.2. Overview of the studies in the dissertation 
Our research is performed using different samples of Flemish social enterprises. In close 
cooperation with sectoral federations and the Flemish government, we identified different types 
of social enterprises in Flanders. More specific, we examine in study 1 the relation between 
stakeholder representation in the board and the engagement of the board in its service role, 
encompassing networking with the external environment, giving advice to executives and 
participating in decision-making (Minichilli et al., 2009). As the ultimate goal of social 
enterprises is to create social and financial value (Arena et al., 2015), we also consider the 
‘accountability for what’ –dimension of governance. The difficulty of measuring the non-
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financial results, which is core to the performance of social enterprises, is often referred to 
(Arvidson and Lyon, 2014; Ebrahim and Rangan, 2014; Grieco et al., 2014). In study 2, we 
develop, in close cooperation with social economy organizations, a measurement tool for 
assessing the non-financial performance of social enterprises. Study 2 was carried out at the 
request of the Flemish government as part of the Policy Research Centre Work and Social 
Economy (Steunpunt Werk en Sociale Economie). Finally, in study 3, we take an overarching 
view and examine how stakeholder involvement in the board impacts board service 
performance and subsequent organizational performance.  
Data were collected in 2013-2014, using qualitative and quantitative research methods. 
Table 1.2 gives an overview of the samples and methods used in each of the studies. 
 
Table 1.1: Overview of the studies in the dissertation 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Sample Sheltered workshops 
Social workshops 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analyses based on 344 
completed surveys of 79 
organizations: 
-79 CEOs 
-265 board members  
 
Sheltered workshops 
Social workshops 
Work experience enterprises 
Work care initiatives 
Work integration enterprises 
Cooperatives  
Local service economy initiatives 
 
Quantitative analyses based on 
241 surveys completed by CEOs 
Sheltered workshops 
Social workshops 
Work experience enterprises 
Work care initiatives 
Work integration enterprises 
Cooperatives 
 
 
Analyses based on 196 surveys 
completed by CEOs 
Methods Process macro of Hayes 
(2013) for mediation, 
moderation and 
conditional process 
analysis 
Focus groups 
Delphi Panel 
 
Exploratory and confirmatory 
factor analysis 
Structural equation modeling 
(SEM) using Lavaan for R 
(Rosseel, 2012) 
 
In the following sections, we discuss the specific research questions and research settings of 
the three studies. 
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Study 1: When stakeholder representation leads to faultlines. A study of board service 
performance in social enterprises 
This study focuses on stakeholder representation, obtained by appointing board members 
representing different stakeholder groups (Harrison and Freeman, 2004; Moriarty, 2014) . 
While this is considered a good ethical practice for all kind of organizations (Hendry, 2001; 
Hielscher et al., 2014), the context of social enterprises is particularly relevant as social 
enterprises often have multi-stakeholder boards (Kerlin, 2006; Spear et al., 2009). Several 
authors however point to the potential negative implications for board functioning, such as 
conflict, subgroup formation and slower decision-making (Huybrechts et al., 2014; Matten and 
Crane, 2005; Pache and Santos, 2010). Although boards generally engage in two roles, the 
control and the service role, our study aims at understanding the relationship between 
stakeholder representation and the engagement of the board in its service role. Through its 
service role, the board is involved in networking with the external environment, as well as in 
giving advice to executives and decision-making (Minichilli et al., 2009). As stakeholder 
representation is suggested to lead to subgroup formation (Pache and Santos, 2010; Smith et 
al., 2013), we build on faultline theory. Faultlines are hypothetical dividing lines splitting a 
group into relatively homogeneous subgroups, based on the alignment of individuals along 
multiple characteristics, possibly leading to conflicts (Lau and Murnighan, 1998). More 
specifically, we argue that the alignment of stakeholder representation with other social 
category characteristics, such as age and gender, may result in faultline emergence, ultimately 
leading to decreased board service performance. Additionally, we study how faultline strength 
indirectly affects board service performance through board task conflict (De Dreu and 
Weingart, 2003; Jehn, 1995). Finally, we elaborate on moderators, mitigating the negative 
effects of faultline emergence and board task conflict.  
Our study was carried out in a sample of 79 work integration social enterprises (WISEs), 
aiming at the reintegration of disadvantaged people, such as disabled people and people with 
social or psychological problems, by offering these people a job while simultaneously investing 
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in job training and social support (Battilana et al., 2015; Van Opstal et al., 2009). Our analyses 
our based on the responses of 265 board members and 79 CEOs of 79 WISEs.  
 
Study 2: The development of a measurement instrument for the organizational 
performance in social enterprises 
In the second study, we develop an instrument suitable for the internal assessment and the 
external reporting of the non-financial performance of social enterprises. Because of the dual 
mission of creating social value and being financially sustainable, there is a consensus that, 
when evaluating the performance of social enterprises, non-financial and financial performance 
have to be considered (Arena et al., 2015; Austin et al., 2006; Meadows and Pike, 2010). This 
may support internal decision-making and may answer the demands of accountability towards 
different stakeholder groups (Battilana and Lee, 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014).  
Different methodologies and tools are developed by researchers and practitioners to measure 
the performance of social enterprises (Grieco et al., 2014). Many of these methodologies are, 
on the one hand, very general in their design, not offering specific indicators of measurement 
tools (Manetti, 2014; Nicholls, 2009), or are, on the other hand, case-specific, making it difficult 
to replicate them to other social enterprises (Bellucci et al., 2012).  The goal of this study is to 
fill this gap by developing an instrument suitable for a diverse group of social enterprises. To 
reach this end, we used qualitative (focus groups and a Delphi panel) and quantitative 
(exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis) research methods, involving multiple actors in 
the field of social entrepreneurship. The quantitative analyses are based on the responses of 241 
CEOs of social enterprises. 
 
Study 3: Board social capital and organizational performance in social enterprises 
In this study we integrate study 1 and 2. We examine the relationship between board social 
capital, board service performance and subsequent organizational performance. Using a social 
capital perspective (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998), we take into consideration the importance of 
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stakeholder involvement in social enterprise governance as we study board external social 
capital, encompassing the external ties from board members with external stakeholders (Kim, 
2005; Wincent et al., 2010). Additionally, in line with the growing attention to board internal 
processes and the importance of boards working together as teams (Finkelstein and Mooney, 
2003), we focus on board internal social capital, referring to the internal linkages within the 
organization, mainly between board members (Kim and Cannella, 2008). Using a resource 
dependence perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), we study how board external and internal 
social capital contribute to the engagement of the board in fulfilling its service role and how 
this board service performance subsequently affects organizational performance. When 
measuring organizational performance, we consider financial as well as non-financial 
performance, in which our measures for non-financial performance are derived from study 2. 
More specifically, we use the scale measuring the primary social goals of social enterprises 
(Defourny and Nyssens, 2006), namely hiring disadvantage people and engaging in community 
responsibilities. Our analyses are based on the responses of 196 CEOs of Flemish social 
enterprises. 
In summary, this doctoral research is embedded in the growing interest in the governance 
characteristics of social enterprises in order to deal with diverging stakeholder expectations and 
accountability for both social and financial performance. The following chapters present the 
three studies outlined above. The concluding chapter of this dissertation provides a summary 
of the main findings, and highlights the implications for theory and practice.  
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2. WHEN STAKEHOLDER REPRESENTATION LEADS TO
FAULTLINES: A STUDY OF BOARD SERVICE
PERFORMANCE IN SOCIAL ENTERPRISES
ABSTRACT 
Following the growing interest in sustainability and ethics, organizations are increasingly 
attentive to accountability toward stakeholders. Stakeholder representation, obtained by 
appointing board members representing different stakeholder groups, is suggested to be a good 
ethical practice. However, such representation may also have nefarious implications for board 
functioning. Particularly, it may result in strong faultline emergence, subsequently mitigating 
board performance. Our study aims at understanding the process through which faultlines affect 
board performance, and particularly the board service role through which the board is involved 
in providing counsel and strategic decision-making. We study the relationship between 
faultlines and board service performance in the particularly relevant context of social 
enterprises. We find that faultline strength is negatively related to board service performance 
and that this relationship is mediated by board task conflict. Furthermore, our study reveals the 
importance of clear and shared organizational goals in attenuating the negative effects of 
faultlines.  
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate citizenship, sustainability and ethics in organizational contexts are increasingly 
receiving notice (Aguinis and Glavas, 2012), thus bringing increased attention to accountability 
toward different stakeholders and the social responsibility of organizations (Carroll, 2015), as 
well as giving rise to an active discussion about stakeholder democracy (Matten and Crane, 
2005; Van Buren III, 2010). Stakeholder democracy refers to “stakeholder participation in 
processes of organizing, decision-making, and governance in corporations” (Matten and Crane, 
2005, p. 6). It is considered a best ethical practice or even an ethical obligation (Hendry, 2001; 
Moriarty, 2014; O'Dwyer, 2005): Van Buren III (2010) argues that, as stakeholders contribute 
to the value creation of organizations, they should also have the right to participate in the 
decision-making and corporate governance processes. Through stakeholder participation, 
stakeholders are not just considered as a means, but are also an end, in and of themselves (Evan 
and Freeman, 1993; Hielscher et al., 2014). As taking into consideration stakeholder demands 
is considered crucial for organizational health (Moriarty, 2014), stakeholder participation is 
expected to ultimately benefit both society and organizations (Harrison and Freeman, 2004). 
However, despite the centrality of stakeholder democracy in ethical discussions, the 
literature devotes considerable attention to the participation of only one particular stakeholder 
group, namely employees (Harrison and Freeman, 2004; Matten and Crane, 2005; Moriarty, 
2010), referred to as workplace democracy (Matten and Crane, 2005; Timming, 2015). 
Notwithstanding this empirical emphasis on the employees as stakeholders, the board of 
directors, as the ultimate decision-making body in organizations, is considered to play a crucial 
role in effectuating stakeholder participation (Moriarty, 2010; Van Buren III, 2010). Indeed, it 
is commonly accepted that one of the best ways to provide a diverse range of stakeholders with 
greater voice is through appointments to the board of directors (Harrison and Freeman, 2004; 
Moriarty, 2014). Researchers allude to the potentially positive aspects of stakeholder 
democracy through board appointments (hereafter: stakeholder representation). Specifically, it 
is considered a best practice from an ethical perspective as it enables the organization to share 
power with all stakeholders (Moriarty, 2014; Van Buren III, 2010). Furthermore, stakeholder 
28 
representation may often help in gaining legitimacy from different stakeholder groups, which 
is crucial for the acquisition of resources, including financial and human resources (Doherty et 
al., 2014; Miller et al., 2012). By contrast, other researchers allude to the potentially nefarious 
effects of stakeholder representation on the board, which is related to slower decision-making 
and the lack of knowledge of stakeholder representatives (Harrison and Freeman, 2004; 
Hielscher et al., 2014; Matten and Crane, 2005). Consequently, it is likely for stakeholder 
representation to affect board functioning. Boards typically engage in two different roles, 
referred to as the control role (Okhmatovskiy and David, 2012) and the service role (Fiegener, 
2005; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  It is through the service role that 
the board is involved in enhancing the firm’s reputation, establishing contacts with the external 
environment, as well as giving counsel and advice to executives (Minichilli et al., 2009; Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989). As such, it is likely for stakeholder representation to particularly affect the 
engagement of the board in its service role. Surprisingly, however, there is a dearth of research 
into the implications of stakeholder representation on boards of directors in general and, 
specifically, the board’s service role.  
Our study focuses on understanding the link between stakeholder representation and the 
engagement of the board in its service role (hereafter referred to as “board service 
performance;” similar terms used in the literature include “board service task performance” 
(Minichilli et al., 2009), “board engagement in the service role” (Knockaert and Ucbasaran, 
2013), and “board service involvement” (Knockaert et al., 2015). In doing so, we focus on a 
relevant organizational behavior concept and related theories, namely faultlines. A faultline 
perspective is particularly relevant as stakeholder representation is suggested to lead to the 
formation of subgroups (Pache and Santos, 2010; Smith et al., 2013). Organizational behavior 
scholars point to the importance of studying the behavior of subgroups and suggest focusing on 
faultline emergence as an important mechanism (Bezrukova et al., 2012; Thatcher and Patel, 
2012). Faultlines are hypothetical dividing lines splitting a group into relatively homogeneous 
subgroups, based on the alignment of individuals along multiple characteristics, possibly 
leading to conflicts (Lau and Murnighan, 1998). However, our knowledge on either the 
relationship between stakeholder representation and faultlines, or the relationship between 
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board faultlines and the subsequent board and organizational performance (Almandoz, 2012) is 
still limited. Our study aims at investigating the practice of stakeholder representation on the 
board, thereby focusing on board service performance and the extent to which stakeholder 
representation may affect such performance through the emergence of faultlines.  
In aiming for its research objectives, our study considers a particularly relevant context, 
namely that of social enterprises, which engage in commercial activities to solve social 
problems and, as such, have a dual mission of financial sustainability and social goal 
achievement (Battilana et al., 2015; Doherty et al., 2014). First, from a stakeholder perspective, 
social enterprises are particularly relevant as they lack a dominant external stakeholder and are 
exposed to the conflicting expectations and demands of different principal stakeholder groups 
(Ebrahim and Rangan, 2014; Mair et al., 2015; Ramus and Vaccaro, 2014). To address such 
conflicting demands, social enterprises often have multi-stakeholder boards (Kerlin, 2006; 
Spear et al., 2009). 
Second, any entrepreneurial firm faces challenges that make a board service role perspective 
particularly relevant (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Knockaert and Ucbasaran, 2013; Minichilli et 
al., 2009). However, in addition to general entrepreneurial challenges, social enterprises face 
specific external and internal tensions (Battilana and Lee, 2014). External tensions are related 
to the need to establish legitimacy and obtain support from different stakeholder groups. 
Internal tensions are related to balancing the social and economic goals while avoiding mission 
drift; for instance when making decisions on resource allocation (Ashforth and Reingen, 2014). 
As such, through engaging in the service role, boards may be particularly important in helping 
social enterprises deal with these external and internal tensions (Battilana and Lee, 2014; 
Ebrahim et al., 2014; Mair et al., 2015; Pache and Santos, 2013; Spear et al., 2009). 
Consequently, while boards of directors in social enterprises are largely neglected in academic 
research (Spear et al., 2009), they are of utmost importance as they set the overall framework 
within which these organizations operate and make critical decisions (Battilana and Lee, 2014; 
Mair et al., 2015), thus affecting organizational effectiveness (Ostrower and Stone, 2006).  
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Accordingly, this paper aims at unraveling the implications of stakeholder representation on 
boards of organizations. We specifically study the relationship between faultlines originating 
from stakeholder representation and the engagement of the board in its service role. By 
subsequently unraveling the mechanisms and contingencies through which faultlines are related 
to such performance, we aim at contributing to the business ethics, (social) entrepreneurship, 
corporate governance, and organizational behavior literatures in a number of ways.  
First, we add to the literature on stakeholder democracy and stakeholder participation by 
leaving the beaten paths of workplace democracy to focus on stakeholder representation as a 
largely neglected aspect source of stakeholder democracy. Specifically, we introduce faultline 
emergence as a potentially nefarious consequence of stakeholder representation in corporate 
governance mechanisms in organizations in general. This paper also explicitly responds to calls 
to focus on the governance function in social enterprises (Battilana and Lee, 2014; Mair et al., 
2015) and to specifically study stakeholder representation and subgroup formation in order to 
better understand the relationship between corporate governance practices and board 
performance in social enterprises (Almandoz, 2014; Doherty et al., 2014; Pache and Santos, 
2010). This research further contributes to the extensive body of entrepreneurship literature that 
considers top management and boards as groups of individuals, or teams, and that is pointing 
to faultlines as a promising theoretical avenue (Lim et al., 2013), but is yet to incorporate the 
concept either theoretically or empirically. 
Second, we respond to calls in the corporate governance literature to open up the black box 
of board dynamics (Hambrick et al., 2008; Huse et al., 2011; Van Ees et al., 2009). Specifically, 
Ostrower and Stone (2010) call for studies into a wider range of board member characteristics 
than just demographics such as race and gender. Further, as Westphal and Zajac (2013) and 
Knockaert and Ucbasaran (2013) highlight, while much of the corporate governance literature 
takes an agency theoretical perspective in studying the (control) role of the board, other 
(behavioral) theoretical perspectives may be more relevant when studying the service role of 
the board. Importantly, we respond to a call by Cornforth (2012), who argues that corporate 
governance research is often focused on boards in unitary organizations and calls for studies 
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into the governance of organizations with more complex governance structures, such as social 
enterprises.  
Finally, we add to the organizational behavior literature, which introduced and widely 
studies faultlines. So far, however, faultline research mainly focuses on age, gender and 
ethnicity as social category characteristics that may give rise to faultline emergence (Thatcher 
and Patel, 2012). We add to this literature by introducing stakeholder representation as a 
potentially important social category characteristic (Van der Brempt et al., 2015).  
The paper unfolds along the following lines. First, we systematically develop a number of 
hypotheses on the relationship between faultlines and the board’s service role. We integrate 
these hypotheses in a theoretical framework that is geared toward a better understanding of the 
relationship between stakeholder representation at board level and board service performance, 
just as the intermediate mechanisms in the relationship. In a following section, we describe the 
research method, including the research setting, the description of the sample, data collection 
and operationalization of the variables. After presenting our results, we discuss the main 
conclusions and contributions of our paper, as well as the limitations and directions for future 
research. 
 
2.2. A FAULTLINE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
As articulated above, the representation of different stakeholder groups is often considered 
to be a good practice in balancing the competing demands of stakeholders in the decision-
making process (Moriarty, 2014; Pache and Santos, 2010). At the same time, several authors 
warn of the potentially negative effects of stakeholder representation (Pache and Santos, 2010). 
Specifically, stakeholder representation may contribute to subgroup emergence. Tensions 
between different subgroups on the board can make it difficult to achieve a clear purpose, as 
such slowing down the decision-making process (Huybrechts, 2010; Spear et al., 2009). Pache 
and Santos (2010, p. 468) even warn for ‘dramatic outcomes’. Specifically, escalations of 
conflict may result in organizational paralysis or even permanent organizational breakups. 
However, the literature offers little explanation of the conditions under which the emergence of 
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subgroups may negatively influence board performance (Almandoz, 2014). A possible 
explanation can be found in faultline theory, studying the emergence of subgroups and its effect 
on group dynamics and performance. While faultlines may originate from social category, 
informational and personality differences (Thatcher and Patel, 2012), we introduce the 
representation of different stakeholder groups in the board of directors as an additional social 
category characteristic triggering faultline emergence. 
In what follows, we build upon faultline theory and literature, linking faultlines to board 
service performance. Then, we add a conflict theoretical perspective to explain the process 
through which faultline strength may affect board service performance. Finally, we explore 
which contingency factors could affect the earlier hypothesized relationships. The framework 
we present is summarized in Figure 2.1 and serves as a guide throughout the remainder of this 
section. 
 
Figure 2.1: Conceptual model 
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2.2.1. The origin and nature of faultlines  
The faultline concept has its origin in research on group diversity and heterogeneity. 
Although group members’ traits are important for the way they address issues, it is the 
heterogeneity or homogeneity of these traits among group members that affects how they 
cooperate (Tuggle et al., 2010). Research on group diversity reveals that diversity may have 
positive as well as negative effects on group performance (van Knippenberg et al., 2011). 
Indeed, diversity in a group can be a source of knowledge, information and expertise, leading 
to improved performance. This argument is in line with the earlier mentioned positive effects 
of stakeholder representation in groups, or boards of directors specifically (Diochon, 2010; 
Smith, 2010). On the other hand, diversity is also a potential source of conflict, engendering 
subgroups that may disrupt group processes and, consequently, group performance. Similarly, 
stakeholder representation, or diversity in the stakeholder groups represented in the board, may 
lead to negative effects (Pache and Santos, 2010; Spear et al., 2009). Harrison and Klein (2007) 
refer to these effects of group diversity as ‘diversity as variety’ versus ‘diversity as separation’. 
Whereas the first refers to group members bringing a multiplicity of perspectives and 
experiences, the latter points to these members holding different positions or opinions on task-
or team-related issues. By consequence, whereas variety enhances creativity and decision 
quality, separation typically reduces cohesiveness and subsequent task performance (Harrison 
and Klein, 2007). 
Following the mixed findings on the effects of group heterogeneity, calls have been made to 
introduce more sophisticated models of diversity that are superior in predicting the negative or 
positive effects of diversity (Lau and Murnighan, 1998; Tuggle et al., 2010; van Knippenberg 
et al., 2011). The introduction of the faultline concept by Lau and Murnighan (1998) can be 
considered as a fruitful avenue to answer these calls. Group faultlines are defined as 
hypothetical dividing lines that may split a group into subgroups based on alignment along 
multiple attributes (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Lau and Murnighan, 1998). In the faultlines 
reasoning, different dimensions of diversity are studied in conjunction instead of looking at 
different traits separately (Rico et al., 2007). The theoretical mechanisms used to explain the 
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emergence and the effects of faultlines are self-categorization, social identification, and 
similarity attraction (Thatcher and Patel, 2012). Self-categorization and social identity theories 
explain how individuals, in order to define their identities and to protect their self-esteem, 
classify themselves and others into social categories. As a result of such categorization, 
individuals favor and trust their group members more than individuals of other groups (Lau and 
Murnighan, 2005; Rico et al., 2007). The similarity-attraction paradigm refers to the tendency 
of people to like, trust and cooperate with similar others (Li and Hambrick, 2005; van 
Knippenberg et al., 2011).  
Although it is generally accepted that faultlines can form around many characteristics (Lau 
and Murnighan, 2005; Thatcher and Patel, 2012), the majority of faultline research focuses on 
faultlines based on demographic social category characteristics, i.e. the characteristics of age, 
gender and ethnicity. In addition, informational or task-related characteristics are studied in 
faultline research (Rico et al., 2007; Thatcher and Patel, 2012). Informational characteristics 
are underlying attributes that are directly job-related, such as functional background, tenure, 
and education (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Rico et al., 2007). While less frequently studied 
(Thatcher and Patel, 2012), personality traits and values are also considered a potential source 
of faultline emergence. Conscientiousness and emotional stability are examples of personality 
traits that are examined in faultline research (Molleman, 2005; Rico et al., 2007). In the context 
of faultlines in boards, board tenure, education level, functional background, industry 
background and type of directorship (executive versus non-executive directors) (Kaczmarek et 
al., 2012; Tuggle et al., 2010), in addition to general demographic characteristics like age and 
gender (Veltrop et al., 2015), are studied. So far, research neglects faultlines originating from 
the representation of different stakeholder groups as one of the driving characteristics. In what 
follows, we elaborate on how strong faultlines in the board, to which stakeholder representation 
contributes, may affect board service performance, and then subsequently elaborate on potential 
mediator and moderator relationships.  
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2.2.2. The relationship between faultline strength and board service performance 
It is generally accepted that faultlines are particularly detrimental to the organization if they 
are strong. Faultline strength increases when subgroups are homogeneous as subgroup members 
are then more similar, while more strongly differing from members of others subgroups with 
whom they do not share attributes (Lim et al., 2013). Indeed, following faultline theory, strong 
faultlines will result in reduced information exchange and increased problems in providing 
constructive advice, which in turn has a negative impact on joint decision-making and the 
ability to reach a strategic consensus (Li and Hambrick, 2005; Minichilli et al., 2009). 
Generally, strong competition between the subgroups results in less time and energy spent on 
essential tasks, thus distracting from the organizational goals (Thatcher and Patel, 2012). 
Based on social identity theory and similarity attraction, we introduce stakeholder 
representation as an additional relevant social category characteristic in faultline research. 
Indeed, board members will quickly identify which stakeholder groups other board members 
represent. Based upon faultline theory, we argue that faultlines will emerge following the 
alignment of stakeholder representation with other important social category characteristics, 
such as age and gender. We argue that, if strong faultlines exist based on the alignment of these 
social category characteristics, board members form identity-based subgroups. In the case of 
stronger faultlines, polarization between board members may occur (Fiol et al., 2009), resulting 
in communication hindrances and decrease in focus on the organization’s goals, consequently 
resulting in decreased board service performance. This is in line with research that studies other 
origins of faultline emergence in other contexts, but that has consistently linked faultline 
strength to negative outcomes (Thatcher and Patel, 2012). Indeed, faultline strength is linked to 
diminished performance outcomes, such as decision-making and group performance 
(Bezrukova et al., 2009; Rico et al., 2007).  Subsequently, we propose the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Faultline strength is negatively related to board service performance. 
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2.2.3. Board task conflict as a mediator between faultline strength and board service 
performance 
While we expect to find a negative relationship between faultline strength and board service 
performance, in what follows we argue that faultline strength also indirectly affects board 
service performance through board task conflict.  
First, in line with faultline theory, faultline strength can be expected to positively relate to 
board task conflict. Task conflict refers to differences in viewpoints and opinions about the 
content of the task (de Wit et al., 2012; Jehn, 1995).  Examples of task conflict are conflicts 
about the distribution of resources, procedures, and policies (De Dreu and Weingart, 2003). We 
argue that the representation of different stakeholder groups, strengthened by other social 
category characteristics, on the board will result in different points of view regarding what the 
tasks of the board are and how these tasks are to be fulfilled. Ashforth and Reingen (2014) 
discuss battles between subgroups and the continuing conflicts in the governance process when 
decisions must be made, for instance, on the allocation of resources. Therefore, we argue that 
faultline strength will be positively related to board task conflict, which is in line with studies 
in other contexts and studying other types of faultline origin, but which have consistently linked 
faultlines to task conflict (Lau and Murnighan, 2005; Li and Hambrick, 2005). 
Second, building on conflict theory, we argue that higher levels of board task conflict are 
related to decreased board service performance. While the effect of task conflict on group 
performance is widely studied, the results are inconclusive. For instance, four meta-analyses on 
the effects of task conflict reveal different results. De Dreu and Weingart (2003) and O'Neill et 
al. (2013) find that task conflict has a negative effect on group performance, where de Wit et 
al. (2012) conclude that task conflict is unrelated to such performance. Finally, DeChurch et al. 
(2013) find that task conflict is positively related to group performance. We build on the 
argument of De Dreu (2008), which is particularly relevant for our context, to explain why we 
expect a negative relationship between board task conflict and board service performance. De 
Dreu (2008) argues that in groups where members have vested interests, task conflict will 
negatively influence performance. In the same vein, Loughry and Amason (2014) refer to 
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incompatible goals as a possible boundary condition, which can result in lower group 
performance because of ‘political activity’, such as competing for resources. As we argue that 
task conflict in the boards emerges from faultlines originating from the representation of 
different stakeholder groups, we expect that board members indeed have vested interests and 
that they will most likely demonstrate political behavior in order to defend the stakeholders they 
represent. Political activity, such as competing for resources, is detrimental to group 
performance (De Clercq et al., 2009) as it distracts group members from focusing on the 
essential tasks and overall goals of the organization (Loughry and Amason, 2014). As such, 
vested interests and political behavior hinder constructive debate and joint decision-making (De 
Dreu, 2008). This is further in line with findings in the corporate governance literature, 
negatively linking board task conflict to engagement by the board in advice (Minichilli et al., 
2012) and strategic activities (van Ees et al., 2008). Consequently, we offer the following 
hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Board task conflict mediates the relationship between faultline strength and 
board service performance. Specifically, stronger faultlines are related to higher levels of 
board task conflict (H2a), in turn negatively related to board service performance (H2b). 
 
2.2.4. Shared organizational goals and subgroup imbalance as moderating factors 
While initial research on faultlines aimed at understanding the impact of faultlines, newer 
research focuses on understanding contingencies mitigating the negative effects of faultlines 
(Thatcher and Patel, 2012). In what follows, we address the two sides of the mediation 
relationship, hereby building on faultlines literature and conflict theory. Specifically, we argue 
that the level of shared organizational goals will moderate the first part of the mediation in 
hypothesis 2, whereas subgroup imbalance will moderate the second part of the mediation .  
First, we argue that the identification as one group instead of a categorization in subgroups 
is a key alleviator of the negative impact of faultlines. Specifically, conflict theory indicates 
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that, by introducing ‘integrative forces’, such as an overarching vision, the conflicts that may 
arise through subgroup formation can be weakened (Collewaert and Sapienza, 2014; de Wit et 
al., 2012; Horton et al., 2014). Similarly, Almandoz (2012) and Pache and Santos (2010) 
indicate that the identification of common goals in the board of directors will make conflict less 
fierce. This is in line with the faultline literature, where the existence of clear and shared 
objectives is found to attenuate the negative effects of strong faultlines (van Knippenberg et al., 
2011). As such, while stronger faultlines can be expected to lead to higher levels of board task 
conflict, this effect is likely to be mitigated by higher levels of shared organizational goals. 
Therefore, we propose that higher levels of ‘shared organizational goals’ among the board 
members will weaken the positive relationship between faultlines and board task conflict, 
resulting in the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Higher levels of shared organizational goals recognized by board members 
moderates the relationship between faultline strength and board task conflict. Specifically, 
the positive relationship between faultline strength and board task conflict is mitigated by 
higher levels of shared organizational goals, and strengthened by lower levels of shared 
organizational goals.  
 
Second, we argue that the extent to which task conflict leads to decreased performance will 
be contingent on the relative size of the subgroups. There is a growing interest into how 
subgroup characteristics influence group performance (Carton and Cummings, 2012; Thatcher 
and Patel, 2012). Configurational properties, and particularly the size of the subgroups, are 
studied as potentially important drivers. So far, however, the theoretical arguments and 
empirical results are inconclusive. Some scholars argue that an imbalanced configuration, in 
which subgroups are unequally sized, has a positive effect on group performance. The argument 
put forward here is that the existence of a majority provides certainty (Menon and Phillips, 
2011) and makes conflict less overt, resulting in smoother group dynamics, which in turn 
positively influences performance (Thatcher and Patel, 2012). Other scholars (O'Leary and 
39 
 
Mortensen, 2010) find support for the opposite argument: a more balanced configuration 
positively influences group performance. As they argue, when there is no majority, different 
subgroup perspectives are equally taken into consideration, resulting in better decisions, which 
in turn positively influences group performance. Carton and Cummings (2013) add to this 
stream of literature by arguing that, in order to gain a better understanding of the influence of 
subgroup imbalance (i.e. the extent to which one subgroup is larger than the other) on group 
performance, the subgroup type also has to be considered. Particularly interesting is that, similar 
to our study, they study identity-based subgroups, formed by members sharing the same social 
category characteristics (Carton and Cummings, 2013). Subsequently, when identity-based 
subgroups arise, subgroup balance negatively influences group performance, which can be 
attributed to the fact that the overall group gets locked in conflicts related to values and beliefs 
(Carton and Cummings, 2013). Along the same lines, we can expect increasing levels of 
subgroup imbalance to weaken the negative effects of task conflict on group performance. 
Indeed, as the subgroups we study are identity-based, board task conflict will be particularly 
detrimental to board service performance if subgroups have similar sizes and no dominant 
subgroup can put its stamp on the discussion. In contrast, increasing subgroup imbalance will 
mitigate the negative effect of task conflict on board service performance, resulting in the 
following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between board task conflict and board service performance 
is positively moderated by subgroup imbalance. Specifically, higher levels of subgroup 
imbalance mitigate the negative relationship between board task conflict and board service 
performance. 
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2.3. METHODS 
2.3.1. Research setting 
Shane and Venkataraman (2000, p. 218) defined the field of entrepreneurship as “the 
scholarly examination of how, by whom, and with what effects opportunities to create future 
goods and services are discovered, evaluated, and exploited.” Generally, entrepreneurship is 
about “the new” (in terms of goods, services, knowledge) and how it enters the economic 
system, as well as about change (Langlois, 2007). An entrepreneurial firm is then either a new 
firm or a firm somehow willing and able to reset its own memory (Langlois, 2007), and as such 
entrepreneurship includes, but is not limited to, the creation of new organizations (Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000). While the term “social entrepreneurship” has since been interpreted in 
many different ways (Dees, 1998), Mair and Marti (2006, p. 37) bring together the social and 
entrepreneurial aspects of the concept and define it as a process that involves “the innovative 
use and combination of resources to pursue opportunities to catalyze social change and/or 
address social needs.” As Mair and Marti (2006) point out, through the social contexts in which 
social entrepreneurship occur (newly created or established organizations), social enterprises 
can be distinguished from loosely structured initiatives that also aim at social change, such as 
activist movements.  
It is further clear that the conceptualization of social entrepreneurship is context-dependent 
(Defourny and Nyssens, 2010). Borzaga and Defourny (2001) and Kerlin (2006) indicate that, 
in Europe, social entrepreneurship is mainly confined to the realm of work integration and 
employment creating initiatives. Perrini (2006) indicates that social entrepreneurship in Europe 
is a non-for-profit response to welfare-related challenges, financial pressure put on social-
purpose organizations and decreased donations to such organizations. As such, “Work 
Integration Social Enterprises” (hereafter: WISEs), which are the objects of our study, 
correspond to the definition of social entrepreneurship, while forming a general accepted type 
of social enterprises in a European context. The primary aim of WISEs is the socio-professional 
reintegration of disadvantaged people, such as disabled people and people with social or 
psychological problems, experiencing difficulties to integrate on the job market. WISEs hire 
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these people to produce goods and services for the commercial market. In addition, WISEs 
invest actively in job training, necessary to make reintegration in the labor market possible, and 
provide social support to solve personal problems that are often obstacles for employment 
(Battilana et al., 2015; Pache and Santos, 2013; Van Opstal et al., 2009).  
We study WISEs in a specific part of Belgium, namely Flanders. We particularly focus on 
Flemish organizations for homogeneity reasons as Belgium has a federal structure and social 
economy policies are organized at the regional level. WISEs in Flanders are a good setting to 
test our theoretical framework for a number of reasons. First, as WISEs lack a dominant 
stakeholder, their boards of directors commonly consists of different stakeholder 
representatives (Kerlin, 2006; Spear et al., 2009). The principal stakeholders, namely the 
beneficiaries and customers, are typically represented on the board. As WISEs generally receive 
subsidies from the Flemish and local governments, (regional) government representatives 
frequently serve on WISEs’ boards, just like other funders, academics and volunteers. This is 
in line with the stakeholder groups identified by earlier social entrepreneurship studies 
(Ebrahim et al., 2014; Pache and Santos, 2010; Ramus and Vaccaro, 2014). As such, the 
common practice of representation in the board of different stakeholder groups makes WISEs 
an interesting study context from a stakeholder representation perspective. Second, WISEs face 
unusual challenges, thus making the engagement of the board in its service role critical and the 
study of board service performance relevant. Specifically, WISEs must make important 
strategic decisions on resource allocation. For instance, while their primary social goals point 
to the allocation of resources to training and counseling of disadvantaged individuals, their 
commercial goals favor the allocation of resources improving the quality of products and 
services at a competitive price (Battilana et al., 2015). Further, WISEs operate in highly 
competitive industries, such as packaging, assembly, gardening, recycling, and printing. Not 
only are they faced with competition from other WISEs, but also with competition from 
companies in low-wage countries, production in jails, and other commercial companies. Such 
challenges require the management and board to apply a risk taking attitude and to act 
entrepreneurially in the way they work with the beneficiaries as well as in the services and 
products they offer on the market (Van Opstal et al., 2009). As such, the board can contribute 
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through engaging in service activities that enhance the WISEs’ reputation, strengthen the link 
with the external environment and optimally allocate resources within the organization.  
2.3.2. Sample and data collection 
Data were collected in 2014 from sheltered and social workshops, which are the dominant 
forms of WISEs in Flanders. In order to construct our sample, we contacted the federation of 
the sheltered workshops (VLAB) and the federation of the social workshops (SST), having 54 
and 94 member organizations, respectively. We asked for the name and email address of the 
CEO and also, if available, the name and contact details of the board chair. 
Our research goals required information from the WISEs, but also from the boards in these 
organizations. As such, in a first phase, we constructed a short questionnaire, which we 
distributed over e-mail (subsequently followed up by telephone) to 148 CEOs and 107 board 
chairs, in which we asked for names and contact information of all board members, as well as 
some biographical information on these members, and asked them to cooperate in our study. 
From the initial 148 organizations, 10 WISEs were dropped for technical reasons: mergers, 
acquisitions or because an enterprise had multiple identification codes despite being only one 
organization in reality. Ultimately 84 of the remaining 138 enterprises were willing to 
participate (61% response rate).  
In a second stage, a questionnaire was distributed to the board members (including the board 
chairs) of the 84 WISEs willing to participate. In addition, a new questionnaire was sent to the 
CEOs of these organizations. In this questionnaire, we specifically asked questions about board 
characteristics and tasks alongside questions seeking background information on the 
organization and its board. The questionnaires were developed in English, translated into Dutch 
and back-translated to identify any possible confusion or errors that may have resulted from the 
translation. We pretested the questionnaires with four governance researchers and the directors 
of the two sectorial federations. Based on their feedback, we made some minor changes. A total 
of 788 surveys were distributed. After two rounds of reminders and a follow-up by telephone, 
we received 345 completed surveys (79 CEOs and 266 board members) from 80 different social 
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enterprises. Because the reliance on the perceptions of a single respondent is a concern in 
studying board behavior and board dynamics (Huse et al., 2011; Minichilli et al., 2012), our 
goal was to receive at least two completed questionnaires from every organization.  For that 
reason, we had to exclude one organization for which only one board member participated in 
the survey. As a result, our analyses are based on 344 completed surveys (response rate 44%) 
from 79 organizations (response rate of 57%).  
 
2.3.3. Measures 
Dependent variable   
Board service performance. In line with Hillman and Dalziel (2003) and Huse (2005), we 
consider the service role of the board as a combination of advice giving, strategic participation 
and networking. Based on the research of Minichilli et al. (2009), board service performance is 
measured using 10 items. The CEO and the board members were asked to indicate on a seven-
point Likert scale (ranging from 1: strongly disagree to 7: strongly agree) to what extent the 
board fulfills its service role. More specifically, we asked respondents to indicate the degree to 
which the board (1) provides advice on management issues; (2) provides advice on financial 
issues; (3) provides advice on technical issues; (4) provides advice on market issues; (5) 
provides advice on legal issues; (6) provides linkages to important external stakeholders; (7) 
provides the firm with external legitimacy and reputation; (8) is involved in promoting strategic 
initiatives; (9) is involved in taking strategic decisions; and (10) is involved in participating in 
the implementation phase of long-term strategic decision-making. The Cronbach’s alpha of the 
ten items indicate strong scale reliability (0.91). In a next step, we assessed whether aggregating 
this variable was justified by calculating the eta-squared statistic η2. The eta-squared value for 
this statistic was 0.43 (p<0.001), which exceeded the minimum value of 0.20, demonstrating 
evidence of interrater consistency (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Li and Hambrick, 2005). The 
individual answers were subsequently aggregated by calculating the mean of board service 
performance of the respondents belonging to the same organization. Values of board service 
performance range between 2.3 and 6.66, with an average value of 5.09. 
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Independent, mediator and moderator variables 
Faultline Strength. To measure faultline strength, we used the faultline algorithm developed 
by Thatcher et al. (2003), which is one of the most widely used measures of faultline strength 
(Thatcher and Patel, 2012). Calculating faultline strength (Fau) using this algorithm involves a 
two-step process. In a first step, the percentage variance explained by attribute alignment of 
two or more characteristics is measured for all possible splits of the group in two subgroups. 
The second step is to calculate the maximum value of Fau over all possible splits (Molleman, 
2005; Zanutto et al., 2011). Our measure of faultline strength is based on three social category 
based characteristics: stakeholder group represented, gender and age.  These data were collected 
in the first survey, answered by the CEO or the board chair. As our theoretical rationale is based 
on stakeholder representation, we first consider which stakeholder group the different board 
members represent. In doing so, we based our categorization on the identification of represented 
stakeholder groups in prior social entrepreneurship research (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Pache and 
Santos, 2010; Ramus and Vaccaro, 2014). As such, the first category we consider are 
(representatives of) beneficiaries, such as managers of nonprofit organizations in general and 
institutions taking care of people with disabilities or psychological problems in particular. The 
second category includes managers of for profit organizations representing market and 
customer interests. Third, government representatives frequently figure on the board, 
representing regional and local public policy as well as community interests. Finally, we added 
a fourth category, the “residual category,” consisting of people not belonging to the first three 
categories, such as academics, appointed to the board to support decision-making, and as such 
not representing a specific stakeholder group. In order for faultlines to emerge, the 
conceptualization of these different categories should align with other characteristics; as such 
we added two additional characteristics to calculate faultline strength in the board, namely 
gender and age. These are social category characteristics frequently used in faultline research 
as they are clearly visible characteristics, contributing to the emergence of faultlines based on 
similarity attraction and social identity (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Thatcher and Patel, 2012). In 
measuring age, three categories are considered (≤ 40, 41-60, >60). As to what gender is 
concerned, we distinguish between men and women.  We subsequently calculated Fau using 
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the statistical program R and the asw.cluster package developed by Meyer and Glenz (2013). 
In our sample, Fau has a value between 0 and 1, with an average value of 0.5. A Fau value of 1 
points to the existence of very strong faultlines, whereas a value close to 0 points to very weak 
faultlines between subgroups.  
Board Task conflict. Board task conflict is measured using 6 items based on Jehn (1994) and 
Jehn (1995) that are frequently used (Li and Hambrick, 2005; Minichilli et al., 2009; Zona and 
Zattoni, 2007). Specifically, the respondents were asked to indicate on an seven-point Likert 
scale (ranging from 1: strongly disagree to 7: strongly agree), the degree to which they agreed 
with the following statements: On the board (1) there are frequently conflicts and disagreements 
on decisions to be taken; (2) there are frequently conflicts and disagreements on how the board 
should work; (3) there are frequently conflicts and disagreements on how to pursue the firm’s 
goal; (4) there are frequently disagreements on the firm’s legitimate stakeholders; (5) there is a 
great deal of disagreement on the decision process; and (6) there are major differences of 
opinion about executing the strategy.  
The board task conflict measure is then the average of 6 items (α = 0.91), aggregated by 
taking the mean for the respondents belonging to the same organization (η2 = 0.39, p < 0.001). 
Values for board task conflict range between 1 and 2.94, with an average value of 1.70. 
Shared organizational goals. The level of shared organizational goals was assessed using 
the scale of Leana and Pil (2006), adapted to a board context by Fredette and Bradshaw (2012). 
Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed with six statements using 
a seven-point Likert scale (1: strongly disagree; 7: strongly agree). The six items are the 
following: (1) Board members share the same ambitions and vision for the organization;  (2) 
Board members are enthusiastic about pursuing the collective goals and mission of the 
organization; (3) There is a commonality of purpose in the board of my organization; (4) Board 
members are committed to the goals of the organization; (5) Board members view themselves 
as partners in charting the overall direction of the organization; and (6) On the board, everyone 
is in total agreement on our organization’s vision. Responses to the items were aggregated 
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among members of the same organization (α = 0.94; η2 = 0.45, p < 0.001). The variable’s value 
ranges between 3 and 6.89, with an average of 5.89. 
Subgroup imbalance. As noted earlier, the Fau algorithm calculates for which split into two 
subgroups the value of faultline strength is maximized. As such, through the calculation of Fau, 
we also gained insight into the size of subgroups. We subsequently calculated subgroup 
imbalance by dividing the size of the largest board subgroup by total board size (in terms of 
board members). Thus, a value of 0.5 indicates that both subgroups have the same size, which 
can be considered as a perfect subgroup balance. A value closer to 1 indicates that the subgroups 
are increasingly unequally sized, resulting in increasing subgroup imbalance. The average value 
for subgroup balance in our sample is 0.66. 
 
Control variables 
We further added control variables at board and firm level that may affect board service 
performance (Minichilli et al., 2012; Zona and Zattoni, 2007). At the board level, we control 
for the frequency of board meetings, as research finds that the frequency of board meetings 
impacts board service performance (Knockaert and Ucbasaran, 2013). Because each board 
member may bring different linkages and resources to the board, the number of board members 
is also expected to influence board service performance (Knockaert and Ucbasaran, 2013; 
Minichilli et al., 2009). The organizations in our sample on average hold about 6 board meetings 
per year, with a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 12 annual board meetings. Board size ranges 
from 3 to 20 board members, with an average board size of about 9 members. In line with prior 
faultline research, we further control for diversity effects in the board (Lau and Murnighan, 
2005; Li and Hambrick, 2005). We used Blau’s (1977) heterogeneity index to measure board 
diversity in terms of stakeholder representation, age and gender. Following the procedure 
suggested by Jehn et al. (1999), we averaged the heterogeneity indices for these three indicators 
to construct the board heterogeneity control variable (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Bezrukova et al., 
2012; Veltrop et al., 2015). In our sample, board heterogeneity ranges from 0 to 0.57, with an 
average value of 0.39. 
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At the organizational level, we controlled for age and size of the social enterprise as the need 
for advice and establishing legitimacy by board members may vary between younger and older 
organizations and between smaller and larger organizations (Knockaert et al., 2015; Minichilli 
et al., 2012). The size of the organization is operationalized as the number of employees at the 
end of 2013, obtained from the public annual accounting database, Belfirst. The organizations 
in our sample are between 11 and 54 years old, with an average age of 25. The number of 
employees ranges from 12 to 585 with an average of 142 employees.  
 
2.4. RESULTS 
Table 2.1 provides the means, standard deviations and correlations for all variables.  
To test our model as depicted in Figure 2.1, we employed a regression-based path analysis 
hereby building on existing computational tools. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) ranged 
between 1.157 and 2.679, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem in our analyses (Hair 
et al., 2006). We used the PROCESS macro for SPSS developed by Hayes (2013), which allows 
for testing for the total effect of faultline strength on board service performance (hypothesis 1), 
as well as for the mediation effect through board task conflict (hypothesis 2) (Hayes and 
Scharkow, 2013). Furthermore, we used this macro to test for the moderating effects of shared 
organizational goals (hypothesis 3) and subgroup imbalance (hypothesis 4). 
The model in path diagram can be found in Figure 2.2 and consists of three distinct 
submodels. Model 1, in Panel A, is used to test whether faultline strength has an effect on board 
service performance (hypothesis 1). Models 2 and 3, in Panel B, are used to estimate the indirect 
effect of faultline strength on board service performance through board task conflict (hypothesis 
2). Models 4 and 5 in panel C are used to test hypothesis 3 and 4. 
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Figure 2.2: Conceptual Model (Figure 2.1) represented as a path model, referring to the 
regression coefficients estimated and reported in Table 2.2  
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The results of our analysis are presented in Table 2.2. First, the control model only contains 
the control variables. The results show that the frequency of board meetings has a significantly 
positive effect on board service performance (B = 0.860, p < 0.001). Model 1 then allows us to 
estimate the total effect (c in Panel A of Figure 2.2) of faultline strength on board service 
performance. We find a significant, negative effect (B = -1.360, p < 0.01), supporting 
hypothesis 1. In Model 2 and Model 3, this total effect is decomposed in a direct (c’ in Panel B 
of Figure 2.2) and an indirect effect (a en b in Panel B of Figure 2.2). We find a significant, 
negative direct effect of faultline strength on board service performance (B = -1.006, p < 0.05). 
Furthermore, the results show a significantly positive effect of faultline strength on board task 
conflict (B = 0.727, p < 0.05) and a significant negative effect of board task conflict on board 
service performance (B = -0.487, p < 0.01). A 95% confidence interval for this indirect effect, 
based on 10,000 bootstrap samples, was found to range between -0.920 and -0.069. As zero is 
not included in the interval, board task conflict can be construed as a mediator between faultline 
strength and board service performance, in the expected directions, thus supporting hypotheses 
2a and 2b. Next, in model 4, the moderation effect of shared organizational goals is tested (d in 
Panel C of Figure 2.2). We find a significant, negative effect (B = -1.577, p < 0.01), indicating 
that higher levels of shared organizational goals attenuate the positive effect of faultline strength 
on board task conflict, resulting in lower levels of board task conflict. As such we find support 
for hypothesis 3. Finally in model 5, we test whether the effect of board task conflict on board 
service performance is moderated by subgroup imbalance (e in Panel C of Figure 2.2). 
Hypothesis 4 is not supported as we find a moderating effect that is not statistically significant. 
In order to interpret the significant interaction between faultline strength and shared 
organizational goals in explaining board task conflict, we visualized the interaction in Figure 
2.3. The figure demonstrates that the slope of faultline strength is steeper for organizations with 
lower levels of shared organizational goals. Furthermore, the effect of faultline strength on 
board task conflict is neutralized for organizations with high levels of shared organizational 
goals, emphasizing the importance of having a shared vision on what the goals of the 
organization are within the board.
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Figure 2.3: Interaction effect of faultline strength and shared organizational goals in 
relation with board task conflict 
2.5. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Stakeholder democracy in general, and stakeholder representation in the board of directors 
specifically, can help organizations to deal with the growing attention to sustainability and 
corporate citizenship. Through the involvement of stakeholders in the board, it is expected that 
organizations will be better able to balance diverging stakeholder expectations and, 
consequently, gain legitimacy from different stakeholder groups, which might be important for 
resource acquisition. Despite these advantages of stakeholder representation, several authors 
also warn for the potentially negative effects of such representation. In this study, we argue that 
stakeholder representation may give rise to the origination of subgroups and related faultlines. 
Particularly, we find that faultline strength is positively associated with lower levels of board 
service performance and that this relationship is mediated by board task conflict. As such, our 
results show the importance of considering, alongside the presumed positive implications of the 
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representation of stakeholder groups in the board, the potentially dark side of such stakeholder 
representation. However, our research also points to the existence of important contingencies 
that may mitigate such reverse effects. In particular, we find that, as board members’ visions 
on firm’s organizational goals increasingly converge, the negative impact of faultline strength 
on conflict within the board is mitigated. While not explicitly the focus of this study, we contend 
that the board chair, often considered a mediating hierarch in resolving decision-making 
ambiguities (Knockaert et al., 2015), may have an important role to play in enhancing 
convergence of board members’ visions on the organizational goals. Further, while we expected 
subgroup imbalance to alleviate the negative relationship between task conflict within the board 
and board service performance, we did not find support for such relationship. While our 
expectations were warranted following conflict theory, developments in the organizational 
behavior and entrepreneurship literatures may provide indications to explanations for the lack 
of support. Specifically, researchers point to the fact that individual and group behavior may 
not only be driven by objectives states, but may also be related to the perception of such states. 
For instance, in studies on diversity, scholars argue that it is not only the actual degree of 
diversity that affects behavior, but that the perceived dissimilarity between group members may 
also matter (Cunningham, 2007; Knockaert et al., 2015). Similarly, subgroup imbalance may 
only impact behavior if such imbalance is also perceived by the other group members (Cronin 
et al., 2011; O'Leary and Mortensen, 2010). Alternatively, subgroup imbalance may only 
alleviate the negative consequences of board task conflict in cases where such imbalance also 
leads to differences in the power distribution between subgroups. 
Our study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, it contributes to the 
literature on stakeholder democracy and stakeholder participation, which has largely considered 
stakeholder representation in the board a good practice (Harrison and Freeman, 2004; Moriarty, 
2014), but neglects to study the phenomenon in general. Specifically, it points to the potentially 
nefarious implications of such representation, alongside the identification of contingency 
factors that may alleviate such implications. Second, our study adds to the corporate governance 
literature, which calls for an increased interest in the board service role, alongside (behavioral) 
theoretical perspectives that help to understand the board’s engagement in this role. Indeed, our 
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approach is a clear shift away from the agency perspective that has dominated governance 
research for decades (Daily et al., 2003; McDonald and Westphal, 2010). Our results point to 
the importance of faultlines and conflict, and their underpinning theories, in studying board 
functioning. As such, it also responds to calls to leave the beaten paths of board structure and 
composition in order to provide deeper insights into board dynamics (Finkelstein and Mooney, 
2003; Huse, 2007). Finally, our study contributes to faultlines literature, elaborating on the 
concept in a board context, in which it has been understudied. Specifically, it supports Lim et 
al. (2013)’s call to push the boundaries of the faultlines concept by not only considering 
multiple demographic attributes. Specifically, it introduces stakeholder representation as an 
important identity-based attribute. As such, it also responds to calls in the entrepreneurship 
literature to integrate the promising concept of faultlines in entrepreneurial settings (Lim et al., 
2013). 
Our study also has implications for practitioners as our results reveal the potentially negative 
effects of stakeholder representation. Managers of organizations, just like their stakeholders and 
board members, should be aware of the potential drawbacks of representation of stakeholder 
groups in the board. While this should not be misinterpreted as a call to compose uniform boards 
in terms of stakeholder representation and other demographic characteristics, this research 
indicates that it is important to be aware of the potentially negative effects of faultlines and 
subgroup formation. At the same time, our study points to the importance of contingency 
factors, such as alignment between board members as to what the organizational goals are, in 
alleviating the negative consequences of strong faultline emergence. Practitioners who follow 
good ethical practices by incorporating a range of stakeholders in the board of directors may 
want to take such contingencies into consideration. 
Our paper also has some limitations, which have implications for future research. First, in 
line with the majority of governance research, our study is based on a cross-sectional design, 
and is as such unable to identify causal relationships. Longitudinal studies may provide 
additional insights into causal relationships between subgroup and faultline emergence, the 
efforts made to attenuate the negative effects of faultlines, and board performance (Machold 
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and Farquhar, 2013). Additionally, qualitative research designs could be employed in order to 
study “how” and “why” questions, thus further opening up the black box of board dynamics in 
order to shed light on the processes through which different types of conflicts and actions for 
mitigating the drawbacks from strong faultlines work (McNulty et al., 2013). Such alternative 
research designs could include, among others, observation of board meetings and focus groups 
(Beck, 2014; Bezemer et al., 2014; Hough et al., 2014; Van der Brempt et al., 2015). 
Second, as articulated above, future research could study the impact of subgroup imbalance 
in alleviating the negative consequences of board task conflict on board performance. For 
instance, future research could simultaneously examine actual and perceived subgroup 
imbalance. It has to be noted that, in order to do so, ideally, two-staged research designs will 
have to be developed, in which the researcher first collects data in order to calculate faultline 
existence and strength. In a second phase, the researcher will then have to confront group 
members with the identified subgroups, and ask group members to indicate the extent to which 
imbalance between such subgroups is also perceived. Or, future research may revert to 
experimental designs to shed further light on the relationship between actual and perceived 
subgroup imbalance. Alternatively, future research could study the relationship between 
subgroup imbalance and different dimensions of power (Triana et al., 2014) and how these 
dimensions could alleviate or strengthen the nefarious implications of strong faultlines. Finally, 
as our results show that it is important to build a shared vision of what the goals of the 
organization are, future research could provide insight into the antecedents of convergence in 
shared organizational goals. Specifically, board development practices, such as team building 
and board evaluations, may contribute to such a shared vision (Gill et al., 2005; Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2005) and may be fruitful research areas. Further, in line with board leadership 
research, board chairs may also facilitate a consensus on what the organizational goals are 
(Harrison et al., 2013) and future research could purposefully investigate under which 
circumstances (such as communication style, types and intensity of interactions, leadership 
style…) board chairs are successful in building such consensus.  
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2.6. CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, this study is the first to study how faultlines originating from the representation 
of different stakeholder groups are related to board functioning. We conducted this study in the 
especially relevant context of social enterprises. Specifically, it points to the existence of a 
negative relationship between faultline strength and board service performance, which is 
mediated by board task conflict. Furthermore, the association between faultline strength and 
board task conflict was attenuated by a convergence between board members over 
organizational goals. Our study points to important implications for both academia and practice. 
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3. The development of a measurement instrument for the
organizational performance of social enterprises
ABSTRACT 
There is a growing consensus that the adoption of performance measurement tools are of 
particular interest for social enterprises in order to support internal decision-making and to 
answer the demands of accountability toward their stakeholders. As a result, different 
methodologies to assess the non-financial performance of social enterprises are developed by 
academics and practitioners. Many of these methodologies are on the one hand discussions of 
general guidelines or, on the other hand, very case specific. As such, these methodologies do 
not offer a functional tool for a broad range of social enterprises. The goal of this article is to 
fill this gap by developing an instrument suitable for the internal assessment and the external 
reporting of the non-financial performance of a diverse group of social enterprises. To reach 
this goal, we used qualitative (focus groups and a Delphi panel) and quantitative research 
methods (exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis), involving multiple actors in the field 
of social entrepreneurship. Focusing on five dimensions of organizational performance 
(economic, environmental, community, human and governance performance), we offer a set of 
indicators and an assessment tool for social enterprises.  
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3.1. INTRODUCTION  
Due to the growing interest in sustainability and the organizational responsibilities to society, 
organizations face the challenge of assessing and reporting their non-financial performance. 
This is especially the case for social enterprises (Arvidson and Lyon, 2014; Grieco et al., 2014; 
Manetti, 2014). Social enterprises are social mission-driven organizations that develop an 
entrepreneurial activity (make products and/or deliver goods and services) in order to fulfill 
unsolved social needs in society (Mair and Marti, 2006; Moss et al., 2011). They are considered 
as a distinct category of organizations, positioned between profit and nonprofit organizations 
(Santos, 2012; Wilson and Post, 2013). Social enterprises differ from profit organizations as 
profit is not a goal as such, but a mean to create social value (Arena et al., 2015). Compared to 
nonprofit organizations, social enterprises establish entrepreneurial activities to ensure their 
financial sustainability and rely not (exclusively) on subsidies and donations (Doherty et al., 
2014).  
Because of the dual mission of creating social value and being financially sustainable, 
financial as well as non-financial performance are core to the social enterprise functioning 
(Smith et al., 2013). Social enterprises are described as typical hybrid organizations (Battilana 
et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2012; Pache and Santos, 2013) and face some specific internal and 
external tensions and challenges (Smith et al., 2013). The challenging environment has made 
the assessment and the reporting of the organizational performance within social enterprises of 
particularly importance. Firstly, different authors warn for internal tensions because of the 
difficulty of balancing the financial and social goals in decision-making and refer to mission 
drift, which is the erosion of the social goals in favor of financial goals, as a threat (Doherty et 
al., 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Ramus and Vaccaro, 2014). In addition to the annual account -
which is useful to evaluate the financial performance- a tool that supports social enterprises to 
assess and discuss internally their non-financial performance might be helpful in balancing the 
social and the financial goals in decision-making and in avoiding mission drift (Arena et al., 
2015; Grieco et al., 2014). Secondly, social enterprises face external tensions, related to the 
need to establish legitimacy and to obtain support from different stakeholder groups (Battilana 
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and Lee, 2014; Mair et al., 2015). As social enterprises lack a dominant external stakeholder, 
they are exposed to multiple and conflicting expectations and demands of different principal 
stakeholder groups (Ebrahim et al., 2014). The legitimacy perceived by stakeholders is crucial 
for resource acquisition, such as financial resources and human resources (Doherty et al., 2014; 
Miller et al., 2012). Important stakeholder groups of social enterprises are the beneficiaries of 
the social mission and the customers, paying for the products and services delivered by the 
social enterprise (Ebrahim et al., 2014). Further, also policy makers, funders and volunteers can 
have a legitimate stake in the organization. These stakeholders expect assessments and 
reporting to be transparent and comparable (Pache and Santos, 2010; Spear et al., 2009). This 
has brought social enterprises under significant pressure to seek ways to more actively manage 
and report their non-financial performance to answer the demands of accountability to multiple 
stakeholders (Mair et al., 2015).  As boards of directors typically engage in controlling the 
organizational performance (Daily et al., 2003), they may play a significant role in monitoring 
the non-financial performance of social enterprises. More specifically, they may urge the CEO 
to develop, implement and use a systematic approach to assess and report their non-financial 
organizational performance (Arena et al., 2015). 
Although there is a consensus that the development and adoption of performance 
measurement instruments is of particular interest for social enterprises, there is a lack of 
methodologies with a practical usefulness for a broad range of social enterprises (Arvidson and 
Lyon, 2014; Mair et al., 2015). This paper aims at describing the development of a set of 
indicators and an assessment tool, useful for evaluating and reporting the non-financial 
organizational performance of social enterprises. While the financial performance of social 
enterprises can be evaluated based on the information available in the annual account of the 
organization, the aim of this paper is to develop a tool to assess the non-financial performance 
of social enterprises. If we refer, in the following sections, to the organizational performance of 
social enterprises, we actually focus on the non-financial organizational performance. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the following section, we briefly review relevant 
literature on performance measurement in social enterprises. Next, we describe the different 
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steps carried out to identify relevant indicators and to develop an assessment tool to assess 
organizational performance in social enterprises. The article concludes with a discussion of the 
development of this assessment tool, challenges involved in its use and suggestions for future 
research.  
 
3.2. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN SOCIAL ENTERPRISES  
The idea that organizations should measure and manage their performance is a key-issue in 
management literature and is strongly encouraged by international bodies such as the OECD 
and the World Bank (Boyne, 2010). There is a growing consensus that social enterprises should 
assess their performance to support internal decision-making and to respond to the increasing 
demands of accountability towards different stakeholders (Arvidson and Lyon, 2014; Meadows 
and Pike, 2010). As a result, researchers and practitioners have developed different 
methodologies and tools to measure the performance of social enterprises (Ebrahim and 
Rangan, 2014). These methodologies and tools are however diverse and make a comparison of 
the organizational performance of social enterprises very difficult (Arena et al., 2015). Grieco 
et al. (2014) (p.1) state that ‘the overall picture remains fragmentary if not confusing’. The 
reason why methodologies and tools are falling short of expectations is twofold. On the one 
hand, some studies are ‘general’ in their design and do not offer specific indicators or 
measurement tools. The developed methodologies and tools often discuss frameworks 
providing general guidelines for social enterprises considering designing and implementing a 
performance measurement system, e.g. Manetti (2014). These papers discuss for instance how 
diverging stakeholder expectations can be taken into consideration or they present different 
steps that social enterprise can follow to implement a performance measurement system (Arena 
et al., 2015). They offer as such no insight in the dimensions or indicators that can or should be 
evaluated (Grieco et al., 2014). Other papers discuss relevant dimensions of organizational 
performance (e.g. environmental performance, social performance…),  but do not propose 
relevant performance indicators (Nicholls, 2009). On the other hand, other studies are too 
specific and are examining performance measurement in specific cases and make it difficult to 
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replicate and generalize to other social enterprises. Bellucci et al. (2012), for instance, study the 
performance of fair trade shops in Italy. The performance indicators studied are specifically 
related to the fair trade value chain and cannot be replicated without adaptations to other 
organizational contexts. 
Differences in approach and methods related to performance measurement in social 
enterprises can be attributed to two antecedents. Firstly, social enterprises differ in size, 
activities, objectives and accordingly relevant stakeholders. By consequence, it is not easy to 
develop a model that is suitable for all kind of social enterprises (Arena et al., 2015). Secondly, 
performance measurement can serve different purposes. Generally spoken, performance 
measurement can have an internal or an external purpose. A performance measurement tool can 
be used as an internal management instrument, enabling organizations to assess their 
performance and support internal decision-making. On the other hand, performance 
management tools with an external purpose are used for external reporting and have the main 
purpose of accountability to stakeholders. A different purpose implies a different design of the 
performance measurement system (Grieco et al., 2014). Notwithstanding this diversity in 
organizations and performance measurement systems, we also notice a consensus on some 
aspects. First, there is a consensus that organizational performance is multi-dimensional. Not 
only there is, as mentioned earlier, the difference between financial and non-financial 
performance. Also non-financial performance is multi-dimensional taking into consideration 
performance having an impact on the local community, the environment, society in general, 
people working in the organization (Arena et al., 2015; Grieco et al., 2014). Secondly, there is 
a consensus that performance is not only related to immediate results. Many frameworks use a 
‘results chain’ or ‘logic model’ (Ebrahim and Rangan, 2014) also taking in consideration inputs 
(i.e. resources used) and activities within the organization (Arena et al., 2015; Bagnoli and 
Megali, 2011). These models, stressing the alignment of an organization’s input, throughput 
and output components, can be used to assure program alignment and to evaluate the results of 
an organization (van Loon et al., 2013). Concerning the achieved results, a difference is made 
between immediate results (outputs) and medium and long-term results, often referred to as 
outcomes or impacts (Grieco et al., 2014). Although there is a growing attention for ‘impact 
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measurement’, the terms ‘outcomes’ and ‘impact’ are not consistently used (Ebrahim and 
Rangan, 2014). Ebrahim and Rangan (2014) make a difference between outputs (immediate 
results), outcome (medium- and long-term impact on individuals) and impact (medium- and 
long-term impact on communities or populations). There is a consensus that organizations 
should at least measure and report on inputs, activities and outputs (Boyne, 2010). However 
Ebrahim and Rangan (2014) doubt whether social enterprises should go further and also 
measure outcomes and impact. Their main argument is that the causal link between outputs and 
outcomes is not clear and that outcomes and impact often go beyond the control of the social 
enterprise. Some scholars argue that organizations, or the management of these organizations, 
could be demotivated, withdraw discretionary effort and sit back and see if they win or lose a 
performance indicator game that resembles a lottery (Boyne, 2010). For instance, a work 
integration social enterprise offering a job to disadvantaged people, can measure the number of 
people hired by the organization (output). However, whether this will result in an improved 
quality of life at the individual level (outcome) or a decrease in poverty at society level (impact) 
is not straightforward as also other external factors beyond the control of the social enterprise 
will have an influence on this outcome and impact. Furthermore, Ebrahim and Rangan (2014) 
argue, mainly based on practitioner oriented literature, that focusing on the measurement of 
impacts and outcomes might be counterproductive, because it asks a lot of efforts of the (often 
small) organizations without necessarily resulting in better results. Instead they suggest that 
outcomes and impacts can be measured at an aggregated level, for instance by governments, 
foundations or impact investors. 
Relying on these former insights, the aim of this paper is to develop a performance 
measurement tool for social enterprises. More specific, we want to develop a tool suitable for a 
broad range of social enterprises. Taking in consideration the internal (assessing organizational 
performance and supporting decision-making) and external (reporting) purpose of performance 
measurement, we aim at providing social enterprises with a performance measurement 
instrument which is based on the reliable, valid, and standardized assessment of organizational 
performance. In developing this tool we build on the insights that performance is multi-
dimensional and that, when evaluating performance, inputs, activities and outputs should be 
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considered. Based on the arguments of Ebrahim and Rangan (2014), we will not focus on 
outcomes and impacts. Moreover, we are convinced that taking in consideration outcomes and 
impacts will refrain us from developing a tool suitable for social enterprises with diverse 
activities. 
In what follows, we discuss into detail how we developed the performance measurement 
tools, using qualitative and quantitative research methods and building on the expertise and 
points of view of a broad range of practitioners in the field of social entrepreneurship. 
 
3.3. METHODOLOGY 
The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we want to identify relevant indicators for 
assessing the non-financial performance of social enterprises. This set of indicators can serve 
the external purpose of performance measurement: in the external reporting to stakeholders, 
social enterprises can elaborate on their non-financial performance related to these indicators. 
This is in line with existing standards developed to assess non-financial performance (e.g. 
Global Reporting Initiative, GRI) (GRI, 2015). These standards offer a broad range of possible 
performance indicators and organizations choose, given their activity, performance indicators 
they consider as relevant. While different efforts have been made to develop specific sets of 
relevant performance indicators for different kind of organizations, such as NGOs and public 
sector organizations, this is not the case for  social enterprises (Dumay et al., 2010; GRI, 2014). 
On the other hand, based on the selected indicators, we want to develop a measurement 
instrument that social enterprises can use as a self-assessment tool to evaluate internally their 
non-financial organizational performance. In line with existing quality assessment frameworks, 
such as in the EFQM Excellence model of the European Foundation on Quality Management, 
different members of the organization can complete the measurement instrument, enabling the 
assessment of the non-financial performance and supporting decision-making (Heras-
Saizarbitoria et al., 2011). 
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In order to be able to realize these two aims, we followed generally accepted guidelines and 
phases outlined in scale development literature (DeVellis, 2003; Hinkin, 1995). Table 3.1 gives 
an overview of the five phases of the research process, combining deductive and inductive 
methodologies to generate relevant indicators and items (Hinkin, 1998). 
 
Table 3.1: Overview of the different phases of the research process 
 
Research Process Objectives Results 
Phase 1: Literature review ? Identify performance domains 
? Identify performance indicators 
? 5 performance domains 
? 41 indicators 
Phase 2: Focus groups ? Check relevance and 
completeness of selected 
performance domains and 
indicators 
? 41 indicators (phase 1) approved 
? 12 additional indicators 
? 53 indicators 
Phase 3: Delphi panel ? Find consensus regarding 
relevant indicators  
? 13 indicators removed 
? 40 indicators accepted 
Phase 4: Survey 
instrument development 
and administration 
? Develop a survey instrument to 
assess performance on the 
retained indicators 
? Survey distributed to 1018 social 
enterprises 
? Response rate 24% (244 social 
enterprises) 
Phase 5: Validation of 
relevant indicators and the 
assessment tool  
? Item reduction 
? Indicator reduction 
? Validation of measurement 
instrument 
 
? Validated measurement 
instrument 
? 21 indicators  
 
We performed our research in a Belgian region, namely Flanders. As it is the case in Europe 
in general, Flemish social enterprises mainly emerged because of the persistence of structural 
unemployment and the need for more active policies to tackle the increasing exclusion of 
specific groups. These ‘work integration social enterprises’ offer a job to disadvantaged people, 
but in addition they focus actively on job training, necessary to make reintegration in the labor 
market possible, and provide social support to solve personal problems which are often 
obstacles for employment (Battilana et al., 2014; Pache and Santos, 2013; Van Opstal et al., 
2009). While some of these organizations are specifically set up to hire disadvantaged people, 
others are organizations or local authorities who hire some disadvantaged workers, next to a 
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majority of regular employees (Van Opstal et al., 2009). Next to the work integration social 
economy, there is a growing interest in the entrepreneurial, innovative approach of social 
enterprises. In Flanders, these social enterprises often are member-based democratic 
organizations, mainly adopting the organizational form of ‘cooperatives’ (Defourny and 
Nyssens, 2008; Defourny and Nyssens, 2010). In the phases of the research process, we took in 
consideration and involved (representatives of) the different groups of social enterprises. This 
will be discussed more into detail when commenting phase 2, 3 and 4 of the research process.  
 
3.3.1. Phase 1: Literature review  
To obtain an overview of relevant performance indicators, we started with an extensive 
literature review. This deductive approach is appropriate as measuring the non-financial 
performance of organizations has gained an increasing attention in literature (Hinkin, 1998). 
While screening scientific journals, we noticed that relying on internationally accepted 
standards is a common practice when studying non-financial performance of organizations 
(Wood, 2010). Digging deeper into this standards, we selected four standards often referred to 
in the literature and proven their worth in practice as well as in scientific research: (1) Kinder, 
Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) social responsibility rating (Laplume et al., 2008; Wood, 2010), (2) 
Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) (Consolandi et al., 2009; Robinson et al., 2011), (3) 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) (Hahn and Lulfs, 2014; Levy et al., 2010) and (4) ISO 26000 
(Balzarova and Castka, 2012; Helms et al., 2012). Appendix 1 provides an overview of the 
performance domains considered by each of the four selected standards. Based on this overview 
we selected five performance domains that (1) are taken into account by several of these 
standards and (2) are relevant in the context of social enterprises: economic, human, 
environmental, community and governance performance. Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the 
five selected performance domains.  
Economic performance is related to the economic conditions supporting a strong financial 
position, important for the viability of organizations. As such the focus is not on financial 
indicators reported in the annual financial accounts of organizations, but on economic indicators 
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influencing these financial indicators (GRI, 2015; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005). Human 
performance refers to the relationship of the organization with its workforce (Chang and Chi, 
2007). Environmental performance focuses on the efforts organizations make to protect nature 
(Andersson et al., 2013). Community performance refers to how organizations deal with their 
responsibilities in society (Niehm et al., 2008), including the relationships with dominant 
stakeholders: beneficiaries of the social mission and customers, paying for the delivered 
products and services. Governance performance refers to ‘systems and processes concerned 
with ensuring the overall direction, control and accountability of an organization’ (Cornforth, 
2014). Important issues related to organizational governance are board composition and board 
behavior (Daily et al., 2003; Hambrick et al., 2008), as well as dealing with stakeholder 
expectations (Chan et al., 2014). Governance performance is a particular performance domain 
as it is expected that good governance practices have a positive impact on organizational 
decision-making, in turn positively influencing the other performance domains of the 
organization (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011; Huang, 2010).  
 
Figure 3.1: Overview of the five selected performance domains 
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In a next step, we detected relevant indicators for measuring the five performance domains. 
As the attention for the performance of social enterprises is rather recent, the literature and 
research on the performance of social enterprises is still limited. We therefore decided to screen 
the literature on research regarding the non-financial performance of organizations in general, 
which is more extensively studied in the context of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), 
where it is referred to as ‘social performance’(Wood, 2010). We started with the examination 
of 10 high impact management journals (included in the ISI Web of Science), looking for 
articles with ‘social’ and ‘performance’ in the title in the period 1990-2013. Appendix 2 gives 
an overview of the screened management journals. As a result, we found 68 articles. 33 articles 
were not relevant because they did not focus on the non-financial performance of organizations. 
Analyzing the remaining 35 articles, we concluded that these articles only provide a limited 
number of possible indicators. The main reason is that many articles do not refer to relevant 
indicators because they are conceptual or because they use existing ratings provided by, for 
instance, financial institutions to assess the non-financial performance of organizations.  
In a next step, we screened two additional journals: Journal of Business Ethics and Social 
Enterprise Journal. We selected these journals because they have a focus on CSR and social 
enterprises. Once again, we screened the journals for relevant articles with ‘social’ and 
‘performance’ in the title in the period 1990-2013 . As a result of this additional screening we 
found 60 additional articles, which provided us with more relevant indicators.  
Based on the literature review, we retained 41 indicators. 
3.3.2. Phase 2: Focus groups 
We noticed that, based on the examined management literature, it is difficult to conclude 
that the retained indicators are most relevant for the context of social enterprises. Firstly, 
because the screened literature is not exclusively related to the performance of social 
enterprises. Secondly, because it is possible that some relevant indicators are not detected in 
the literature. Therefore we decided to combine the deductive approach of the literature review 
with additional inductive approaches (Hinkin, 1998). To check the relevance and completeness 
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of the selected indicators, we organized two focus group sessions. The use of focus groups is a 
common qualitative research method in social sciences, often as a part of the development of 
measurement instruments (Cowton and Downs, 2015). We decided to organize focus groups 
because it enables in-depth discussions with experts on emerging and unexplored topics 
(Bruggen and Willems, 2009). 
The reason why we selected key informants with a different background to participate in the 
focus groups, is twofold. Firstly, we wanted insights in the performance of different kinds of 
social enterprises (the dominant form of work integration, as well as other social enterprises 
such as cooperatives). Secondly, we considered it useful to ask the opinion of employees 
involved in the management of a social enterprise and informants with a broader focus. The 
latter group are mainly researchers and civil servants supporting social enterprises. We 
therefore decided to organize two focus groups. In the first focus group session, 8 managers of 
social enterprises were involved. Because of the prevalence of work integration social 
enterprises in Flanders (Van Opstal et al., 2009), we invited managers of different types of work 
integration social enterprises. In the second focus group, we aim at a broader perspective: 3 
representatives of sectorial federations of work integration social enterprises, 2 researchers with 
a broad perspective on social entrepreneurship and 2 civil servants of the Flemish government 
were involved.  
Organizing two focus groups involving 15 key informants with a different background, gave 
us the opportunity to gain insight in different perspectives regarding measuring the performance 
of social enterprises. Specifically, we asked the participants whether the 5 performance domains 
and the 41 indicators selected in phase 1 are suitable for assessing the performance of social 
enterprises and whether there were indicators missing. As a result of the focus groups, the 41 
indicators selected in phase 1 were approved and 12 indicators were added, resulting in 53 
indicators. The indicators in each performance domain are presented in Table 3.2. A distinction 
is made between indicators selected based on the literature review (phase 1) and approved by 
the focus groups (phase 2), on the one hand, and indicators that are provided by the focus groups 
(phase 2), on the other hand.  
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Table 3.2: Overview of the indicators selected through literature review, focus groups and 
Delphi panel 
 
Indicators identified through literature review and focus groups (53) Consensus in 
Delphi panel (40) 
Economic performance   
Literature and approved by focus groups  
Market share in comparison to important competitors  
Growth in market share  
Additional indicators focus groups  
Received subsidies and donations   
Innovativeness X 
Proactiveness X 
Risk Taking X 
Environmental performance   
Literature and approved by focus groups  
Use of renewable energy X 
Transportation of materials and goods  X 
Transportation of the members of the organization’s workforce X 
Waste reduction X 
Use of sustainable materials X 
Environmental policy X 
Environmental performance measurement X 
Community performance  
Literature and approved by focus groups  
Offering job opportunities  
Hiring disadvantaged people X 
Local suppliers X 
Local customers  
Philanthropy  
Partnerships X 
Being responsive to complaints of customers  
Adaptation of products and services to satisfy complaints of customers  
Additional indicators focus groups  
Informing the local community X 
Offering traineeships to students X 
Offering products/services to vulnerable people X 
Addressing unsolved problems in society X 
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Table 3.2: Overview of the indicators selected through literature review, focus groups and 
Delphi panel (continued) 
 
Indicators identified through literature review and focus groups (53) 
(continued) 
Consensus in 
Delphi panel (40) 
Human performance   
Literature and approved by focus groups  
Supporting learning initiative X 
Policy on education and training X 
Providing education and training X 
Diversity management X 
Equal opportunities for minorities X 
Involvement of personnel in education and training  X 
Age sensitive personnel policy  
Work-life balance X 
Interaction between employees X 
Goal oriented HRM X 
Additional indicators focus groups  
Development/personal growth of personnel X 
Absenteeism through illness  
Support on the work floor X 
Job satisfaction X 
Governance performance   
Literature and approved by focus groups  
Board diversity  
No CEO duality  
Independent board members X 
Adaptation of the composition of the board X 
Clear organizational mission and goals X 
Engagement of board members toward the mission and goals of the 
organization 
X 
Involvement of the board in strategic initiatives X 
Clarity of roles (of board members and management team) X 
Participative decision-making X 
Goals meeting the needs of the stakeholders X 
Adaptation to changes in the environment X 
Efficient, well prepared board meetings  
Preparedness to learn from mistakes X 
External communication to stakeholders X 
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3.3.3. Phase 3: Delphi Panel 
In focus groups, group dynamics and more particularly the dominance of some participants 
may substantially influence the results. Moreover focus groups are not anonymous, potentially 
making people less outspoken (Bruggen and Willems, 2009; Cowton and Downs, 2015). To 
overcome these potential disadvantages of focus groups, we used the Delphi technique to reach 
a consensus on the indicators. The Delphi technique encompasses a structured, iterative process 
in which subject matter experts share their anonymous opinion during subsequent rounds 
(Caffey et al., 2001; Landeta, 2006; Okoli and Pawlowski, 2004; Rowe et al., 2005; Schmidt, 
1997; Von Der Gracht, 2012; Worrell et al., 2013). Specifically, this Delphi panel includes 17 
panelists with different backgrounds: (1) managers of social enterprises, (2) experts on social 
entrepreneurship (academics, government officials, representatives of sectorial federations) and 
(3) members of two networks of organizations focusing on sustainability and corporate social
responsibility (Kauri and Positive Entrepreneurs) and as such having a keen interest in non-
financial performance. By synthesizing these opinions after each round, the researcher pursues 
consensus within the panel of experts (Schmidt, 1997; Von Der Gracht, 2012; Worrell et al., 
2013). After two rounds, the required consensus was achieved which resulted in the removal of 
13 indicators and the selection of 40 indicators. Table 3.2 gives an overview of the removed 
and accepted indicators. 
3.3.4. Phase 4: Survey instrument development and administration 
As explained earlier, next to the selection of relevant performance indicators which can serve 
the external purpose of reporting to external stakeholders, we aim at developing a measurement 
instrument that social enterprises can use as an internal, self-assessment tool. Therefore, the 40 
selected indicators were concretized in a survey instrument. Questionnaires are the most 
commonly used method of data collection in field research (Hinkin, 1998) and over the past 
several decades, scales have been developed suitable for assessing input, throughput and output 
of the performance of organizations. In the next section (phase 5), the items and scales used to 
measure the indicators are discussed for each performance domain separately. To achieve high 
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levels of content validity, most of the constructs and measures used in the instrument were 
already verified in earlier research. Next, we created measures by adapting existing scales. 
Given the purpose of developing a measurement instrument suitable for a broad range of 
social enterprises, the survey was contributed to different groups of organizations, 
encompassing the sector of social enterprises in Flanders, Belgium. The work was carried out 
with the active help of the Flemish government who provided the sample for the study. 
The following organizations were selected: (1) sheltered workshops and social workshops: 
established with the main purpose of reintegrating job seekers who face difficulties to find a 
job in the regular job market because of physical, social or psychological problems, mainly 
operating in packaging, assembly, gardening, recycling, and printing (Battilana et al., 2014), 
(2) local service economy initiatives: social enterprises closely connected to local authorities, 
offering jobs to long-term unemployed people in combination with offering quality services to 
the local community and households (e.g. cleaning services, shopping assistance for the elderly) 
(Van Opstal et al., 2009), (3) work experience enterprises and work care initiatives, offer a job 
to long-term unemployed people and are mainly active in health and social care or the cultural 
sector (Van Opstal et al., 2009), (4) work integration enterprises receive subsidies in return for 
employing long-term unemployed jobseekers and integrate them into their regular staff (Van 
Opstal et al., 2009) and (5) cooperatives: member-based democratic organizations (Spear, 
2004). 
The survey was distributed to the CEOs of 1018 social enterprises. These CEOs have an 
overview over the overall performance of the organization, including the different performance 
domains which are part of our measurement instrument. The survey was distributed using a 
web-based tool (Qualtrics). After a period of intensive follow-up (mail and telephone) of the 
responses, a total of 244 CEOs completed the survey, yielding a response rate of 24%. After 
removing incomplete surveys, our results are based on the responses from the CEOs of 241 
organizations. The age of the organization in our sample varies between 2 and 93 years old, 
with an average age of 26. The number of employees ranges from 1 to 2023 with an average of 
147 employees. 84% of the organizations are SME’s with less than 250 employees. Table 3.3 
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gives an overview of the population of 1018 social enterprises and of the 241 social enterprises 
that participated. 
Table 3.3: Overview of the population and sample of  the survey 
Population Sample 
Sheltered an Social Workshops 80 (8%) 44 (18%) 
Local service economy initiatives 206 (20%) 60 (25%) 
Work experience enterprises/Work care initiatives 278 (27%) 81 (34%) 
Work integration enterprises 293 (29%) 35 (15%) 
Cooperatives  161 (16%) 21 (9%) 
Total 1018 (100%) 241 (100%) 
3.3.5.  Phase 5: Validation of relevant indicators and the assessment tool 
The aim of this phase in the research process is twofold: (1) reduction of the number of 
indicators by identifying overarching performance indicators, encompassing different of the 
retained indicators and (2) validation of the developed survey instrument. Building on scale 
development and construct validation literature (DeVellis, 2003; Hinkin, 1995), we use 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis to reach these goals and we assess the internal 
consistency of the remaining scales using Cronbach’s alpha (Hair et al., 2006; Janssens et al., 
2008). 
We will discuss the analyses and results for each performance domain separately (economic, 
environmental, community, human and governance). First we will give an overview of the items 
and scales used to measure the selected indicators. When analyzing the data, we first used 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Because some indicators are measured using adapted scales, 
not been validated in prior work and because some indicators are measured using a single item, 
running a factor analysis for the items of each indicator separately would be inappropriate. 
85 
 
Therefore we conducted, for each performance domain, EFA of all items. If, within a 
performance domain, items used to measure different performance indicators load on a latent 
factor, we can reduce the number of indicators by detecting an overarching indicator. Items that 
load insufficiently onto one factor will be removed if different items are used to measure the 
indicator (Janssens et al., 2008).  
We build on the results of the EFA to specify the factor models used in the confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA). We conducted confirmatory factor analysis using the Lavaan package, 
developed for Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) in the statistical program R (Rosseel, 2012). 
Because we use categorical data (ordinal variables using likert scales and dichotomous 
variables), we use the robust weighted least squares (WLSMV) estimator (Brown, 2006). The 
Chi Square statistic is commonly reported in CFA research, more specific we report the Chi-
Square test statistic, divided by the degrees of freedom (c²/df) (Janssens et al., 2008). Next to 
the Chi-Square statistic, it is suggested to take into consideration different other fit indices to 
evaluate the model fit  (Brown, 2006; Hair et al., 2006).  Brown (2006) (p.82) distinguishes 
three categories of fit indices and advises to report at least one index from each category. 
Following the advice of Brown (2006), we report the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual 
(SRMR), the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), the Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI). 
There is no consensus on the cutoff values that should be used to evaluate model fit. It is 
even argued that the use of absolute cutoff values is inadvisable because fit indices are 
influenced by different aspects of the research setting, e.g. sample size and type of data (Brown, 
2006; Hair et al., 2006). However there are some guidelines for the fit indices we use in our 
study. For the χ²/dfratio, Janssens et al. (2008) mention as criterion < 2, while Hair et al. (2006) 
mention < 3. For the SRMR, Hu and Bentler (1999) use a cutoff value of 0.08, while Hair et al. 
(2006) mention that an SRMR over 0.1 suggests a problem with fit. Concerning the RMSEA, 
the cutoff value of 0.06 proposed by Hu and Bentler (1999) is often referred to. However Brown 
(2006) mentions that RMSEA’s in the range of 0.8-0.1 suggest mediocre fit and that models 
with RMSEA over 0.1 should be rejected. For CFI and TLI, Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest 
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values ≥ 0.95, but different authors indicate that values in the range 0.9 – 0.95 indicate 
acceptable fit (Brown, 2006; Hair et al., 2006; Janssens et al., 2008). 
Finally, we assess the internal consistency or reliability of the scales used for measuring the 
different indicators, by reporting the Cronbach’s alpha (Janssens et al., 2008). Based on Hair et 
al. (2006), a value above 0.7 is considered indicating a strong reliability, while a value above 
0.6 indicates a satisfactory reliability, allowing the use of summated scales. 
 
Economic Performance 
Economic performance is related to conditions supporting the financial sustainability of 
organizations. As mentioned earlier, the focus is not on traditional financial indicators such as 
profit, cash flow, Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Investment (ROI) (Wiklund and 
Shepherd, 2005), but on indicators positively influencing these indicators. Based on the focus 
group sessions and the Delphi panel, three indicators are selected to assess the economic 
performance of social enterprises. Table 3.4 gives an overview of the indicators, items and 
scales used to evaluate economic performance. 
These indicators (innovation, proactiveness and risk taking) are related to the entrepreneurial 
orientation of organizations4. Therefore, we used the measure introduced by Helm and 
Andersson (2010), specifically developed to evaluate the entrepreneurial orientation of social 
enterprises and comprising three subscales to measure innovation, proactiveness and risk 
taking. The scale measures along a continuum: two opposite statements are formulated and 
respondents are asked to indicate on a 8 point likert scale which statement best characterize 
their organization.   
We conducted a principal component exploratory factor analysis using varimax rotation of 
the 10 items of the scale. The results are reported in Table 3.5. The results show three factors 
                                                          
4 As the 3 selected indicators all are related to the entrepreneurial performance of the social enterprises, 
economic performance actually measures entrepreneurial performance. We prefer however to keep on using 
the broader concept economic performance as the focus of this performance domain is broader than only 
entrepreneurial performance indicators. 
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with eigenvalues greater than one, explaining 72% of the variance, corresponding to the 
subscales identified by Helm and Andersson (2010).  Item ‘ECON1’ has a high factor loading 
(> 0,5) on ‘Innovation’ as well as on ‘Proactiveness’. For that reason we decided to exclude 
‘ECON1’ in the confirmatory factor analysis. The other items  loaded sufficiently onto one 
single (expected) factor.  
Table 3.4: Economic performance: overview of indicators, items and scales 
Innovation 
Presently and during the last five years my organization has: 
ECON1* Placed a strong emphasis on the maintenance of tried-and-true products or services –  
Placed a strong emphasis on the development of new products or services 
ECON2 Placed a strong emphasis on the maintenance of established organizational processes –  
Placed a strong emphasis on the development of new organizational processes 
ECON3 Introduced no new processes, policies, products or services –  
Introduced many new processes, policies, products and services 
ECON4 Made only minor changes in processes, policies, products or services –  
Made major changes in processes, policies, products or services 
Proactiveness 
Presently and during the last five years my organization: 
ECON5 Is very seldom the first organization to introduce new products/services, 
administrative techniques, operating technologies, etc. –  
Is very often the first organization to introduce new products/services,  
administrative techniques, operating technologies, etc. 
ECON6 Been reticent to exploit changes in the field - Exploited changes in the field 
ECON7 Followed the lead of similar service providers - Provided the lead for similar service providers 
Risk taking 
Presently and during the last five years my organization: 
ECON8 Conducted itself consistently with the behavioral norms of the operating environment, industry or sector –  
Conducted itself in conflict with the behavioral norms of the operating environment, industry or sector 
ECON9 Selected projects that support the organization's public image –  
Selected projects that may alter the organization's public image 
ECON10 Made decisions that maintain staff stability –  
Made decisions that created changes in staff stability 
Measured on a 8-point likert scale. Based on Helm and Andersson (2010) 
* Item removed after EFA 
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Table 3.5: Economic Performance: items and item loadings EFA. 
ECO1 
INNOVATION 
ECO2 
PROACTIVENESS 
ECO3  
RISK TAKING 
ECON1 0.561 0.505 0.304 
ECON2 0.812 0.122 0.265 
ECON3 0.803 0.249 0.045 
ECON4 0.806 0.350 0.094 
ECON5 0.226 0.832 0.195 
ECON6 0.333 0.805 0.044 
ECON7 0.179 0.822 0.225 
ECON8 0.092 0.320 0.745 
ECON9 0.036 0.129 0.824 
ECON10 0.327 0.029 0.757 
Principal component factor analysis, varimax rotation 
In a next step we used CFA to test a second order model. Specifically we checked whether 
the results of EFA are confirmed by CFA and whether the three detected factors (innovation, 
proactiveness and risk taking) load onto the second order factor ‘Economic Performance’. The 
results are reported in Figure 3.2.  
The results show acceptable fit indices, with χ²/df= 1.99; CFI=0.936; TLI=0.905; 
RMSEA=0.064 and SRMR=0.043. All factor loadings are significant (p<0.001) and indicate 
strong factor loadings. The results indicate that the indicators (1) innovation, (2) proactiveness 
and (3) risk taking are relevant to measure the economic performance of social enterprises. 
Finally, we checked the internal consistency of the scales used to measure these indicators by 
calculating Cronbach’s alpha. The results reported in Figure 3.2, indicate strong scale reliability 
(> 0.70): innovation (α = 0.829), proactiveness (α = 0.848), risk taking (α = 0.739).  
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Figure 3.2: Economic Performance: items and item loadings CFA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmental Performance 
Environmental performance refers to the efforts organizations make to protect nature 
(Andersson et al., 2013). Based on the focus group sessions and the Delphi panel, seven 
indicators are selected to assess the environmental performance of social enterprises. Table 3.6 
gives an overview of the indicators, items and scales used to evaluate the environmental 
performance. 
 
 
 
Standardized item loadings using the WLSMV estimator 
p < 0.001 for all loadings 
c2/df = 1.99; CFI=0.936; TLI=0.905; RMSEA=0.064; SRMR=0.043 
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Table 3.6: Environmental performance: overview of indicators, items and scales 
  
We conducted a principal component exploratory factor analysis using varimax rotation of 
the 10 items measured using a 7-point likert scale. The results are reported in Table 3.7. Based 
on the results of the EFA, we can distinguish three factors, explaining 74% of the variance. 
These three factors are related to (1) Transportation, (2) Use of ecological materials and (3) 
Environmental performance management. Item ‘ENV6’ has a high factor loading (> 0,5) on 
‘Ecological Materials’ as well as on ‘Environmental performance management’. For that 
reason, we decided to exclude ‘ENV6’ in the confirmatory factor analysis. Item ‘ENV8’ seems 
 Transportation of materials and goods 
ENV1 Our organization deliberately selects cleaner transportation methods for materials and goods 
(Mishra and Suar, 2010) 
 Transportation of the members of the organization’s workforce 
ENV2 Our organization encourages employees to use ecological transportation modes 
Adaptation based on GRI (2015) 
 Use of sustainable materials 
ENV3 Our organization uses recycled input materials 
Adaptation based on GRI (2015) 
ENV4 Our organization takes the initiative to use environmental-friendly natural resources 
(Chen et al., 2008) 
ENV5 Our organization has a preference for green products in purchasing 
(Mishra and Suar, 2010) 
ENV6* Our organization has implemented sustainability criteria for the procurement of goods and services 
Adaptation based on GRI (2015) 
 Environmental policy 
ENV7 Our organization has incorporated environmental performance objectives in organizational plans 
(Rettab et al., 2009) 
ENV8* Our organization is concerned about the protection of the natural environment 
Adaptation based on GRI (2015) 
ENV9 Our organization has a clear environmental policy 
(Mishra and Suar, 2010) 
 Waste reduction 
ENV10 Our organization has reduced the amount of waste in recent years 
Adaptation based on GRI (2015) 
 Environmental performance measurement 
ENV11 Does your organization measure the organization’s environmental performance? 
(Rettab et al., 2009) 
 Use of renewable energy 
ENV12 Does your organization use energy produced from renewable sources?  
(O’Connor and Spangenberg, 2008) 
*  Item removed after EFA 
All items measured on a 7-point likert scale except ENV11 (yes/no) and ENV12 (yes/no) 
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to be scattered across the three factors and does not load sufficiently onto one single factor. For 
that reason also ‘ENV8’ is eliminated in the confirmatory factor analysis.  The other items load 
sufficiently onto one single factor.  
 
Table 3.7: Environmental Performance: items and item loadings EFA 
 EN1 
TRANSPORTATION 
EN2 
ECOLOGICAL 
MATERIALS 
EN3  
ENVIRONMENTAL 
PERFORMANCE MGT 
ENV1 0.757 0.186 0.344 
ENV2 0.832 0.286 0.120 
ENV3 0.264 0.747 0.301 
ENV4 0.215 0.843 0.292 
ENV5 0.278 0.790 0.257 
ENV6 0.004 0.568 0.626 
ENV7 0.274 0.400 0.717 
ENV8 0.408 0.548 0.347 
ENV9 0.231 0.366 0.812 
ENV10 0.283 0.168 0.766 
Principal component factor analysis, varimax rotation 
 
We checked whether the results of EFA are confirmed by CFA and whether the three 
detected factors (transportation, ecological materials and environmental performance 
management) load onto the second order factor ‘Environmental Performance’. We also added 
the two items measured as dummy variables. Based on content, we added ENV11 to the factor 
‘environmental performance management’ and ENV12 to the factor ‘ecological materials’.  
The fit indices reveal an acceptable fit, except for TLI: χ²/df= 2.79; CFI=0.922; TLI=0.890; 
RMSEA=0.086 and SRMR=0.047. All factor loadings are significant (p<0.001), but the factor 
loading of ENV12 is low (0.283). Further investigation of the model in Lavaan shows that the 
fit of the model will be better if ENV12 is moved to the factor ‘environmental performance 
management’. This is acceptable as the use of renewable energy can be considered as an 
environmental result. This is comparable to the fact that ENV10 (waste reduction), based on 
the results of EFA, also loads on this factor. 
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 The fit of this model is better. Figure 3.3 gives an overview of the results. All fit indices 
show an acceptable fit: χ²/df= 1.73; CFI=0.968; TLI=0.955; RMSEA=0.055 and SRMR=0.036. 
All factor loadings are significant (p < 0.001). Finally, we checked the reliability of the scales 
used to measure the three remaining indicators by calculating Cronbach’s alpha. The results 
indicate a satisfactory scale reliability (> 0.60): Transportation (α = 0.696), Ecological materials 
(α = 0.877), Environmental Performance Management (α = 0.829). The results indicate that the 
originally selected seven indicators can be reduced to three indicators, relevant for measuring 
the environmental performance of social enterprises.  
Figure 3.3: Environmental Performance: items and item loadings CFA 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardized item loadings using the WLSMV estimator 
p < 0.001 for all loadings;c2/df = 1.73; CFI=0.968; TLI=0.955; RMSEA=0.055; SRMR=0.036 
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Community Performance 
Community performance refers to how organizations deal with their responsibilities in 
society (Niehm et al., 2008). Following the results of the focus groups and the Delphi panel, 7 
indicators are selected. Table 3.8 gives an overview of the indicators, items and scales used to 
evaluate the community performance. 
 
Table 3.8. Community performance: overview of indicators, items and scales 
 Hiring disadvantaged people 
COM1 Our organization actively hires immigrants  
Adaptation based on Graafland et al. (2004) 
COM2 Our organization actively hires low skilled people  
Adaptation based on Graafland et al. (2004)  
COM3 Our organization actively hires elderly people 
Adaptation based on Graafland et al. (2004) 
 Informing the local community 
COM4 Our organization informs the local community by organizing presentations, company visits,… 
Adaptation based on CAF (2013) 
 Offering traineeships to students 
COM5 Our organization offers traineeships to students 
Adaptation based on CAF (2013) 
 Offering products/services to vulnerable people 
COM6 Our organization offers products and/or services to  vulnerable people  
Adaptation based on CAF (2013) 
 Addressing unsolved problems in society 
COM7 Our organization addresses unsolved societal problems 
Adaptation based on CAF (2013) 
 Partnerships 
COM8 Our organization pursues partnerships with: 
? Governments 
? For profit organizations 
? Social economy organizations 
? Labor agencies 
? Other community organizations 
Adaptation based on Mishra and Suar (2010) 
 Local suppliers 
COM9* Our organization mainly has local (Flemish) or regional (Belgian) suppliers 
Adaptation based on GRI (2015) 
* Item removed after CFA 
All items measured on a 7-point likert scale except COM8 (sum of different kind of partnerships) and 
COM9 (yes/no) 
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We conducted a principal component exploratory factor analysis using varimax rotation of 
8 items. As we did in the analyses of environmental performance, we didn’t take in 
consideration COM9 because it is a dummy variable. The results are reported in Table 3.9. 
Based on the results of the EFA, we can distinguish two factors, explaining 56% of the variance. 
The first factor is related to the indicator ‘Hiring disadvantaged people’. All the other indicators 
load on a second factor, that we call ‘Community responsibilities’.  
Table 3.9: Community Performance: item and item loadings EFA. 
C1 
HIRING DISADVANTAGED 
PEOPLE 
C2 
COMMUNITY  
RESPONSIBILITIES 
COM1 0.887 0.059 
COM2 0.727 0.092 
COM3 0.845 0.041 
COM4 -0.040 0.695 
COM5 0.200 0.459 
COM6 0.126 0.766 
COM7 0.057 0.848 
COM8 -0.013 0.639 
Principal component factor analysis, varimax rotation 
The results of the EFA reveal that all indicators of community performance load on one 
factor, except for the items related to the indicator ‘hiring disadvantaged people’. This indicates 
that hiring disadvantaged people is considered as a distinctive performance indicator of 
community performance in relationship to the other indicators. We use CFA to check if this 
distinction is confirmed. Furthermore, using CFA, we want to investigate whether the two 
detected factors load on the second order construct ‘community performance’. In this stage we 
also add COM9, measured as a dummy variable. In our model we add COM9 to the factor 
‘Community responsibilities’ as choosing local suppliers is not related to the hiring of 
disadvantaged people. 
Testing this second order model in Lavaan, the fit indices show an acceptable fit (χ²/df= 
1.69; CFI=0.932; TLI=0.905; RMSEA=0.054 and SRMR=0.055), however the factor loading 
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of COM9 (local suppliers) is low (0.173) and not significant (p < 0.1). A possible explanation 
is that the organizations in our sample are mainly small, locally embedded organizations. 89% 
of the social enterprises in our sample mainly have local or regional suppliers. As such having 
local suppliers is not a distinguishing factor in our sample. Because of the low, insignificant 
factor loading, we decided to exclude COM9. 
Figure 3.4 gives an overview of the CFA results of the adapted model. The fit indices show 
a good fit: χ²/df= 1.78; CFI=0.943; TLI=0.916; RMSEA=0.057 and SRMR=0.053. All factor 
loadings are significant (p < 0.001). The Cronbach’s alpha of the scales used to measure ‘hiring 
disadvantaged people’ (α = 0.767) and ‘community responsibilities’ (α = 0.718) reveal a strong 
reliability. The results indicate that the seven indicators selected for assessing the community 
performance of social enterprises, can be reduced to two indicators. 
 
Figure 3.4: Community Performance: item and item loadings CFA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardized item loadings using the WLSMV estimator 
p < 0.001 for all loadings  
c2/df = 1.78; CFI=0.943; TLI=0.916; RMSEA=0.057; SRMR=0.053 
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Human Performance 
Human performance refers to the relationship of the organization with its workforce (Chang 
and Chi, 2007). Based on the results of the focus groups and the Delphi panel, 12 indicators are 
selected. Table 3.10 gives an overview of the indicators, items and scales used to evaluate the 
human performance. 
The results of the EFA are shown in Table 3.11. Based on the results of EFA we can 
distinguish 4 factors, which we identify as (1) performance support, (2) training & development, 
(3) HR- policy and (4) diversity management. The results are not straightforward: different 
items have high factor loadings on different factors. A second problem is that in some cases the 
loading on a specific factor cannot be explained based on the content of the item. This is not 
exceptional in EFA. Janssens et al. (2008) suggest that content should be taken in consideration 
and that content takes precedence over factor loadings.  
In analyzing and evaluating the factor loadings we took different steps. In a first step, we 
look for items with significant factor loadings on different factors. Based on our sample size, 
we consider values above 0.375 as significant factor loadings (Janssens et al., 2008). If there 
are different items used to measure the indicator, we remove the item. This is the case for 
HUM15. If the indicator is measured using a single item, we decide not to remove the item 
because this would imply removing the indicator. Instead, we evaluate based on content to 
which factor we will add the item in the CFA-model. This is the case for HUM5, HUM6, 
HUM14. For Item ‘HUM5’ (significant loading on H2 and H3), we decide to assign it to H2 as 
HUM5 is more related to education and training.  Item ‘HUM6’ has a significant factor loading 
on H1  and H2. Based on the content, we decide to add it to H2. Item ‘HUM14’ has a significant 
loading on H1 and H3. As it is more related to HR-policy (H3) than to Performance Support 
(H1), we assign it to H3. For some items with significant factor loadings on different factors, 
we notice that it is difficult to assign them to one of the factors. This is the case for HUM9 and 
HUM20. Therefore we decide to assess this items separately and not assigning them to a first 
order factor. Instead we will add this items in the model, directly loading on the second order 
factor ‘Human Performance’.  
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Table 3.10: Human performance: overview of indicators, items and scales 
Providing education and training 
(Calantone et al., 2002) 
HUM1 Our organization has a strong ability to learn and this offers us a competitive advantage 
HUM2 The basic values of this organization include learning as key to improvement 
HUM3 The sense around here is that employee learning is an investment, not an expense 
HUM4 Learning in my organization is seen as a key commodity necessary to guarantee organizational survival 
Development/ personal growth of employees 
HUM5 We develop our employees aiming at job rotation within our organization 
Adaptation based on GRI (2015) 
Supporting learning initiative 
HUM6 Our organization supports all employees who want to pursue further education 
(Rettab et al., 2009) 
Equal opportunities for minorities 
HUM7 Our organizations has a policy concerning equal rights and non-discrimination  
(O’Connor and Spangenberg, 2008) 
Involvement of personnel in education and training 
HUM8 Our organization involves the employees in the planning of education and training 
Adaptation based on CAF (2013) 
Interaction between employees 
HUM9 We pay attention to good relationships between our employees 
Adaptation based on ISO26000 (2010) 
Goal oriented HRM 
HUM10 Our HR-policy is carefully planned 
Adaptation based on GRI (2015) 
HUM11 Our HR-policy is carefully evaluated 
Adaptation based on GRI (2015) 
Job satisfaction 
HUM12 Our organization pays attention to individual job satisfaction 
Adaptation based on GRI (2015) 
Diversity management 
HUM13 Our organization has a policy on diversity management 
(de la Cuesta-González et al., 2006) 
Policy on education and training 
HUM14 Our organization has a policy for the training and development of employees 
(Mishra and Suar, 2010) 
Support on the work floor 
Adaptation based on Heslin et al. (2006) 
HUM15* We support our employees in taking on new challenges 
HUM16 We offer useful suggestions regarding how employees can improve their performance 
HUM17 We provide constructive feedback to employees regarding areas for improvement 
HUM18 We help employees to analyze their performance 
HUM19 We provide guidance regarding performance expectations 
Work-life balance 
HUM20 Our organization is successful in balancing paid work and family life 
Adaptation based on Milkie and Peltola (1999) 
* Item removed after CFA
All items measured on a 7-point likert scale 
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Table 3.11: Human Performance: items and item loadings EFA. 
H1 
PERFORMANCE 
SUPPORT 
H2 
TRAINING & 
DEVELOPMENT 
H3  
HR-POLICY 
H4 
DIVERSITY 
MANAGEMENT 
HUM1 0.263 0.650 0.301 0142 
HUM2 0.318 0.835 0.207 0.111 
HUM3 0.287 0.718 0.151 0.352 
HUM4 0.235 0.770 0.303 0.116 
HUM8 0.318 0.729 0.204 0.122 
HUM16 0.805 0.362 0.199 0.096 
HUM17 0.805 0.338 0.191 0.157 
HUM18 0.786 0.278 0.247 0.140 
HUM19 0.814 0.244 0.186 0.137 
HUM10 0.239 0.319 0.758 0.256 
HUM11 0.274 0.340 0.746 0.239 
HUM7 0.144 0.317 0.309 0.772 
HUM13 0.160 0.266 0.367 0.743 
HUM15 0.686 0.299 0.400 0.036 
HUM5 0.255 0.413 0.418 0.226 
HUM6 0.604 0.377 0.112 0.324 
HUM14 0.582 0.243 0.472 0.128 
HUM9 0.291 0.663 0.092 0.390 
HUM20 0.593 0.093 -0.109 0.514 
HUM12 0.261 0.545 0.312 0.243 
Principal component factor analysis, varimax rotation 
 In a second step we check if, the items with only one significant factor loading, can be 
assigned to that factor based on content. HUM12 has a significant factor loading on H3 but is 
not related to training and development. Neither it is related to one of the other factors. 
Therefore we decide, similar to HUM9 and HUM20 to load it directly on the second order factor 
Human Performance.  
We use CFA to test this second order model. The results of the second order CFA model 
show acceptable fit indices: χ²/df= 2.94; CFI=0.916; TLI=0.903; RMSEA=0.09 and 
SRMR=0.066. All factor loadings are significant. The fit of the model will however be better 
when HUM14 is removed to H2. Based on content, HUM14 is as well related to H2 (Training 
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and Development) as to H3 (HR-policy). However because the overall fit is better when 
HUM14 is assigned to H2, we decide to assign HUM14 to H2. Figure 3.5 gives an overview of 
the results of the adapted model.  
Figure 3.5: Human Performance: items and item loadings CFA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardized item loadings using the WLSMV estimator 
P < 0.001 for all loadings; c2/df = 2,9; CFI=0.918; TLI=0.905; RMSEA=0.089; SRMR=0.058 
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The fit indices show a good fit: χ2/df = 2.9; CFI=0.918; TLI=0.905; RMSEA=0.089 and 
SRMR=0.058. All factor loadings are significant (p < 0.001). Finally, we checked the reliability 
of the scales used to measure the four remaining indicators by calculating Cronbach’s alpha. 
The results indicate a strong scale reliability (> 0.70): Performance support (α = 0.938), 
Training & Development (α = 0.907), HR-policy (α = 0.883) and Diversity Management (α = 
0.843). The results indicate that the originally selected 12 indicators can be reduced to seven 
indicators (the four indicators H1, H2, H3 and H4 and the single-item indicators HUM9, 
HUM12 and HUM20), relevant for measuring the human performance of social enterprises.  
 
Governance Performance 
Governance performance focuses on good governance practices. On the one hand, it is 
related to best practices regarding board composition and board practices. On the other hand, it 
refers to having clear organizational goals taking in consideration stakeholder expectations 
(Cornforth, 2014; Hambrick et al., 2008).  
Based on the results of the focus groups and the Delphi panel, 11 indicators are selected. 
Table 3.12 gives an overview of the indicators, items and scales used to assess governance 
performance.  
We conducted a principal component exploratory factor analysis using varimax rotation of 
the 25 items measured on a 7-point likert scale. The results are reported in Table 3.13 and reveal 
5 factors, explaining 70% of the variance. However the results are not straightforward: several 
items have significant factor loadings on different items and sometimes the loading on a factor 
is not in line with the content of the item, making a thorough evaluation necessary.  
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Table 3.12: Governance performance: overview of indicators, items and scales 
 Adaptation of the composition of the board 
GOV1 New board member are selected to meet the organization's changing needs 
Adaptation based on Herman and Renz (2004) 
 Adaptation to changes in the environment 
Adaptation based on Jackson and Holland (1998) 
GOV2 The board of directors is able to cope with changes in the legal environment. 
GOV3 The board of directors is able to cope with changes in the economic environment. 
GOV4 The board of directors is able to cope with changes in the political environment. 
GOV5 The board of directors is able to cope with changes in the needs of stakeholders. 
 Engagement of board members toward the mission and vision of the organization 
(Fredette and Bradshaw, 2012) 
GOV6 Board members share the same ambitions and vision for the organization. 
GOV7 Board members enthusiastically pursue collective goals and mission. 
GOV8 Board members are committed to the goals of the organization. 
GOV9 Board members view themselves as partners in charting the organization direction. 
GOV10 There is a commonality of purpose among board members of this organization. 
GOV11 Everyone in the board of directors is in total agreement on our organization's vision. 
 Participative decision-making 
(Li and Hambrick, 2005) 
GOV12 All the board members have a voice in major decisions. 
GOV13 Communications among board members can best be described as open and fluid. 
GOV14 When major decisions are made, board members collectively exchange their points of view. 
GOV15 Board members frequently share their experience and expertise. 
 Clarity of roles  
(Gill et al., 2005) 
GOV16 Board members demonstrate clear understanding of the respective roles of the board and 
CEO 
 Preparedness to learn from mistakes 
(Jackson and Holland, 1998) 
GOV17 In the board of directors we discuss about what we can learn from a mistake we have made 
 External communication to stakeholders 
(Jackson and Holland, 1998) 
GOV18 This board communicates its decisions to everyone who is affected by them 
 
First, we look for items with significant factor loadings on different factors. If different items 
are used to measure the indicator, we consider excluding the item. This is the case for GOV12, 
GOV13 and GOV15, items used to measure the indicator ‘participative decision-making’, but 
apparently closely related to the indicator ‘Shared vision’. Eliminating this three items implies 
that ‘participative decision-making’ would be measured using only one item. We do not 
consider this as a suitable solution. An alternative solution is to combine ‘Shared vision’ and 
‘Participative decision-making’ and exclude GOV14. However, we do not consider this as a 
good solution either as having a shared vision on the mission and goals of the organization is 
clearly distinct from how issues are discussed within the board and from how decisions are 
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taken in the board. Therefore we decide to keep both the factors G1 an G4 and to keep the items 
GOV12, GOV13 and GOV15. 
Table 3.13: Governance Performance: items and item loadings EFA. 
G1 
SHARED 
VISION 
G2 
ADAPTABILITY 
G3  
STRATEGIC 
BOARD 
ROLE 
G4 
PARTICIPATIVE 
DECISION-
MAKING 
G5 
CLEAR 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
GOALS 
GOV1 0.127 0.553 0.140 0.071 0.003 
GOV2 0.184 0.834 0.210 0.184 0.077 
GOV3 0.210 0.764 0.315 0.082 0.158 
GOV4 0.174 0.789 0.044 0.099 0.156 
GOV5 0.237 0.771 0.236 0.161 0.166 
GOV6 0.781 0.259 0.171 0.191 0.095 
GOV7 0.799 0.232 0.108 0.121 0.162 
GOV8 0.761 0.154 0.176 0.293 0.228 
GOV9 0.784 0.309 0.200 0.231 0.045 
GOV10 0.876 0.167 0.060 0.105 0.123 
GOV11 0.874 0.215 0.083 0.177 0.111 
GOV12 0.402 0.143 0.154 0.567 0.076 
GOV13 0.656 0.320 0.072 0.454 0.018 
GOV14 0.369 0.265 0.070 0.658 0.042 
GOV15 0.421 0.279 0.210 0.569 -0.002 
GOV16 0.280  0.722 0.103 0.130 0.098 
GOV17 0.286 0.554 0.212 0.454 0.042 
GOV18 0.247 0.501 0.007 0.482 0.099 
GOV19 0.277 0.302 0.693 0.328 0.141 
GOV20 0.150 0.264 0.866 0.064 0.078 
GOV21 0.140 0.253 0.889 0.093 0.103 
GOV22 0.005 -0.041 0.134 0.508 0.540 
GOV23 0.014 0.083 0.066 0.036 0.690 
GOV24 0.288 0.145 0.048 -0.025 0.810 
GOV25 0.169 0.188 0.065 0.066 0.769 
Principal component factor analysis, varimax rotation 
Also GOV17, GOV18 and GOV22 have high factor loadings on different factors. However 
because these items are used to measure indicators with a single item, we decide not to remove 
the items. Instead we evaluate, based on content to which factor the items can be added. GOV17 
has a high factor loading on G2 and G4. Because on content we decide to add GOV17 to G2 
103 
 
because this factor is related to the extent that boards are able to adapt to changes in the external 
environment. We consider ‘preparedness to learn from mistakes’ (GOV17) as related to the 
adaptability of the board of the organization.  
GOV18 has a high factor loading on G2 and G4. The indicator is related to communication 
to the stakeholders, which is not related to having a shared vision in the board nor to 
participative decision- making in the board. Therefore we keep it as a separate indicator in the 
CFA model directly loading on the second order construct ‘Governance performance’.  
GOV22 has a high factor loading on G4 and G5. As the indicator ‘Goals meeting the needs 
of the stakeholders’ is measured using this single item, we decide not to exclude GOV22. Based 
on content, we decide to add it to the factor G5 ‘Clear organizational goals’ in the CFA model. 
In a next step we use CFA to test a second order model. The results are reported in Figure 
3.6. Specifically, we test whether the model reflecting the results of EFA and reflecting our 
interpretation based on content, are confirmed by CFA. We also added GOV26, measuring the 
independent directors as a dummy variable. The results reveal an acceptable fit, but GOV26 
has a very low factor loading -0.190 (p < 0.01). A possible explanation is that 91% of the 
organizations in our sample have external directors and as such this indicator is not a 
distinguishing factor in our sample. Therefore we decided to remove GOV26 in our analyses.  
The results of the adapted model (Figure 3.6) show acceptable fit, with χ²/df= 1.24; 
CFI=0.942; TLI=0.935; RMSEA=0.036; SRMR=0.057. All factor loadings are significant 
(p<0.001) and indicate strong factor loadings. Finally, we checked the reliability of the scales 
by calculating Cronbach’s alpha. The results reported in Figure 3.6, indicate a strong scale 
reliability (> 0.70): Adaptability (α = 0.897), Shared vision (α = 0.944), Strategic board role (α 
= 0.886), Participative decision-making (α = 0.828) and Clear organizational goals (α = 0.748). 
The results indicate that the 11 originally selected indicators can be reduced to 6 indicators (G1, 
G2, G3, G4, G5 and GOV18), relevant for measuring the governance performance of social 
enterprises.  
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Figure 3.6: Governance Performance: item and item loadings CFA. 
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Overview of selected indicators based on the results of the exploratory and confirmatory 
factor analyses 
As result of the exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, we retain 21 indicators. Table 
3.14 gives an overview of these indicators, for each performance domain. 
 
Table 3.14: Retained indicators after EFA and CFA. 
Economic performance 
Innovation Proactiveness 
Risk taking  
Environmental performance 
Transportation Environmental performance management 
Ecological materials  
Community performance 
Hiring disadvantaged people Community responsibilities 
Human performance 
Performance support Interaction between employees 
Training & Development Job satisfaction 
HR-policy Work-life balance 
Diversity management  
Governance performance 
Shared vision Participative decision-making 
Adaptability of the board Clear organizational goals 
Strategic board role External communication to stakeholders 
 
 
3.4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper aimed at describing an assessment tool for the organizational performance of 
social enterprises, as well as reporting on its development and reliability. By developing a set 
of relevant indicators suitable for external reporting and an internal assessment tool, we answer 
the calls for a scale development of performance measurement tools that can be implemented 
in social enterprises. More specifically, the internal assessment tool consists of the withdrawn 
items for the five performance domains (as shown in Table 3.4, Table 3.6, Table 3.8, Table 
3.10, Table 3.12). In line with other internal assessment tools such as EFQM and CAF, the 
items are preferably answered by a diverse group of employees of the organization. Their 
(diverse) opinions about the performance of the organization regarding the different 
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performance indicators may give rise to an internal discussion about the non-financial 
performance of the organization. This may help social enterprises in preventing mission drift 
and safeguarding the balancing of social and financial goals in internal decision-making. 
Furthermore, this internal assessment may provide insights and information, useful for the 
external reporting of the non-financial performance. For the reporting of the non-financial 
performance, social enterprises can use the set of selected performance indicators as a guideline. 
Existing standards developed to report the non-financial performance, of which the GRI is the 
most widely accepted (GRI, 2015), offer a broad range of possible performance indicators. 
Based on their specific situation and activity, organizations, reporting according the GRI-
principles, have to choose relevant indicators, motivate why these indicators are relevant and 
report the organizational performance with respect to these indicators. As the set of GRI-
indicators is very broad, efforts are made by GRI as well as by researchers, to provide a specific 
set of relevant performance indicators for a specific kind of organizations, such as NGO’s and 
public sector organizations (Dumay et al., 2010; GRI, 2014). In the same vein, we developed a 
set of relevant performance indicators for social enterprises. Social enterprises will have to 
demonstrate their performance with respect to the different performance indicators. As it is not 
the focus of this paper, we do not elaborate on guidelines regarding the reporting of non-
financial performance. However, there is no doubt that social enterprises should preferably 
follow the general accepted guidelines. Examples are providing quantitative as well as 
qualitative information, reporting positive as well as negative results and reporting consistently 
over time such that evolutions in time may be assessed (GRI, 2015). 
The results of our study will be discussed in relation to four key notions - robustness, utility, 
understanding, and relevance - with regard to scale development (Claes et al., 2010). 
Robustness refers to the psychometric qualities of the instrument. With regard to this quality 
aspect, we conducted exploratory and confirmatory analysis to identify relevant indicators and 
we controlled for the internal consistency (or reliability) of the scales used to measure the 
indicators. Utility relates to the application of an instrument and the implications of the results: 
the evaluation tool can be regarded as an adequate tool to integrate multiple values of social 
enterprises. Thirdly, understanding refers to how we should correctly assess and interpret the 
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construct. Since the evaluation tool is carried out in close cooperation and dialogue with 
stakeholders (managers of social enterprises and experts in the field of social entrepreneurship), 
we integrated best practices and knowledge in the field based on different perspectives. With 
regard to relevance, the application of the assessment tool for measuring social performance 
broadens our view and stimulates us to think beyond financial performance in social enterprises 
by placing emphasis on different performance dimensions. We emphasize the rigorous process 
which we have undertaken in the development of this assessment tool. A profound literature 
study guarantees content validity of the items. Recommendations of experts and stakeholders - 
in order to adapt the measures to the context of social enterprises - were taken into account 
during the development of the assessment tool. A major contribution is the sample size and 
representativeness of the respondents of the scale used in the final validation of the research. 
We can also stress the innovation in the methodology in this specific context.  
We contribute to the literature surrounding performance measurement in social enterprises 
as it adds to our understanding of the use of performance measurement systems in social 
enterprises. Existing literature has shown that no large-scale empirical research has been 
systematically conducted dealing with performance measurement in social enterprises and that 
the developed tools are, or too general or too specific in their design, having an impact on the 
practical usefulness of these tools. In order to bridge this gap, we used qualitative and 
quantitative research methods, incorporating the expertise and knowledge of multiple actors in 
the field of social entrepreneurship, to develop a performance measurement tool, suitable for a 
wide range of social enterprises. 
Moreover, we add to the literature surrounding performance measurement in social 
enterprises by contributing to the use of performance indicators and performance measurement 
in the particular context of social enterprises. We acknowledge the role of diverse performance 
dimensions in this instrument and we analyze a more comprehensive view of performance than 
mere financial organizational performance, proposing a much broader concept that 
encompasses a variety of performance indicators. Although this holistic approach seems 
promising, scholars have only recently engaged in conceptual and empirical studies (Grieco et 
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al., 2014). We do not quantify non-financial performance by assigning a specific score or rating 
on the performance indicators. By consequence, we neither calculate a score for the overall 
organizational performance by adding or multiplying ratings on individual indicators. We are 
aware that this approach is not unusual when measuring non-financial performance (for 
instance, the KLD-measure is based on additive measurement) and that it has the advantage that 
organizations may easily be benchmarked (Mattingly and Berman, 2006; Demas and Blass, 
2010). However, there are some caveats when using additive or multiplicative scores. First, it 
is extremely difficult to assign a valid rating or score to individual performance indicators as 
even organizational members may disagree about the degree of performance (Chatterji et al., 
2009). In addition, there is debate about the appropriateness of adding or multiplying individual 
scores and when doing so, whether weights should be used to express the impact of performance 
indicators (Willems et al., 2014). Given these concerns, we do not calculate a single rating as 
relying on a not valid rating may harm social enterprises as well as  investors or governments 
by, for instance, misallocating resources (Chatterji et al., 2009). 
In addition, our study has implications for practitioners. As explained earlier in this section, 
the performance measurement tool can be used for several reasons. Social enterprises can use 
the developed performance measurement tool to deal with the tensions they are exposed to 
because of their hybrid character. Firstly, we provide social enterprises with an internal self-
assessment tool. Secondly, the set of selected performance indicators may support social 
enterprises to report the non-financial performance to external stakeholders. As such they 
respond to the increasing demand of accountability, necessary to establish legitimacy. 
Furthermore, the selected set of performance indicators might also be useful for external 
stakeholders, such as providers of financial resources or governments, providing subsidies to 
social enterprises as they may require that performance with respect to these (or some of these) 
indicators is reported as a prerequisite for financial support. If they do so, they have to be 
cautious however when interpreting the reported performance as they have to rely on the self-
evaluation of the organizations. Furthermore it will be difficult to compare organizations 
(Delmas and Blass, 2010). Following the previous described reporting guidelines may however 
improve the accuracy and the comparability of the reported information (GRI, 2015). 
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Our paper also has some limitations, which have implications for future research. First, we 
conducted this study within Flemish social enterprises. It would be useful to replicate and 
generalize it to examine the validity of the developed tool on a larger international scale. 
Furthermore, after conducting exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, there are still 
indicators that are measured by a single item (e.g. interaction between employees). These single 
items will probably not sufficiently capture the complexity of the performance indicators. 
Therefore we suggest  to adapt the scales used for these indicators by using scales with multiple 
items when re-testing the assessment tool (DeVellis, 2003). 
Furthermore, a promising trajectory for future research is to study the moderating effect of 
cultural differences in social enterprises between countries. As such, it would be interesting to 
examine the validity of this evaluation tool on a larger international scale. Finally, performance 
management involves setting expectations for future achievements on the indicators which have 
been selected. The benefits of setting targets are that organizations have a focus and a clarity of 
organizational goals (Boyne, 2010). Future empirical studies could focus on setting targets, and 
could examine the impact of setting targets on organizational performance. 
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Appendix 2. Journals screened in phase 1 (literature review) 
Journals screened on articles with ‘Social’ and 
‘Performance’ in the title. 
Period: 1990-2013 
Part 1: 
? Academy of Management Journal 
? Academy of Management Review 
? Administrative Science Quarterly 
? Business Ethics Quarterly 
? Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice 
? Journal of Management 
? Journal of Management Studies 
? Organizational Science 
? Organizational Studies 
? Strategic Management Journal 
Part 2: 
? Journal of Business Ethics 
? Social Enterprise Journal 
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4. BOARD SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL
PERFORMANCE IN SOCIAL ENTERPRISES
ABSTRACT 
In the social entrepreneurship literature, a consensus is emerging that the board of directors is 
of major importance to deal with the specific tensions social enterprises, as hybrid 
organizations, face. Using a resource dependence  and social capital perspective, we study board 
social capital, encompassing external ties from board members with external stakeholders and 
internal ties between board members. Particularly, we analyze the relationship between board 
social capital, board service performance and subsequent organizational performance. Our 
study in Flemish social enterprises reveals that board external social capital as well as board 
internal social capital are positively related to board service performance. Furthermore, we find 
that board service performance is positively related to social performance, while it is not 
significantly related to financial performance. 
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4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Social enterprises are described as hybrid organizations as they pursue a dual mission of 
creating social value as well as being financially sustainable (Doherty et al., 2014; Pache and 
Santos, 2013). As such, they combine the creation of social value, associated with the non-
profit sector, with traditional business approaches, associated with for-profit organizations 
(Wilson and Post, 2013). Specifically, social enterprises aim at fulfilling unsolved social needs, 
such as social exclusion, poverty or ecological damage (Dacin et al., 2010; Mair et al., 2012; 
Santos, 2012). Despite this dual mission, activities supporting social performance are not 
always compatible with activities supporting financial performance (Dees, 2012; Smith et al., 
2013). By consequence, the balancing of social and financial goals in decision-making is 
described as a major internal challenge in social enterprises (Battilana and Lee, 2014). More 
specifically, several authors warn for the emergence of mission drift, causing an organization 
to deviate from its original mission or goals (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Ramus and Vaccaro, 2014). 
In the context of social enterprises, mission drift is often discussed as the erosion of the social 
goals in favor of commercial and financial performance (Doherty et al., 2014). However, also 
the reverse situation may occur in which the overemphasizing of social goals and the neglect of 
financial goals, leads to business failure (Cornforth, 2014; Tracey et al., 2011). While a number 
of causes for the origination of mission drift have been articulated in the literature (Cornforth, 
2014; Jones, 2007), a high level of dependence on a single or a limited number of stakeholders 
in the external environment is frequently mentioned as one of the core reasons for mission drift 
(Bennett and Savani, 2011). Indeed, as hybrid organizations situated between the for-profit and 
the nonprofit sector, social enterprises lack a dominant stakeholder and face the challenge of 
aligning the interests of a wide range of stakeholders such as the beneficiaries of their social 
mission, their customers, funders and governments (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Pache and Santos, 
2010). Collaborating with these stakeholders is important in order to gain legitimacy and to 
acquire (amongst others financial and human) resources from the environment (Battilana and 
Lee, 2014; Doherty et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2012), but may also give rise to mission drift when 
the demands of stakeholders conflict and social enterprises have to decide which demands they 
prioritize on (Ebrahim et al., 2014). 
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Corporate governance mechanisms in general and the boards of directors in particular are 
considered vital in dealing with these specific challenges of social enterprises (Battilana and 
Lee, 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Mair et al., 2015; Pache and Santos, 2013; Spear et al., 2009). 
As the ultimate decision-making body, the board of directors has the responsibility to balance 
potential tensions between the social and financial goals in decision-making (Cornforth, 2014; 
Pestoff and Hulgård, 2015). Moreover, boards serve as a connection between the social 
enterprise and its external environment (Ebrahim et al., 2014). Through their linkages with 
external stakeholders, board members may play a major role in securing stakeholder support as 
well as in identifying risks and opportunities in the external environment (Doherty et al., 2014; 
Ebrahim et al., 2014). Put differently: boards may, next to their control function, engage in their 
service role, through which they engage in networking, advice giving and strategic decision 
making (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 2000; Minichilli et al., 2009). As Knockaert 
and Ucbasaran (2013) argue, important information and resources are exchanged between the 
organization and its external environment through the personal networks and linkages of board 
members. Accordingly, it is through its service role that boards contribute to the safeguarding 
of the social and financial mission and performance of social enterprises. From a resource 
dependence theory perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), board capital, encompassing the 
human and social capital of the board, is considered as an antecedent of board service 
performance, i.e. the engagement of the board in its service role (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
In this paper, using a social capital perspective, we specifically focus on the relationship 
between board social capital and board service performance , which is particularly relevant in 
our context. Indeed, as multi-stakeholder organizations, the linkages of board members with 
different external stakeholder groups enable the board to fulfill its service role to the interest of 
a wide variety of stakeholders, subsequently balancing social value creation and financial 
sustainability (Doherty et al., 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014). 
In considering the relationship between board social capital and board service performance, 
we distinguish between external and internal social capital, in line with Kim and Cannella 
(2008). Particularly, board external social capital refers to the linkages between the board 
members and the environment of the organization (Tian et al., 2011). Board external social 
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capital is of primary importance as it connects the organization to its environment, reducing the 
level of dependence on the environment. As such, external social capital fulfills a bridging 
function with the environment (Kim and Cannella, 2008). Board internal social capital then 
refers to internal linkages within the organization (Stevenson and Radin, 2009) and is supposed 
to play a bonding function, fostering familiarity and trust between board members (Kim and 
Cannella, 2008). This subsequently enhances information sharing and counseling within the 
board, which ultimately enables board members to collaborate and make decisions as a team 
(Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009). 
This paper aims at gaining insight into the extent to which board external and internal social 
capital contribute to the organizational performance of social enterprises, hereby considering 
the engagement by board members in their service role as an antecedent of such performance. 
More specifically, we stepwise approach our research objectives. First, we disentangle the 
relationship between board external and internal social capital and board service performance. 
Subsequently, we analyze how this board service performance is related to firm performance. 
In doing so, we consider the dual mission of social enterprises and simultaneously study social 
and financial performance. We aim at contributing to the social entrepreneurship and corporate 
governance literatures in a number of ways. 
First, we contribute to the social entrepreneurship literature by responding to calls to study 
how social enterprises deal internally with the specific tensions related to their hybrid nature 
(Pache and Santos, 2010). Importantly, while the board of directors is expected to be of major 
importance in dealing with such tensions, the governance mechanism has so far received 
surprisingly little attention in academic research (Ebrahim et al., 2014). By studying the 
relationship between the board’s social capital and organizational performance of social 
enterprises, this paper responds to calls to study the governance function in social enterprises 
(Doherty et al., 2014; Mair et al., 2015). We further add to the social enterprise literature by 
studying financial and social performance in conjunction. While there is a consensus that social 
enterprises should be evaluated looking at financial and non-financial performance 
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simultaneously (Austin et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2013), there is a dearth of research that does 
so (Battilana et al., 2015; Coombes et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2014).  
Second, we contribute to the corporate governance literature in a number of ways. While 
board service performance has received an increasing interest in academic research, studies 
have so far mainly focused on antecedents of board service performance (Knockaert et al., 2015; 
Minichilli et al., 2009). Only few studies have examined the relationship between board service 
performance and organizational performance (Minichilli et al., 2012; Westphal, 1999; Zattoni 
et al., 2015). Further, studies on the relationship between board social capital and performance 
have typically focused on financial performance, hereby producing mixed findings on the 
relationship between the two constructs. Our study contributes to the corporate governance 
literature by studying both antecedents and outcomes of board service performance. 
Importantly, in doing so, we do not consider organizational performance to be unidimensional, 
but consider both social and financial performance indicators. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we present our theoretical 
framework in which we link board external and internal social capital, board service 
performance and the organizational performance in social enterprises. Subsequently, we 
describe the research method, including the research setting, data collection and the measures 
used, followed by the presentation of our results. The article concludes with the discussion of 
main conclusions and contributions, as well as the limitations and directions for future research. 
 
4.2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
4.2.1. A Resource Dependence and Social Capital perspective 
Our theoretical framework unites resource dependence and social capital theory. First, while 
agency theory focuses on the monitoring or control function of boards (Daily et al., 2003; 
Dalton and Dalton, 2011), resource dependence theory emphasizes the service role of the board 
(Hillman et al., 2000; Hillman et al., 2009). Specifically, through their engagement in the 
service role, board members contribute to building organizational legitimacy by linking the 
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organization to important external stakeholders, as such facilitating the attraction of resources. 
Furthermore, external networks of board members provide valuable information, enabling 
board members to give advice and counsel to executives and participate in strategy formulation 
and decision-making (Minichilli et al., 2009).  
Second, board capital, encompassing board human capital and board social capital, has 
typically been considered as an antecedent of board service performance (Haynes and Hillman, 
2010; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). In line with our research focus and context, we particularly 
focus on board social capital, hereby building on social capital theory. Based on Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal (1998), we define social capital as ‘the sum of the actual and potential resources 
embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed 
by an individual or a social unit’ (p243). Social capital has been studied in a variety of fields, 
such as community studies, development economics, schools and education and family studies 
(Kwon and Adler, 2014; Leana and Van Buren III, 1999). Further, in management and 
organizational research, social capital has gained interest and is increasingly considered as an 
antecedent of group and organizational performance (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Leana and Pil, 
2006). At the organizational level, social capital refers to the relationships between an 
organization and its external stakeholders as well as the linkages between organizational 
members, also referred to as external and internal social capital (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Leana 
and Pil, 2006).  This is also the case in the corporate governance literature, in which a growing 
body of research pays attention to board social capital (Johnson et al., 2013).  
Board social capital, also called board relational capital (Dalziel et al., 2011), refers to the 
external and internal  social relations and networks of board members (Kim and Cannella, 2008) 
and has been studied in relationship to different organizational outcomes. First, one stream of 
research on board external social capital has particularly focused on board interlocks, or the 
extent to which board members also serve on the boards of other organizations (Shropshire, 
2010), however not coming to a consensus on the relationship between such interlocks and 
organizational performance (Johnson et al., 2013). Indeed, while some authors find support for 
a positive relationship following the increased access to information, resources and 
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opportunities to cooperate with other organizations (Haynes and Hillman, 2010; Tian et al., 
2011; Wincent et al., 2010), others warn for the risk of ‘overboarding’ or ‘overextended 
directors’ (Barroso-Castro et al., 2016; Sundaramurthy et al., 2014). Serving on many boards 
can hinder board members in fulfilling their board task effectively as it decreases time available 
for  giving advice and engaging in decision making, for regularly attending board meetings, or 
preparing for such meetings (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). 
Furthermore, Ruigrok et al. (2006) argue that interlocks can result in conflict of interests and 
lack of independence of interlocked board members. For these reasons, some authors have 
argued for a curvilinear (inverted U-form) relationship between board interlocks and firm 
performance, however without finding empirical support for such relationship (Barroso-Castro 
et al., 2016; Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009).  
Second, next to board interlocks, external social capital also comprises the contacts board 
members have in the external environment (Kim, 2005; Wincent et al., 2010).While few studies 
have looked into the relationship between this dimension of board external social capital and 
performance, the results have so far been mixed. While Kim (2007) found a positive association 
between the linkages of board members with the external environment, Wincent et al. (2010) 
did not find a significant relationship between board members’ ties to other organizations and 
innovative performance.  
Next to the attention to board external social capital, and in line with the growing attention 
to board internal processes and the importance of boards working together as teams (Crucke 
and Knockaert, 2016; Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Hambrick et al., 2008; Huse et al., 2011), 
board internal social capital has increasingly gained interest. Interpersonal relationships 
between board members are expected to enhance trust, in turn fostering the exchange of 
knowledge and information, which is ultimately beneficial for decision-making within the 
board (Kim and Cannella, 2008). Empirical research supports the positive relationship between 
internal social capital and organizational performance (Barroso-Castro et al., 2016; Kim, 2005; 
Tian et al., 2011), however, considering organizational performance as a unidimensional 
financial construct. 
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Subsequently, as we argue, the literature has so far provided a fragmented picture on the 
relationship between board social capital and organizational performance, with some authors 
studying the relationship between board social capital and board service performance, and 
others studying the relationship between board service performance and organizational 
performance. Furthermore, studies have typically focused on understanding financial 
performance, hereby neglecting that performance is a multi-dimensional construct (Chandler 
and Hanks, 1993; Hamann et al., 2013).  In what follows we aim at uniting board social capital, 
service performance and different dimensions of organizational performance in one theoretical 
framework, hereby building upon resource dependence and social capital theory.  
 
4.2.2. Board external social capital and board service performance 
As articulated above, studies on the relationship between board external social capital and 
board service performance have produced contradictory results. Social enterprises are however 
particularly exposed to diverging expectations of different stakeholder groups (Battilana and 
Dorado, 2010; Pache and Santos, 2010). In order to deal with diverging stakeholder 
expectations, social enterprises develop external social capital through the networks of 
individual board members with different stakeholder groups (Cornforth and Spear, 2010; Spear 
et al., 2009). Following social capital theory, we expect that the linkages of board members 
with external stakeholders will enhance trust and mutual understanding between the social 
enterprise and its stakeholders. Particularly, through such board external social capital, social 
enterprises can meet the accountability demands of different stakeholder groups and gain 
legitimacy in the external environment (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Huybrechts et al., 2014). The 
availability of board external social capital will thus foster the exchange of resources and 
information with different stakeholder groups. Such exchange by consequence helps board 
members in identifying risks and opportunities in the external environment, which is important 
for adequate advice giving and decision-making taking in consideration of the needs and 
expectations of different stakeholder groups (Doherty et al., 2014). Based on these arguments, 
we argue that boards which have higher levels of board external social capital will be better 
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able to fulfill their task of networking, advice giving and strategic decision making, and 
therefore to a larger extent engage in board service activities. Subsequently, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Board external social capital is positively related to board service performance. 
 
4.2.3. Board internal social capital and board service performance 
Board internal social capital then refers to ties and relations of board members within the 
organization and is expected to fulfill a ‘bonding function’ (Kim and Cannella, 2008). 
Governance literature emphasizes the importance of behavioral aspects and internal processes 
within the board (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009; Hambrick et al., 2008; Huse et al., 2011). Board 
internal capital is expected to affect board service performance for different reasons. First, when 
board members have good relationships with the CEO and other members of the organization, 
they are more committed to the organization and, as a consequence, more likely to engage in 
acquiring firm-specific knowledge (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Westphal and Zajac, 2013). 
This will in turn enhance the quality of the advice provided by board members, subsequently 
positively influencing decision-making quality. Next, when board members share strong ties, 
they will be aware of each other’s external networks and related expertise. This enables board 
members to effectively share and coordinate their expertise, consequently enhancing board 
service performance (Tian et al., 2011). This is particularly important in a social 
entrepreneurship context, where the hybrid nature of the organizational goals complicates 
decision making (Mair et al., 2015; Smith et al., 2013). Finally, connections between board 
members foster familiarity and trust between board members (Forbes and Milliken, 1999), in 
turn enhancing information sharing and counseling within the board (Kim and Cannella, 2008), 
which ultimately enables board members to collaborate and make decisions as a team 
(Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Stevenson and Radin, 2009; Westphal, 1999). Consequently, 
we expect a positive relationship between board internal social capital and board service 
performance and offer the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2: Board internal social capital is positively related to board service performance. 
 
4.2.4. Board service performance and organizational performance 
Resource dependence theory suggests that, if boards engage in their service role through 
which they help firms in overcoming their dependence on the environment for resources, they 
will positively affect organizational performance (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 
2009). Indeed, as board members provide qualified advice and participate in decision-making, 
it is expected that they contribute to the maximization of value creation (Finkelstein and 
Mooney, 2003; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Minichilli et al., 2012). Only a limited number of 
studies have examined the relationship between board service performance and organizational 
performance, hereby focusing on the financial performance of organizations (Minichilli et al., 
2012; Westphal, 1999; Zattoni et al., 2015). These results however support our assertion of a 
positive relationship between board service performance and financial performance. Further, as 
performance is a multi-dimensional construct, and diverse dimensions deserve attention, 
particularly in a social entrepreneurship context, we also consider social performance (Austin 
et al., 2006; Battilana et al., 2015). Different scholars emphasize the major role boards may play 
in overseeing the creation of social value as well the achievement of financial sustainability 
(Doherty et al., 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014). Through their engagement in the service role, 
boards are able to balance the social and financial goals in giving advice and engaging in 
strategic decision-making. By consequence, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Board service performance is positively related to organizational social 
performance. 
Hypothesis 4: Board service performance is positively related to organizational financial 
performance. 
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4.3. METHODOLOGY 
4.3.1. Research setting and sample 
Although entrepreneurs and organizations aiming for social value creation have always 
existed, studies on social entrepreneurship have only recently emerged (Bacq and Janssen, 
2011). Furthermore, the conceptualization of social entrepreneurship and its development has 
widely differed between the US and Europe, with very few connections until the years 2004-
2005 (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010). In Europe, social enterprises mainly emerged because of 
the persistence of high rates of unemployment during the 1980s and the increasing exclusion of 
vulnerable groups from the labor market and society. Instead of relying only on passive labor 
market policies, authorities started encouraging and developing active labor policies (Defourny 
and Nyssens, 2010). By consequence, social enterprises were set up to reintegrate people in 
society by offering them a job, while simultaneously providing job training and social support 
(Battilana et al., 2015; Pache and Santos, 2010). As a consequence ‘Work integration social 
enterprises’ (WISEs) are the dominant type of social enterprises in Europe (Defourny and 
Nyssens, 2008). This is also the case in Belgium, the country in which this study is conducted. 
However, there is a growing awareness, also among policy makers, that entrepreneurship with 
social aims goes beyond work integration. Indeed, more organizations offering entrepreneurial, 
innovative responses to unsolved social needs have recently been created. These organizations 
often adopt the cooperative legal form (De Cuyper et al., 2015).  
Our sample reflects the social entrepreneurship field in Belgium. In this paper, we study 
social enterprises in Flanders, one of the regions of Belgium. The data are collected as part of 
a research project with support of the Flemish government, which provided the names and 
contact information of Flemish social enterprises. The following organizations were selected in 
their definition of social enterprises: (1) sheltered workshops and social workshops, established 
with the main purpose of reintegrating job seekers who face difficulties to find a job in the 
regular job market because of physical, social or psychological problems, mainly operating in 
packaging, assembly, gardening, recycling, and printing (Battilana et al., 2015), (2) work 
experience enterprises and work care initiatives, offering a job to long-term unemployed people 
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and mainly active in health and social care or the cultural sector (Van Opstal et al., 2009), (3) 
work integration enterprises employing long-term unemployed jobseekers and integrating them 
into their regular staff (Van Opstal et al., 2009) and (4) cooperatives: member-based democratic 
organizations (Spear, 2004). 
In terms of the legal form, which may affect the governance characteristics, these 
organizations are mainly associations and co-operations. Next to the board, there is a CEO or 
management team, depending on the size of the organization. While the board is expected to be 
involved in advice giving and strategic decision making, the CEO and the management team 
will operationalize these strategic decisions in the day-to-day management. Furthermore, the 
board will control the organizational results and will evaluate the CEO and the managers. 
4.3.2. Data collection 
In order to target our research objectives, we combine primary data obtained from an online 
questionnaire as well as secondary data available in the public database Belfirst, which contains 
information on annual accounting information of all Belgian enterprises. Specifically, the 
questionnaire comprised questions on general company information, board dynamics and board 
tasks, as well as on the functioning and (non-financial) performance of the social enterprises. 
The questionnaire was distributed to the CEOs of 812 Flemish social enterprises, using a web-
based tool (Qualtrics). After a period of intensive follow-up (through e-mail and telephone), a 
total of 199 CEOs completed the survey, yielding a response rate of 25%. We removed 3 
responses which were incomplete. Subsequently, the survey data were matched with the 
secondary data obtained from Belfirst. Because of missing financial data in Belfirst, our sample 
size was further reduced to 174 social enterprises. 
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4.3.3. Measures 
Dependent variables   
Board service performance. Board service performance is measured using the 10 item-scale 
developed by Minichilli et al. (2009) and is incorporating the advice giving, strategic 
participation and networking of the board service role (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Huse, 2005). 
Respondents were asked to indicate on a seven-point Likert scale (ranging from 1: strongly 
disagree to 7: strongly agree) to what extent the board fulfills its service role. Specifically, we 
asked respondents to indicate the degree to which the board (1) provides advice on management 
issues; (2) provides advice on financial issues; (3) provides advice on technical issues; (4) 
provides advice on market issues; (5) provides advice on legal issues; (6) provides linkages to 
important external stakeholders; (7) provides the firm with external legitimacy and reputation; 
(8) is involved in promoting strategic initiatives; (9) is involved in taking strategic decisions; 
and (10) is involved in participating in the implementation phase of long-term strategic 
decision-making.  
Social performance. To measure the social performance of social enterprises, we used the 
scale developed by Crucke and Decramer (2016). The scale unites the two primary social goals 
of social enterprises, namely hiring disadvantaged people and engaging in community 
responsibilities. Subsequently, social performance was assessed using a seven-point Likert 
scales through which respondents indicated their agreement with the following statements (1: 
strongly disagree; 7: strongly agree): (1) Our organization actively hires immigrants, (2) Our 
organization actively hires low skilled people, (3) Our organization actively hires elderly people 
(4) Our organization informs the local community by organizing presentations, company 
visits,…, (5) Our organization offers traineeships to students, (6) Our organization offers 
products and/or services to vulnerable people, (7) Our organization addresses unsolved societal 
problems, (8) Our organization pursues partnerships with governments, for profit organizations, 
social economy organizations, labor agencies and other community organizations.  
Financial performance. In line with previous research studying social enterprises (Battilana 
and Lee, 2014), we used a productivity measure to measure the financial performance of social 
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enterprises. Specifically, we calculated the added value per employee, which is considered a 
good measure for the overall financial performance of organizations (Ooghe et al., 2006; 
Sharma, 2014). Information for the calculation of this variable was obtained from the public 
database Belfirst. 
Social and financial performance are both measured in 2014. 
 
Independent variables   
Board external social capital. In order to measure this independent variable, we used the 
measure developed by Kim and Cannella (2008), focusing on the bridging function of the board 
through relationships with different stakeholder groups and different industries. As we study 
external social capital in a social context, we added one item (item 5 below) to their measure, 
in order to also capture the connectivity of the board with important social organizations, which 
is relevant in the context of social enterprises. Specifically, the respondents were asked to 
indicate on an seven-point Likert scale (ranging from 1: strongly disagree to 7: strongly agree), 
the degree to which they agreed with the following statements: (1) The board appoints lead 
outside directors, (2) The board has members who know important suppliers of the 
organization, (3) The board has members who know important customers of the organization, 
(4) The board has members who know important financing institutions, (5) The board has 
members who know important social (nonprofit) organizations (6) The board consists of 
members with diverse industry/ sector backgrounds.   
Board internal social capital. Board internal social capital is measured using four items 
developed by Kim and Cannella (2008). The respondents were asked to indicate on an seven-
point Likert scale (ranging from 1: strongly disagree to 7: strongly agree), the degree to which 
they agreed with the following statements: (1) Directors have good relationships with the CEO, 
(2) Directors possess firm specific knowledge, (3) Directors share beliefs regarding the level of 
effort each individual is expected to put forward a task, (4) Each director is aware of other 
directors’ areas of expertise.  
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Control variables 
We further added control variables at board and firm level that may affect board service 
performance (Minichilli et al., 2012; Zona and Zattoni, 2007). At board level, we control for 
the frequency of board meetings and board size, as the frequency of board meetings is likely to 
affect board service performance (Knockaert and Ucbasaran, 2013). Further, as each board 
member may bring different linkages and resources to the board, also board size is expected to 
influence board service performance (Knockaert and Ucbasaran, 2013; Minichilli et al., 2009). 
At the organizational level, we controlled for age and size of the organization as the need for 
advice and establishing legitimacy by board members may vary between young and old  and 
small and large organizations (Knockaert et al., 2015; Minichilli et al., 2012). Furthermore, the 
performance of organizations is generally considered to be influenced by the age and size of 
organizations (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005), which also holds for social enterprises, (Liu et 
al., 2014; Weerawardena and Mort, 2012). The size of the organization is operationalized as the 
number of employees at the end of 2013, obtained from the public database Belfirst. The 
organization’s age is obtained by using the date of incorporation obtained from Belfirst. 
 
4.4. RESULTS 
4.4.1. Analytical approach 
To test our theoretical model, we applied structural equation modeling (SEM), using the 
Lavaan package developed in the statistical program R (Rosseel, 2012). Because we mainly use 
ordinal variables, we use the robust weighted least squares (WLSMV) estimator (Brown, 2006). 
Furthermore, the sample size requirements of WLSMV are less restrictive than those of other 
estimators. Brown (2006) refers to studies indicating that, using the WLSMV estimator, sample 
sizes of 150 to 200 are sufficient for medium-sized models with 10 to 15 indicators. These 
conditions are similar to the sample size and number of indicators in our study.  
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We followed the commonly used two-stage procedure of Anderson and Gerbing (1988). In 
a first step, we used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to assess the validity of individual 
constructs and of the measurement model. In a second step, we added a structural model to test 
the hypothesized relationships between the variables.  
Following Brown (2006), we report different well-established fit indices to assess both the 
measurement model and the structural model. Although there is no consensus regarding the cut-
off values to evaluate model fit, we rely on some guidelines for the fit indices we use in our 
study. Specifically, we report an acceptable fit between the hypothesized model and the data 
when  χ²/dfis lower than 3, when the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) and 
the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) are below 0.1 and when the Comparative 
Fit Index (CFI) and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) are above 0.9  (Brown, 2006; Hair et al., 
2006; Janssens et al., 2008). 
Although there are no strict guidelines about the desirable amount of data when conducting 
CFA, there is a general agreement that parameter estimates and fit indices are favorably 
influenced by larger sample sizes. Therefore it is argued that sample sizes < 100 should be 
avoided and that sample sizes > 200 are desirable (Bandalos, 1997; Marsh et al., 1998). 
Moreover, several rules of thumb recommend that the number of indicators should be limited 
in the case of small sample sizes. This is particularly challenging in research using lengthy 
ordinal scales (Yang et al., 2010). To deal with these challenges, we used the technique of 
parceling, which has become quite common in SEM (Bandalos, 2002; Little et al., 2002) and 
which is considered acceptable when the goal is to assess the relationships between different 
constructs rather than to examine the structure of the constructs used (Little et al., 2013). A 
parcel can be defined as ‘an aggregate-level indicator comprised of the sum (or average) of two 
or more items, responses or behaviors’ (Little et al., 2002:152). We split all odd and even items 
for the construct used and used their means to calculate two parcels that represent each latent 
variable. Splitting odd and even items into two parcels is a general accepted method for 
parceling (Yang et al., 2010).  
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Common – method variance (CMV) is often reported as a potential problem in research 
using self-reported data, certainly when the measurement for the dependent and independent 
variables are provided by the same respondent (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). As such, the risk 
of CMV is limited when we deal with financial performance, which we obtained from the public 
database Belfirst. However, for the measurement of social performance, we had to rely on self-
reported measures. To account for this issue, we included both ex-ante and ex-post approaches 
in this study (Chang et al., 2010). First, we tried to avoid CMV by assuring respondents about 
the confidentiality and anonymity of their responses, by emphasizing that there are no right or 
wrong answers and by asking to answer the questions as honestly as possible (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). Second, the items about board capital, board service performance and organizational 
social performance were put in separate sections of the survey to create psychological 
separation to avoid common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2012). Third, we applied an ex-post 
statistical procedure as suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2003), which is discussed when reporting 
the results of the measurement model.  
4.4.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 provides the means, standard deviations and correlations for all variables. None of 
the correlations exceeds 0.8, indicating that multicollinearity is not likely to affect our results  
(Gujarati and Porter, 2008). 
 
4.4.3. Measurement model 
In a first step, CFA is used to assess the validity of the individual constructs and of the 
measurement model. The validity of the different constructs (board external social capital, 
board internal social capital, board service performance, social performance)  is assessed 
simultaneously in one CFA. The results reveal a good model fit: χ²/df=  1.27; CFI = 0.96; TLI 
= 0.94; RMSEA = 0.04; SRMR = 0.06). The internal reliability of each construct is evaluated 
by calculating the Cronbach’s alpha. Alpha’s of  0.72 for board external social capital, 0.72 for 
board internal social capital, 0.91 for board service performance, and 0.67 for social 
performance indicate that the scales are internally consistent (Hair et al., 2006). 
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Furthermore, we tested if common method variance was not affecting our results by 
conducting the unmeasured latent method construct (ULMC) technique as outlined by 
Richardson et al. (2009) and Facteau et al. (1995). This technique involves the analyses of four 
alternative measurement models. The results are reported in Table 4.2.  
Model 1 is a null measurement model. In this model no factors underlie the data. In model 
2, one factor explains the data. Model 3 is the measurement model used in this study. Finally, 
model 4 adds a single uncorrelated method factor to model 3. If a method factor exists, model 
2 should fit the data significantly better than model 1, and model 4 should fit the data 
significantly better than model 3.  
First, the results of model 1 and model 2 are compared. The results in Table 4.2 reveal that 
model 2 provides a significantly better fit for the data than model 1, but fits the data very poorly. 
The second comparison involves model 3 and 4. The results of model 3 reveal a good fit. Model 
4 does not provide a significantly better fit to the data. These results indicate that CMV is not a 
concern in this study. 
 
Table 4.2: Results of the ULMC procedure for assessing common method variance 
Model Chi-Square df CFI TLI RMSEA 
1 507.547*** 91    
2 344.268*** 77 0.358 0.242 0.133 
3 87.902*** 69 0.955 0.940 0.037 
4 92,253*** 51 0.960 0.929 0.064 
 
4.4.4. Structural Model 
The structural model is used to test the hypothesized relationships between the latent 
variables and is presented in Figure 4.1. 
All goodness of fit indices indicate a good fit of the model with the data: χ²/df=  1.23; CFI = 
0.95; TLI = 0.93; RMSEA = 0.04; SRMR = 0.07. The standardized path coefficients show that 
board external social (0.24, p < 0.05) as well as board internal social capital (0.74, p<0.001) 
have a significant positive effect on board service performance, supporting Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2. The results indicate that the effect of board internal capital on board service 
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performance is bigger than the effect of board external capital. The size of the effect is such 
that an increase of internal social capital from mean to mean plus 1 standard deviation results 
in a 17% increase of board service performance, while an increase of external social capital 
from mean to mean plus 1 standard deviation results in a 6% increase of board service 
performance. In addition, board service performance (0.35, p<0.01) is significantly positively 
related to social performance, supporting hypothesis 3. An increase of board service 
performance from mean to mean plus 1 standard deviation results in a 26% increase of social 
performance. Hypothesis 4 is not supported as we find a coefficient which is not statistically 
significant.  
 
Figure 4.1: The Structural model 
 
 
Note. * p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Goodness of fit indices are c2/df =  1.23; CFI = 0.95; 
TLI = 0.93; RMSEA = 0.04; SRMR = 0.07.  
Standardized path coefficients are reported. S.E. values in parentheses. 
The impact of control variables is not depicted. The number of board meetings showed a 
positive effect on board service performance (0.236*), while board size has a negative effect 
on board service performance (-0.298**). The age of the organization has a positive effect on 
financial performance (0.290**), while the size of the organization has a negative effect on 
financial performance (-0.312***).  
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Some of the control variables also point to significant additional relationships. The number 
of board meetings has a positive effect on board service performance (0.236, p<0.05), while 
board size has a negative effect on board service performance (-0.298, p<0.01). The age of the 
organization has a positive effect on financial performance (0.290, p <0.01), while the size of 
the organization has a negative effect on financial performance (-0.312, p < 0.001).  
4.4.5. Alternative models 
As we did not find a statistically significant relationship between board service performance 
and financial performance and as financial performance could be assessed using alternative 
indicators, we wanted to exclude that our results are influenced by our choice of financial 
performance indicator. We therefore estimated three alternative models using return-on-assets, 
cash flow and solvency as measures for financial performance. The results are in line with the 
results of our structural model, revealing similar fit indices and path coefficients, and again 
finding support for hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 and not for hypothesis 4. 
4.5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In the social entrepreneurship literature, a consensus is emerging that the board of directors 
is of major importance to deal with the specific tensions social enterprises, as hybrid 
organizations, face (Doherty et al., 2014). Boards have the ultimate responsibility to balance 
the social and financial goals in decision-making to ensure financial viability as well as the 
achievement of the social mission (Cornforth, 2014). Multi-stakeholder dialog and stakeholder 
involvement are often discussed as typical governance characteristics of social enterprises 
(Huybrechts et al., 2014). Social enterprises lack a dominant stakeholder, instead they are 
accountable to multiple principal stakeholders with diverging interest, such as the beneficiaries 
of the social mission, clients and governments (Ebrahim et al., 2014). Through stakeholder 
involvement in social enterprise governance, social enterprises are expected to be better able to 
deal with the diverging expectations of stakeholders. Furthermore, such involvement is in line 
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with the democratic and participatory values that typify social enterprises (Pestoff and Hulgård, 
2015). 
In this paper, we take a resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and social capital 
perspective (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998) to study the linkages between the board and the 
external environment. More specifically, we study linkages between the social enterprise and 
different stakeholder groups in the external environment, through linkages of individual board 
members with stakeholders (Tian et al., 2011). As such, we study how board external social 
capital is instrumental in helping boards to fulfill their service role. Furthermore, as it is 
commonly accepted that boards have a stronger role to play in the service role if they function 
as teams (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003), we also study board internal social capital, referring 
to internal linkages within the organization, mainly between board members (Stevenson and 
Radin, 2009).  
The results of our study of boards in Flemish social enterprises indicate that board external 
social capital as well as board internal social capital are positively related to board service 
performance. Although it is important for boards in social enterprises to be connected with 
multiple stakeholder groups in the external environment, our study reveals that also the internal 
connections and good relationships between board members are of major importance. These 
findings are in line with corporate governance literature emphasizing the importance of internal 
board dynamics in general (Hambrick et al., 2008; Huse et al., 2011) and the cohesiveness 
within the board in particular (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Westphal, 1999). The importance 
of internal social capital is also in line with the warnings for potential negative aspects of multi-
stakeholder involvement in governance mechanisms. Taking in consideration that the diverging 
expectations of multiple stakeholders may result in conflict, slower decision making within the 
board (Pache and Santos, 2010) and even give rise to faultline emergence (Crucke and 
Knockaert, 2016), our results point to board internal social capital as a potential alleviator of 
such concerns.  
Our study further analyzes how the engagement of the board in its service role is related to 
organizational outcomes. There is a consensus that, when assessing the performance of social 
143 
 
enterprises, financial as well as social performance should be taken in consideration (Austin et 
al., 2006). The results of our study indicate that board service performance is positively related 
to the social performance of social enterprises. However, we did not find support for a positive 
relationship between board service performance and financial performance. This is line with 
the results of the study by Coombes et al. (2011), who studied the impact of behavioral aspects 
of social enterprise boards on entrepreneurial orientation and subsequently on financial and 
social performance. A possible explanation can be found in the paper of Pache and Santos 
(2013), studying how social enterprises deal internally with the conflicting demands they are 
exposed to. The authors discuss one particular pattern of managing internal tensions, that they 
refer to as ‘Trojan horse’. It means that actors related to commercial goals, choose to enact 
practices sustaining the social goals to compensate for the lack of legitimacy in the social 
enterprise context because of the affiliation with commercially oriented organizations. 
Although the context in the study of Pache and Santos (2013) is different as they study the 
affiliations and connections of founders of social enterprises, we believe that this mechanism 
may possibly also explain the extent to which board member behavior in the service role relates 
to organizational performance.  
Our study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, it contributes to the social 
entrepreneurship literature, which has focused on the importance of the board in directors in 
dealing with the particular challenges social enterprises face (Mair et al., 2015). Furthermore, 
social enterprise scholars have emphasized the involvement of stakeholders in social enterprise 
governance in line with the democratic and participatory values social enterprise subscribe 
(Huybrechts et al., 2014; Pestoff and Hulgård, 2015). Our study indicates the importance of 
boards being connected with multiple external stakeholders, resulting in better advice giving 
and strategic decision making. Our results however also emphasize the importance of the 
relations and linkages between board members. As such, our study also contributes to the 
corporate governance literature where calls are made to gain deeper insights into board 
dynamics and board cohesiveness (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Huse et al., 2011). Our study 
further contributes by analyzing how board characteristics impact board service performance 
and subsequent organizational performance. While most studies either focus on the link 
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between board characteristics and board task performance, or on the relationship between board 
service performance and organizational performance, to our knowledge, only few studies have 
provided a more holistic picture by uniting these elements (Zattoni et al., 2015). In doing so, 
our study also acknowledges that performance is a multi-dimensional construct, and unites 
social and financial performance in one research design.  
Our study also has implications for practitioners as our results reveal the major importance 
of the linkages between board members. This may be challenging as board members who are 
connected to specific stakeholder groups, may have different visions about the decisions the 
board should take, which may result in conflict and slower decision-making.  
Our study also has some limitations, which have implications for the interpretations of our 
findings and for future research. First, our study uses a cross-sectional design. While we built 
our arguments and the directions of these arguments in line with social capital theory and the 
corporate governance literature, we are thus unable to make strong claims on the direction of 
the relationships. Longitudinal studies may provide additional insights in how board capital 
contributes to board performance and subsequent organizational performance (Machold and 
Farquhar, 2013). Additionally, qualitative studies may contribute in gaining additional insights 
in how social capital shapes board dynamics and board decisions (Sundaramurthy et al., 2014). 
Second, our study only focuses on the service role on the board. Although we are convinced 
that the service role is relevant to study in this context, studying the control function as well 
may offer additional insights. In particular, when analyzing the relationship between board 
performance and organizational performance, it might be interesting to study the relationship 
between the engagement of the board in its control function and financial as well as social 
performance. It could be that board performance is related to financial performance through the 
engagement in its control function, which we were not able to test with the applied structural 
model in this paper. In the same vein, additional relationships could be studied, such as the ones 
between social and financial performance and between social capital and performance directly. 
Third, our study was executed in a particular context, namely that of Flemish social enterprises. 
While we do not have reasons to believe that our choice of context is likely to affect our results, 
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future research could fruitfully study the relationship between board capital, board service 
performance and organizational performance in other contexts, where other definitions of social 
entrepreneurship apply (e.g. the US), or where corporate governance laws differ. Finally, while 
our study specifically points to the importance of board internal social capital for board service 
performance, it does not study the antecedents of such internal social capital. Future research 
could as such purposefully study the relationship between board member characteristics (e.g. 
human capital), board characteristics (e.g. board cohesion), board evaluation and development 
practices (Gill et al., 2005; Kiel and Nicholson, 2005), board chair characteristics (e.g. 
leadership and communication style) (Harrison and Murray, 2012), and interaction patterns in 
building such social capital.  
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5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
The main objective of this dissertation was to gain insight in how social enterprises, as 
multiple goal and multiple stakeholder organizations, deal with the governance challenges they 
face. To reach this objective, we relied on qualitative and quantitative research methods, 
involving CEOs and board members of social enterprises as well as experts in the field of social 
entrepreneurship. Furthermore, a mixture of statistical analyses was used, including regression 
based path analysis, exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation 
modeling. This final chapter summarizes the main findings of the three studies, outlines the key 
academic contributions, highlights the implications for practitioners and suggests avenues for 
further research. 
 
5.1. MAIN FINDINGS 
The first study focused on the effects of stakeholder representation in the board of directors 
of social enterprises. In the literature, positive as well as negative effects of stakeholder 
representation are referred to. We build on faultline theory to gain insight in the conditions 
under which subgroups emerge, subsequently having an negative impact on board performance. 
Our results, obtained by using regression based path analysis, are based on the responses of 265 
board members and 79 CEOs of 79 Flemish work integration social enterprises. We found that, 
if faultlines are strong because of the alignment of stakeholder representation with age and 
gender, this is associated with lower levels of board service performance. Furthermore, our 
results reveal that this relationship is mediated by board task conflict. Finally, we also found 
that the negative impact of faultline strength on task conflict is mitigated, if the board members’ 
visions on the organization’s goals converge. As such, the results of our research reveal the 
importance of taking into account possible negative implications of stakeholder representation, 
as well as contingencies which may mitigate the impact of subgroup emergence.  
In the second  study, we developed an assessment tool for the non-financial performance of 
social enterprises. Evaluating the non-financial performance may support social enterprises in 
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balancing the dual objectives of creating social and financial value. Furthermore, by externally 
reporting the non-financial performance, social enterprises respond to the increasing demands 
of accountability towards multiple stakeholder groups. Using focus groups, a Delphi panel and 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, we identified 5 performance domains and 21 
performance indicators. In addition, we developed a questionnaire that social enterprises can 
use as a self-assessment tool. 
In the third study, we analyzed how board external and internal social capital support boards 
of social enterprises in fulfilling their service role. The results, based on a sample of 196 
Flemish social enterprises, indicate that board external social capital as well as board internal 
social capital are positively related to board service performance. These results reveal that, 
while being connected with multiple stakeholder groups in the external environment is 
important, good relationships between board members matter more as they enable the board to 
function as a team. In this study, we further examined how the engagement of the board in its 
service role is related to organizational performance, taking into consideration financial as well 
as social performance. While our results reveal a positive relationship between board service 
performance and social performance, we did not find a significant relationship between board 
service performance and financial performance. 
 
5.2. ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation primarily makes a number of contributions to the (social) entrepreneurship 
and corporate governance literature. 
Our research contributes to the (social) entrepreneurship literature by studying how social 
enterprises can deal with the governance challenges they face. First, as multi-stakeholder 
organizations and in line with their democratic and participatory values, the involvement of 
stakeholders in social enterprise governance is claimed to be an important characteristic of 
social enterprises (Huybrechts et al., 2014; Spear, 2004). More specifically, the board of 
directors is considered to play a major role in balancing the social and financial goals of the 
organization and in establishing legitimacy in the external environment by providing 
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accountability to multiple external stakeholder groups (Battilana and Lee, 2014; Doherty et al., 
2014). However, this is mainly discussed in theoretical terms (Campi et al., 2006). Empirical 
research focusing on the role of governance and the board of directors in social enterprises is 
still limited (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Mair et al., 2015), which is the first research gap we address. 
Specifically, the first study provides insight in how stakeholder representation in the board 
may negatively affect the involvement of the board in its service role through the emergence of 
subgroups. As such, the first study points to the potentially nefarious implications of 
stakeholder representation. Furthermore, the results of the first and third study indicate the 
importance of board cohesiveness. In the first study, we found that, having a shared vision on 
the organizational goals, mitigate the positive relationship between faultline strength and task 
conflict. In the same vein, the third study emphasizes the importance of the relations and 
linkages between board members. These findings are important as they demonstrate that, in 
order to capture the positive effects of stakeholder involvement, the organization has to pay 
attention to the cohesiveness between board members and if necessary, take efforts to 
strengthen the relationships between board members. 
Second, our research contributes to the social entrepreneurship literature by developing an 
assessment tool for the non-financial performance of social enterprises. While there is a 
consensus that, by virtue of the dual mission of social enterprises, social and financial 
performance should be measured and reported, the assessment of the social performance still 
lacks standardization and comparability (Arena et al., 2015; Ebrahim and Rangan, 2014). Our 
assessment tool takes in consideration that performance measurement can serve different 
purposes (Grieco et al., 2014). Specifically, we distinguish between a set of indicators, that can 
be used for external reporting and an internal assessment  instrument, supporting organizations 
in decision-making. Additionally, the assessment tool is developed in close cooperation with 
social enterprises and should be suitable for a broad range of social enterprises. 
Finally, given its largely quantitative approach, our study responds to calls for studies in the 
domain to move beyond case studies, and to use larger datasets (Certo and Miller, 2008; Dacin 
et al., 2011; Short et al., 2009) 
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Our study also contributes to the corporate governance literature. First, much of the corporate 
governance literature takes an agency theory perspective when studying the role of boards 
(Daily et al., 2003). In this dissertation, we answer to the calls made to use other theoretical 
perspectives (Hambrick et al., 2008; Huse et al., 2011). Given the specific internal and external 
challenges social enterprises face, we elaborate on the importance of boards engaging in their 
service role (Knockaert and Ucbasaran, 2013; Westphal and Zajac, 2013). Furthermore, we take 
an overarching view by analyzing, in the same study, the relationship between board 
characteristics and board service performance and subsequently between board service 
performance and organizational outcomes (Zattoni et al., 2015). Simultaneously, we 
acknowledge that organizational performance is multi-dimensional and consider social and 
financial performance in one research design. 
Second, we also contribute to the corporate governance literature by answering the calls to 
gain deeper insights into board dynamics and board cohesiveness (Westphal and Zajac, 2013). 
By studying interpersonal relationships between board members, we go beyond merely 
studying board demographics or ‘the usual suspects’ in explaining board service performance 
(Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Ostrower and Stone, 2010). We use several theoretical 
frameworks to gain insight in the board dynamics between board members. In the first study, 
we build on faultline theory, which is considered a promising theoretical framework to study 
subgroup formation in teams, but which has received only limited attention in governance 
research (Kaczmarek et al., 2012; Tuggle et al., 2010; Veltrop et al., 2015). Additionally, we 
rely on conflict theory to gain insight in how the emergence of faultlines impact board service 
performance (De Dreu and Weingart, 2003). In the third study, we use a social capital 
perspective to study the internal linkages between board members (Kim and Cannella, 2008).  
In parallel, the papers of this dissertation integrate other theoretical lenses and concepts 
while studying governance in social enterprises. By consequence, this study has contributed to 
a number of adjacent fields, as we elaborate on in what follows.  
The first study contributes to faultline theory by introducing the representation of 
stakeholder groups as an additional relevant social category characteristic. While faultline 
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research has mainly focused on age, gender and ethnicity, we demonstrate that, as board 
members quickly identify which stakeholder groups other board members represent, 
stakeholder representation may be a characteristic giving rise to subgroup formation and 
faultline emergence. Next to our implications for faultline research, our first study also enriches 
conflict theory. The effects of task conflict on group performance are widely studied, revealing 
inconclusive results (De Dreu and Weingart, 2003; de Wit et al., 2012; DeChurch et al., 2013; 
O'Neill et al., 2013). We contribute to the conflict literature, by studying the impact of  task 
conflict in a context where team members have vested interests because of the different 
stakeholder groups they represent. Our results support the arguments made by De Dreu (2008) 
and Loughry and Amason (2014), warning for the risk of ‘political activity’ by team members 
in the case of vested interests and incompatible goals, negatively influencing team performance. 
Finally, we also add to the literature on stakeholder democracy and stakeholder participation, 
that until now has mainly focused on workplace democracy (Timming, 2015). While it is 
generally accepted that appointing stakeholder representatives to the board is one of the best 
ways to involve stakeholders in decision-making, this has only received limited attention in 
empirical research. 
 
5.3. PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
In this section, we discuss the implications of the dissertation for those practitioners which 
are likely to benefit the most from our study, namely social enterprises and policy makers. We 
make a distinction between, on the one hand, implications related to board composition and 
board functioning and on the other hand, implications related to performance measurement in 
social enterprises 
 
5.3.1. Practical contributions concerning board composition and board functioning 
First, this doctoral research calls for increased attention into the formation of the board in 
social enterprises. Stakeholder involvement in social enterprise governance is, given the 
161 
 
democratic and participatory values of social enterprises, considered as a good practice that 
yields several advantages. However, our research points to the potential nefarious effects of 
stakeholder representation in the board. By consequence, it is important that CEOs and board 
chairs take these potential drawbacks into consideration when appointing board members. 
Specifically, our study reveals the importance of good relationships between board members as 
well as the importance of having a shared vision on what the goals of the organization are, in 
mitigating the potentially negative effects of stakeholder involvement. Although this was not 
the focus of our research, we expect, in line with board leadership research (Harrison et al., 
2013), that board chairs may play an important role in establishing cohesiveness and good 
interpersonal relationships within the board. Also board development practices, such as team 
building and board evaluations, may contribute to boards functioning as a team (Gill et al., 
2005; Kiel and Nicholson, 2005). Based on these practical implications, we may formulate 
some guidelines for social enterprises regarding board functioning and composition. These 
guidelines may help the board in fulfilling its tasks and, as such, in contributing to the 
organizational performance. Furthermore, professionalization of the board may enhance the 
reputation of the social enterprise, for instance because this will favor the quality of the  external 
communication, as well as the partnerships with external stakeholders. 
Guideline 1: Goals and strategy of the social enterprise 
Given the risk of mission drift within social enterprises and the importance for board 
functioning of having a shared vision within the board, clarifying the goals of the social 
enterprise is crucial. Board can play an important role in setting the goals of the organization 
and the strategies to realize these goals, in cooperation with the CEO (or management team) 
while taking into consideration diverse stakeholder demands (guideline 2). However, this 
implies that boards are engaged and able to discuss without conflict paralyzing decision making 
(guideline 4). Furthermore, it is important that the goals and strategies agreed upon are 
evaluated on a regular base and that it is checked whether decisions taken are in line with these 
goals and strategies. 
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Guideline 2: Stakeholder engagement 
Stakeholder involvement is one of the fundamental principles of many social enterprises.  
Moreover, our results emphasize the importance of stakeholder involvement in decision 
making, in turn favoring organizational performance. Boards can help to engage effectively 
with stakeholders by identifying key stakeholders and evaluating stakeholder relations. Ways 
to optimize stakeholder involvement can be discussed and implemented. A suggestion here is 
to evaluate the role of the general assembly. As discussed in the introduction, in many 
associations, the general assembly is very similar to the board, minimizing its potential function 
as an important sounding board, representing diverse stakeholder expectations. In the same 
vein, it is a challenge for co-operatives to enhance the participation of its members in the general 
assembly.  
Guideline 3: Board composition 
There is no doubt that board composition is an important issue in relationship to the ability 
and the willingness of the board to fulfill its tasks properly. Therefore, board composition 
should be discussed and evaluated on a regular base.  
Concerning the ability of the board, a suggestion is to identify the necessary skills, expertise 
and stakeholder relations that should be available within the board. Our results reveal the risk 
of subgroup formation and conflict between stakeholder representatives. A possible way to deal 
with this, is appointing board members with necessary expertise (for instance financial or legal 
expertise), who are not related to a specific stakeholder group and can act as a ‘neutral’ board 
member, possibly mitigating of even preventing harmful types of conflict within the board.  
Concerning the willingness of the board to fulfill its tasks, it is important to appoint engaged 
board members, willing to participate actively within the board. We have to admit that this 
might be challenging as board members in social enterprises are generally not compensated. 
Another concern is the size of the board within social enterprises as board size may influence 
its effectiveness. A larger board does not necessarily imply a more effective board as it may 
hinder the ability to come to a consensus and result in slower decision making. In our dataset, 
there are boards with up to 26 board members. In such large boards, the effectiveness should 
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be evaluated and possible solutions (such as working with subcommittees) should be taken in 
consideration. 
Guideline 4: Board functioning 
Our results indicate the importance of good relationships between board members, as well 
as the risk and negative consequences of conflict within the board. We expect that the chair of 
the board, or more generally, board leadership is important in order to have a constructive 
debate within the board, dealing effectively within dissent. As already mentioned earlier, board 
evaluations and board development also may improve board functioning, but we expect that, in 
order to reach this, board leadership also is a necessary condition. 
 
5.3.2. Practical contributions concerning performance measurement in social 
enterprises 
Second, the assessment tool developed in the second study, may support social enterprises 
in assessing their non-financial performance. We provide social enterprises with an internal 
self-assessment tool. Ideally, the assessment tool is completed by diverse employees to gather 
a broad range of opinions about the non-financial performance of the organization. These 
diverse opinions may give rise to internal discussion related to the safeguarding of the dual 
mission of the organization. The set of the selected indicators can be used as a guideline to 
report the non-financial performance.  This is important as there is an increasing demand for 
accountability towards different stakeholders. 
Our research also has implications for policy makers. The assessment tool for the non-
financial performance of social enterprises was developed at the request of the Flemish 
government as part of the Policy Research Centre Work and Social Economy. The aim of 
Flemish policy makers is that social enterprises, as they receive subsidies from the Flemish 
government for hiring disadvantaged people, have to report their non-financial performance. 
As such, the set of indicators can be used by the Flemish government supporting its subsidy 
regime for social enterprises. 
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It is important to notice that we do not opt for a strict standardization of non-financial 
performance evaluation as our assessment tool does not imply the calculation of a single score 
to assess the non-financial performance of social enterprises. Given the diversity of social 
enterprises, we are convinced it is extremely difficult to develop a valid scale. The 
standardization is limited to identifying a relevant set of performance indicators, encouraging 
social enterprises to demonstrate their performance with regard to these indicators. In order to 
enhance reporting quality and the comparability between social enterprises, it is suggested to 
report using generally accepted reporting guidelines. The guidelines developed by the GRI are 
a good example of such reporting guidelines. 
5.4. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This dissertation has explored a topic that has only received limited attention within the field 
of social entrepreneurship. While the results of this dissertation provide new insights into the 
governance of social enterprises, our research also has limitations, which result into 
implications for future research. 
First, the studies in this dissertation use a cross-sectional design. By consequence, we are 
unable to identify causal relationships. Longitudinal studies may provide additional insights 
into causal relationships between stakeholder involvement and board performance. More 
specifically, it would be interesting to study how stakeholder representation gives rise to 
subgroup formation and faultline emergence and how efforts to enhance the cohesiveness of 
the board mitigate these negative effects of stakeholder representation. An interesting approach 
for future research is looking into how the presence of board members who share characteristics 
with different subgroup may influence subgroup formation and board performance. Mäs et al. 
(2013) demonstrate how the so-called ‘crisscrossing actors’, sharing demographic attributes 
with several subgroups, will prevent polarization in the long run. Although not explored in their 
paper, they aspect that the presence of ‘crisscrossing opinions’ could have a similar integrative 
effect. In the case of stakeholder representation, this implies that it might be interesting to 
investigate the impact of ‘neutral’ board members who may share opinions with several 
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stakeholder groups and are able to communicate arguments towards different subgroups of 
stakeholder representatives.  The use of qualitative or observational research could be 
interesting to further uncover the underlying board mechanisms (Beck, 2014; Hough et al., 
2014).  However, we also have to point to the difficulty of gathering qualitative data. In 
particular, performing observational research is challenging as it is difficult to receive the 
permission to attend board meetings (Bezemer et al., 2014). 
A second limitation is situated in the generalizability of the results to other populations. Our 
research was performed in a particular context, namely that of Flemish social enterprises. Future 
studies could analyze the extent to which our findings hold in other institutional contexts, which 
alter the nature of social enterprises, or the legislation (for instance related to corporate 
governance) which affect these enterprises. This may be particularly relevant for the 
relationships between board characteristics, board performance and subsequent organizational 
performance, as examined in study 1 and 3. At the same time, it would also be interesting to 
test the validity of the developed assessment tool in other contexts. 
Third, while our research reveals the importance of good interpersonal relationships within 
the board, it does not study the antecedents of board cohesion. Future research could study 
board leadership, board development practices and board evaluations in relationship to board 
cohesion and board dynamics. 
Fourth, in this dissertation we did not study new established entrepreneurial social ventures. 
As governance research reveals that governance and board characteristics are a reflection of the 
organization’s life cycle (Lynall et al., 2003), it might be interesting to study how these young 
organizations deal with the governance challenges social enterprise face and how the 
governance of these social enterprises evolves over time. Additionally, it might also be 
interesting to study whether these new established social enterprises rely on the board to gather 
the necessary advice and counsel, or whether other advisors are in place to support these social 
entrepreneurs. 
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